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ABSTRACT
This thesis discusses the suitability of industries to
non-metropolitan communities by analyzing the case of two devel-
opment towns in Israel, Yerucham and Dimona.
- A model is constructed to describe the dynamics of the
current crisis in the industrial base of these communities. The
model depicts the interrelationships and interactions among the
three major components participating in the situation: the com-
munity, the industry, and the governmental policies.
It is found that the main cause for the weakness of the
economic base of the towns is the deterioration in the "suitabil-
ity" between the existing local plants and the changing charac-
teristics of the communities' labor force. It is suggested that
due to the government's policies the "island phenomenon"--the
existence of communities with the characteristics of developing
countries within the context of a developed society--was rein-
forced.
Historically, the situation has evolved as a result of an
unequal development of the industrial sector and the communities,
while the government which was heavily involved in the initial
stages of development has gradually abandoned its involvement.
In the last section of the thesis some suggestions for
making industries more suitable for non-metropolitan communities
are given.
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INTRODUCTION
Israel has launched, vigourously at times, a
population dispersal policy aiming to redistribute the
population from the metropolitan urban centers along the
coast to the southern and northern parts of the country.
Development towns were used as the primary mechanism for
-pursuing the population dispersion goal.
The extent to which the development towns have
succeeded or failed has been the focal issue studied in the
late 1960s and at the beginning of the 1970s (Spiegel, 1966;
Berler, 1970; Litchfield, 1971; Shachar, 1971). Various
indicators have been used to evaluate the extent to which
they have been successful, -concentrating mainly on
statistical measures of population movement. Based on these
studies and others, the policy to disperse the population
has been considered to be quite successful even though it
did not live up to the expectations and planned objectives
(Zilberberg, 1973).
For the last few years, two of the southern
development towns, Yerucham and to a lesser extent Dimona,
as well as several other development towns have begun facing
increasingly difficult circumstances. The main evidence for
1
2the stage of crisis has been the increasing rate of
emigration especially among the young adults and the
discharged soldiers. Politicians, bureaucrats and public
figures on the local and the national level, as well as the
residents of these communities, pointed to the employment
area as the main source of dissatisfaction and hence
emigration. In this area a paradoxical phenomenon has
surfaced: an increasing rate of unemployment on one hand,
and a severe shortage of needed workers in the industrial
plants on the other hand, especially in plants belonging to
the group of "first generation" plants (established during
the late 1950s and the early 1960s). These plants have
filled the job vacancies with Arab labor-force from the
administered territries--the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
The plants have also faced operational and financial
problems, stemming from competition in the local and
especially the export markets.
Various theories have been used throughout this
study to accoount for the situation. Location theory, for
example, (Hoover, 1948; Isard 1956; Klaassen, 1967; Carlton,
1979 and many others) helped in understanding why some
plants have failed--due to inadequate selection of the
product or because of ignoring the disadvantageous location
of the towns. Studies of the selection process of
appropriate technologies (Eckaus, 1977; Anderson, 1979;
Shumacher, 1970; and others) contributed to the
3understanding of the misuse of technology in several plants
and its effects on the employees. These theories, coupled
with studies conducted so far on the issue of
industrialization of development towns in Israel (Kipnis,
1976; Gradus and Krakover, 1977; Toren, 1979; Gradus and
Einy, 1970; Bar-El et al., 1981) did not fully account for
the evolution of the situation and its effects on the
community.
The objective of the study was to explore the
meaning of "suitable industries for non-metropolitan
communities" in a dynamic context--over time. The study
strived to construct an operating definition for
"suitability" which would help in understanding and
evaluating undergoing industrialization processes as well as
creating a planning tool for designing and implementing
industrialization policies.
The research questions analyzed by this study were:
1. What were the historical causes of the weakness of
the industrial base of the development towns, and why
has the industrial base deteriorated over the last
several years?
2. What have been the effects of the weak industrial
base on the communities, over the years?
The concept of the "island phenomenon" was suggested
as a framework for understanding the weak economic and
social base of the non-metropolitan industrial towns.
4It was hypothesized that the development towns have
been "islands"--possessing characteristics of developing
countries, within the context of the developed society of
Israel. The roots of the problems lie in the relative
success of the non-metropolitan industrial towns compared to
the other towns and to the rest of the country. In this
relative progress measured by the level of education,
income, size of apartment per person, rate of motorization
and other indicators of the standard of living, one may find
the roots of the problematic situation.
A model was constructed to describe the development
of the situation. The model depicted the interrelationships
and interactions among the three major components
participating in the situation: the community (in the
development town), the industry and the governmental
policies.
The study was based mainly on extensive interviews
with politicians, policy makers, and administrators on the
local, regional and national levels, and with residents in
both towns. In the industrial area, interviews were
conducted with entrepreneurs, managers and heads of
personnel departments in the local and regional plants, as
well as with employees and their representatives. In
addition, published material--especially statistical
data--was analyzed.
5The two development towns of Yerucham and Dimona,
were selected for the detailed case-studies due to three
main reasons:
1. Both towns are physically remote from the
metropolitan areas and thus serve the population
dispersal goal, more than other development towns
which are located closer to the central parts of the
country. In this way, the study captured the
"distance" issue in industrialization of development
areas.
2. Both were initially established as industrial-based
towns. Many of the other development towns were
initially established to be the service centers for
the rural settlements in their respective regions.
However, adequate links between the new towns and the
already existing and self-sufficient infrastructure
built up among the collective villages were not
established, and as a result, they have been turned
later into industrial towns.
3. These towns represent very different rates of
success. Dimona has been considered for a long time
a successful development town, while Yerucham,
inspite of the physical proximity to Dimona, has
encountered difficulties since its establishment.
Both were facing difficulties and problems at the
time of the study which were shared, to various
6degrees by some other non-metropolitan industrial
towns.
The dissertation contains eight chapters, brief
summaries of these chapters are:
Chapter I: Israel--The History of the Population
Dispersal Policy and the Establishment of the Development
Towns. This chapter surveys the history of the population
dispersal policy in Israel, with a special emphasis on the
validity and justification of the goal. The role of the
development towns in implementing this policy is described.
Chapter II: Literature Review. This chapter examines
the various theories and studies relevant to this area of
research. It analyzes the ways the literature deals with
the subject and points mainly to its weaknesses in giving a
comprehensive explanation to the whole pheonomenon.
Chapter III: The Socioeconomic Development of Yerucham
and Dimona. Description of the historical development of
the two towns, in the context of the national development.
A special attention is given to social, demographic and
educational development.
Chapter IV: Description of the Current Situation of
the Development Towns--The "Island Phenomenon." The "island
phenomenon" is defined as a situation in which the community
in a development town has characteristics of developing
societies in the midst of a country with characteristics of
7well-developed societies. It is hypothesized that this
phenomenon has a strong impact on the community, its labor
force and their behaviour. The phenomenon is examined from
three angles:
1. The socioeconomic perspective.
2. The industrial ,and employment perspective.
3. The subjective perception of the phenomenon by the
residents of the towns and by outsiders.
Chapter V: The Industrial Structure of Yerucham,
Dimona and the Region. A detailed description of the-plants
in the communities and the region.
Chapter VI: The Suitability Model. Based on
theoretical literature and the empirical data collected
throughout this study a model is constructed which can help
in evaluating the undergoing industrialization process as
well as creating a planning tool for designing and
implementing industrialization policies. This chapter
consists of two parts:
1. The theoretical background for the model.
2. The model
Chapter VII: Analysis and Generalization of the Case
Studies. This chapter analyzes the data collected by
correlating the key events in the relevant period 1955-1980,
with the model.
Chapter VIII: Conclusions and Recommendations. This
chapter summarizes the study by concentrating on three major
subjects:
81. The historical explanation of the development of the
"island phenomenon" and its effects.
2. Policy implications to prevent similar situations and
suggested solutions.
3. Subjects for further research.
CHAPTER I
ISRAEL--THE HISTORY OF THE POPULATION DISPERSAL
POLICY, AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE
DEVELOPMENT TOWNS
Most of the world countries, regardless of their
location, population structure and regime, are struggling in
one way or another with policies affecting the spatial
distribution of their population. Every public policy with
some territorial component (from location of industrial
plant to implementation of national health plan) means
directing resources and affecting the physical structure of
the nation, in a way whose impact cannot always be
predicted.
The issues and problems connected with the
physical-national policies are summarized under three
headings: size, growth and decline (Alonso, 1972). The
problems of size include: congestion, pollution, access to
open land and social and psychological problems such as
personal alienation. At the lower end of the scale of size
there are the problems of lack of resources, lack of
adaptability to change, a narrowed range of social and
economic choices and increasing dependency. The problems of
growth, as distinct from those of excessive size, include
governmental cash-flow crisis in paying for additions to the
9
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urban plant out of proporation to the existing population
base; the disruption of traffic and land-use arising from
the successive installation of new major urban elements, and
the lose of such valued features as agricultural landscapes.
There are also the problems of population decline, found in
the central cities of ,metropolitan areas and in many smaller
communities. They include the depreciation of existing
capital stock and the welfare problems of a population which
is increasingly composed of the old, the uneducated and the
very young.
The instruments used for implementing the policy
range from enforcing people to move to the areas with
national priorities, through regulations and laws on the
national and local level to economic incentives and the
investment of resources in the developed areas. The extent
to which these instruments are used depends upon the social,
economic and political background of the country and the
degree of government intervention.
Among the various available policies to attack these
problems, population dispersal policy is considered to be
the policy which has the strongest impact on the spatial
distribution of the population in order to solve these
problems. But various researches on popuation dispersal
policies in developed countries have found that effective
population dispersion has been achieved in countries like
Sweden and France, which have explicit policies to disperse
11
the population, as well as in countries in which the
governmental efforts have been minimal like Japan and the
U.S.A. (Sundquist, 1975). In Britain, in which governmental
policies are extensive, goals have been achieved to a lesser
degree.
Population dispersal policy has various objectives;
the central one is regional equality or bridging the gaps
between regions. Other objectives are: national security,
territorial presence, environmental protection and more.
In all cases it is believed that ". . . population
distribution is the territorial aspect of a highly connected
and interdependent social system, and that local variations
in welfare and productivity are also aspects of this larger
system reflected upon geogrphic space" (Alonso, 1972).
Consequently, economic and social problems are
frequently attacked by territorial programs, i.e., changing
settlement patterns, reducing the amount of immigration to
urban centers, etc. Territorial policies, by their nature
operate against the natural trends and dynamic processes of
the various population groups.
Immigration processes, on the microlevel (the
individual decision to migrate and the decision regarding
the distination) and on the macro level (the significance of
the location forces of "pull" and "push") are not well
understood. Therefore, there are doubts whether any
governmental policy will be able to affect the various
12
components of the system in the adequate way and at the
proper time.
For many questions regarding regional policies in
general and population dispersal in particular, there are
not unequivocal answers (Hansen, 1976).
In the rest of this paper, a background to the
population dispersal policies in Israel will be given. It
will consist of four parts:
1. The origin of the policy
2. The justification of the policy
3. The implemention of the policy and the establishment
of the development towns.
4. The results and the measurement of effectiveness of
the policy.
1.1. The Origin of the Policy
Prior to the establishment of the State (1948) and
extensively since then, Israel has implemented vigourously a
policy of population dispersal.
The policy has been defined throughout this period
as the policy which aims to achieve a balance in the spatial
distribution of the population over the country's regions.
The justification for the policy and its objectives
stem from a wide variety of considerations: ideological,
political, social, economic and security, originated in the
pre-statehood era.
13
1.1.1. The Pre-state Period
Settlement patterns in the Yishov--the Jewish
community in pre-state Palestine--were determined by the
waves of immigrants and Zionist ideology which accorded to
land reclamation and Jewish manual labor a great
significance (Akzin, 1966).
The origin of the population dispersal policy can be
found in this pre-state period. The main reasons were:
1. Uneven use of the available land--intensive
cultivation of the land in the central parts of the
country.
2. Overcrowding in the three big cities (Tel-Aviv,
Jerusalem and Haifa).
3. Introduction of a new concept to the security issue,
namely, concentration of population by penetration to
new regions rather than confining to a small area or
quarter (as was practiced until the 1929 riots)
(Reichman, 1979).
Population dispersal policy has never materialized
in the pre-state period. In 1948, 70 percent of the
population was urban and only 30 percent was rural, but the
rural minority got the greatest attention, while the
city--ideologically and functionally was regarded as
unimportant (Cohen, 1970).
14
1.1.2. The Statehood Period
Following the establishment of the state in 1948,
the situation has changed abruptly. In the first three
years of statehood, an influx of hundreds of thousands of
immigrants (fleeing, after the Second World War, from Europe
and Arab countries) more than doubled the size of the
population of the state. It was soon recognized by the
government authorities that because of the different types
of immigrants--"They came to Israel as refugees, not out of
an ideological conviction which might sustain them while
adopting to the harsh life of an agricultural laborer"
(Spilerman and Haviv, 1976)--and the small capacity of the
rural settlements, the latter will not be able to absorb
this mass of immigration, and that residential quarters
would have to be constructed to accommodate the immigrants.
Even at this stage, the "rural bias" was still
strong among policy makers and public agencies. The rise in
importance of planned urban absorption of immigrants was not
accompanied by a change in outlook from rural to an urban
colonizing or pioneering ideology. "The authorities did not
turn their efforts to urban development out of their own
free choice. This decision was forced upon them by the
circumstances of immigration and settlements which emerged
after the establishment of the state" (Cohen, 1970).
The slogan "dispersal of the population" has never
gained the same ideological urgency and importance as, for
15
example, the slogan of "Mizug Galuyot" (Integration of the
Diasporas) but it was nevertheless accepted as a public
policy.
Contrary to the additude on the ideological level,
the implementation of the policy has not encountered many
difficulties. The immigrants were almost totally dependent
on public agencies which used this dependency to try to
alter the settlement pattern existing at that time. The
implementation policy was accompanied by a development of a
comprehensive population-dispersal plan. The novel part of
the first plan was the establishment of new urban
centers--the development towns. They were basically planned
to serve as the missing middle links between the existing
urban centers and the scattered villages. The newly
established towns were planned to function as the regional
service centers.
Over the last thirty years, the Ministry of
Interior--which is responsible for the physical
planning--has issued, every few years, eight plans stating
the desired distribution of the population. The last one is
aimed at the year 1992, when Israel will have five million
inhabitants.
The plan specifies six major objectives, each
connected to a different region. The specification reveals
different justification for each objective. The
justifications can be divided into five main groups:
16
geo-political, economic, ideological, social and
ecological-environmental. More specifically:1
A. To increase the share of the population in the
northern region (Gallil) and especially the share of its
Jewish population.
This objective stems mainly from geo-political
considerations. The northern part is the less developed
region as a consequence of topographical and physical
disadvantages. Being very hilly it prevented agricultural
development and it lacks a strong urban center and
industrial infrastructure. Therefore, this region has
suffered from outmigration especially among the Jewish
population. On the other hand, there has been a
concentration of minorities in this region, and since their
birth-rate is higher than the Jewish birth-rate they have
become the majority in many locations.
'The following three concepts should be clarified:
1. The goal of population dispersal--This is the goal
which aims to achieve a more balanced spatial
distribution.
2. Justification--The explanation behind each reason,
i.e., economic, geo-political, ideological, social,
etc.
3. Obiective--The detailed goal or the practical
implication of the goal on its regional level.
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Security considerations, coupled with political
calculations have put the objective of settling the Gallil
among the top priorities for development.
B. To continue increasing the share of the population
in the southern part (Negev),- exploiting its development
potential.
This objective stems from economic and territorial
considerations.
The Negev area has natural resources which are not
fully exploited yet, and empty land adequate for industrial
development. The region has also several tourist
attractions (medicinal springs, archeological sites) which
are not fully developed. The forthcoming movement of the
army forces back to the Negev may well be a stimulant to the
development of this area.
C. Increasing the share of the population in the
surrounding of Jerusalem and in the city--the capital of
Israel. Encouraging the city as the spiritual and cultural
center of the country.
This objective is motivated mainly by geo-political
and ideological considerations.
D. Curtailing the rate of growth of the population
along the central plain.
This objective stems mainly from economic and
ecological considerations.
18
There seem to be diseconnomies to the scale of large
urban areas which cause economic, social and environmental
problems. Among them: expensive provision of
transportation and sanitation services, higher rate of crime
and air pollution.
E. Strengthening the "Development Towns" in order to
prevent outmigration and to attract veterans and new
immigrants.
Many of the development towns have been founded for
the last thirty years in the less populated regions and have
been initially settled by immigrants. Apart from the
objective of territorial presence, the objectives of ethnic,
social and economic integration were planned to be carried
out in these towns.
F. Preserving the balance between the rural sector and
the urban sector in light of the decrease in the share of
employment in agriculture out of the total employment in the
econnomy.
The rapid progress in the development of various
sectors, relative to agriculture causes a concern regarding
the future of the rural sector and the agricultural
settlements. There are ideological motivations and economic
considerations for the preservation of the agricultural
land.
Israel has gone through various stages in
implementing policies to disperse the population. Over
19
these stages, the priorities among the objectives and
therefore priorities accorded to the respective regions have
been changed.
Since the 1967 war, two new phenomena have emerged,
which have a direct relevancy to the six objectives
mentioned above:
1. The new settlements in the West Bank territories.
2. A comprehensive program to renew 160 urban
neighborhoods all over the country. The lion's share
of them are concentrated in the most populated urban
centers.
These two programs are not an integral part of the
goals of the Ministry of Interior's plan for 1992, but for
the short and long run they compete with the other national
objectives on limited capital and human resources.
1.2. The Justification of the Policy
The population dispersal goal was believed to be
essential in the first nineteen years (until the Six-Day
War) of statehood. It fulfilled various ideological
objectives which the country has been committed to, and it
seemed to serve adequately the necessities of a country in
its infancy.
In the light of changing circumstances the validity
of the goal of population dispersal is questioned. It is a
crucial issue for further attempts to implement this policy.
20
While studying the issue of justification it is
important to make a sharp distinction between the validity
of the goal and the way it was implemented. The same goal
can be implemented in various ways, some ways may be
successful and some may fail to achieve the goal. There has
been a tendency--which has gained support in the last
decade--to reflect from a failure in the implemention
process to the validity of the goal. For example, if there
are several development towns which are lagging behind,
maybe the goal of population dispersal should not be carried
on.
Therefore, the following section will deal with the
validity of the goal, while the next chapter will discuss
implementation, and its results.
1.2.1. The Validity of the Goal
The validity of any goal, derived, at least
theoretically from the justifications behind the policy. It
is commonly accepted that in the case of the population
dispersal policy, the justifications were based (at least
until 1967) on a national consensus which was a result of a
"modus vivendi" of various ideologies and points of views
expressed by interest groups, political parties and other
public bodies, as Hill states it:
The planning has been extremely effective in
meeting stated objectives as long as there was
consensual agreement on objectives and there were
no inherent contradictions between them--in that
situation the pragmatic facet planning which has
21
characterized so much of Israel's urban and
regional development was very effective. (Hill,
1978)
The goal of population dispersal, at least in the
official declarations and in governmental documents, since
1948 has never diminished in its importance (Zilberberg,
1973).
As much as it is for the consensus and lack of
contradiction, it is for the wide range of justifications
which support the goal, i.e., political, geographical,
economic, security, environmental, etc. Whenever one of
them diminishes in importance, there is another one to
replace it in priority. For example, if the security reason
is found to be less important as a result of changes in the
balance of power in the region, the environmental issue of
lessening overcrowding in the central parts of the country
will justify further support of an unsuccessful border town.
The outcome of the existence of an umbrella of
justifications is a validity continuously given to the goal
and a change in priority given to the regions. Since
population dispersal in each region is based on different
justifications, whenever one justification becomes more
important, the specific region will get more attention and
resources. These changes in the priorities given to the
regions, are not an outcome of changes in the declared
policy, but rather an outcome of the policy implemented.
22
To sum up: in order to find out if the goal of
population dispersal is still valid, one should not look for
a single criteria to validate the goal, since there are
several of them. Among politicians and policy makers there
does not seem to be an attempt to find a single criteria or
one justification, since it may involve ideological and
political controversies. As a result, the validity issue
focuses on the order of priorities among the various
regions. The order of priorities is created by group
pressures and circumstances.
In the next section two issues relevant to the
justification for the policy will be raised:
1. The conflict between the goal of "population
dispersal" and "the right of the individual to choose
his place."
2. The conflict between the goal of "population
dispersal" and other national goals.
1. The conflict between the goal and the "right to choose"
This issue is a part of the ideology behind any
policy attempting to direct the population. It states the
right of the individual to choose its residency, life style,
his and his children's future against the legitimacy of the
country to influence him to reside in a specific place.
Israel had implemented its policy of population
dispersal mainly by directing new immigrants to the
23
preferred areas. Employment and housing were provided to
them only in these areas. It turned out to be a delicate
issue in the Israeli scene since the policy at its peak has
been implemented by one specific group of the
population--the immigrants from Asia-Africa countries rather
than with a fair representation of the whole society.
Over the last ten years, the rate of immigration has
considerably decreased, and there has been also a change in
the socioeconomic and cultural background of the immigrants.
Most of them have come from urban centers and therefore they
preferred to settle in the central parts of the country
rather than to go to peripheral regions.
The validity of the goal is questioned here in light
of a violation of the right of the individual to choose. In
a way it ties the validity of the goal to the mechanism of
implementing it, since if nobody chooses to go to the
peripheral regions, how will the goal be achieved? In other
words, if the goal cannot be achieved, is it still valid?
(This issue will be further discussed in the chapter on
implementation.)
2. The conflict between national goals
The various objectives of the population dispersal
policies in the world fall into the following categories:
regional equality, efficiency, environmental goals, human
well-being, territorial presence, ethnic integration, etc.
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These objectives may have inherited conflicts in
them. The goal of regional equality conflicts with national
efficiency, the environmental goal conflicts with the
efficiency objective, and the human well-being objective
which calls for the provision of choices and for freedom to
choose may conflict with the integration goal.
Inspite of what has been said so far, the validity
of the goal of population dispersal can be questioned when
the issue of the order of priorities of the national goals
is questioned.
There is a threat to the priority of the goal, once
it has to compete with other national goals. (In paragraph
1.1.2. a distinction was made between priorities under the
same physical goal of population dispersal, while here the
physical national goal is confronted with other national
goals.)
The first time a threat like this has been created,
was after the Six-day War (1967) when several events
coincided to cause what seems to be a diminishing in the
importance of the population dispersal goal. (Again, on the
implementation level rather than on the declared one.) The
events were:
1. Economic and industrial policies to increase economic
independence. The changes in policies were the
outcome of:
a) a need to improve the balance of payments.
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b) decrease in government intervention and
decentralization trends.
c) a newly formed government (1977) with a "right
wing" ideology, encouraging "free enterprises."
The meaning of these policies was to maximize
national efficiency--regardless of specific
sectors and regions. In practice they may create
regional and sectorial inequality.
d) The new settlements in the administered
territories, competing on limited human and
national resources.
All of these seemed to compete with the goal of
population dispersal and the chances of the development
towns to survive.
1.3. The implementation of the policy and the establishment
of the development towns.
In 1951, Aria Sharon, the head of the planning
department in the Prime Minister's office--which was then in
charge of planning and development--issued a document which
spelled out the foundations of the physical planning in the
new state. While planning the implementation of the
population dispersal policies for the future, the writer has
concentrated on two situations which were supposed to
facilitate the process of implementation. the first was
governmental control over most of the land, and the second
was mass migration.
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At that time, 82 percent of the population resided
in the metropolitan area, along the coast line, 11 percent
in Jerusalem and only 7 percent settled in the Gallil and
the rest of the country.
The first comprehensive plan for the new physical
planning of the country was created by the National Planning
Department-- a new unit established within the Ministry of
Labor. The plan was based on the following principles
(Reichman, 1975):
1. The basic concept is a region whose size is 300-500
km 2 with 50,000 residents.- In each region, there
will be several small villages, 1,000 residents each,
two-three small urban centers of 6,000-7,000
residents and one major center of 20,000 residents.
2. The economic base of the large city will supply the
needs of the city and the whole region.
There were two novelties in the plan: the
hierarchical principle, and the establishment of several
small towns located 10 km. apart from each other.
Nevertheless, not much attention was given to the economic
base of the small towns.
This geogrphical solution, fulfilled all the stated
national objectives. The regional approach and the size of
the region were supposed to fulfill the goal of reclaiming
the land and ethnic integration, and the small towns were
supposed to fulfill the security goal--control over land.
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Over the years, the population dispersal policy has
gone through various stages. A study by the Economic
Planning Authority (Zilberberg, 1973) gives a detailed
account of the policy by periods. These periods were
determined according to their characteristics regarding
population dispersal policies, and they are congruent with
the waves of immigration.
1. First Period: (1948-1955): The years of mass
immigration and rural settlement.
The influx of immigrants in the late 1940s and the
beginning of the 1950s was settled first in the
arabic quarters of the big cities abandoned by their
previous settlers. Later on the more remote
evacuated small towns and abandoned villages were
settled. The main contribution for the population
dispersal goal came through the agricultural
settlements which were spread all over the country.
At that time, the development towns have begun to be
build, but they did not have a considerable impact on
the population dispersion.
2. Second Period: (1956-1960): Urbanization of
Development Regions.
The policy in the second part of the 1950s was based
on a smaller wave of immigrants. This was the period
in which the existing settlements (rural and urban)
have been further developed. The Lachish region has
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been settled. The Jewish urban population increased
by 25 percent (300,000), and the development towns
added to their residents another 100,000 (an increase
of 80 percent). At that time, the urbanization of
the development towns has followed the regional
approach, namely, the development towns have been
planned to serve as the urban centers for the rural
settlements surrounding them.
3. Third Period: (1961-1965): Industrialization of
development towns.
From a quantitative point of view, there were only
minor changes in the population dispersion. The
share of the peripheral regions increased at a
smaller rate--from 29 percent to 30.5 percent of the
population. The only region in which the rate of
increase was larger than the rate of increase of the
population was the south which has absorbed
approximately a quarter of the population increase.
In these years, the industrial infrastructure
of the development towns was founded. Eighty percent
of the capital accumulated in the industrial sector
by the end of this period (1965) originated in this
period.
4. Fourth Period: (1966-1972): Freezing in the
population dispersion.
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The main reasons for the freezing were the economic
recession and the lack of immigration. After the
"Six Day War" (1967), although there were an economic
tide and an increase in immigration, the priority
given to the goal diminished and affected its
implementation. (A more detailed analysis of the
periods including the period 1972-1980 will be given
in chapter VII.)
Over the years, various policies and mechanismms
were implemented to achieve the quantitative goals of the
population dispersal plans. They can be divided into two
major types:
1. Incentives to encourage development of preferred
areas and development towns. The incentives
consisted of subsidies to the community and its
infrastructure, e.g., provision of public housing,
subsidizing the cost of land and physical
infrastructure, establishing plants, implementing
employment policies, provision of social services,
etc., and personal incentives to the residents of
these areas.
2. Restrictive measures to curb the growth in the
central parts of the country.
Among the various policies and mechanisms which were
introduced and implemented over the years, this study will
concentrate on the industrialization policies and their
results.
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1.4. Results and evaluation of the policy.
Evaluating the results, and measuring the
effectiveness of the policy to disperse the population are
of great importance for a further successful implementation.
Measuring the effectiveness of the policy is
difficult and complicated for several reasons: First, the
process is long and therefore results can be evaluated only
after a long period. Second, it is difficult to measure
what could be happened without the policy, and third, there
are simultaneusly, other implicit policies which have
indirect effects on the spatial distribution of the
population which are complicated to measure, and which may
mask the effects of the explicit policy.
Most of the studies which evaluate the policy of
population dispersal, concentrated on the measurement of the
changes in the distribution of population over the country,
using statistical and geo-statistical measures. They
measured quantities, types, numbers of settlements, sizes of
population, quantities of new jobs, volumes of subsidies,
etc. Other methods used are:
1. Cost-benefit analysis--a method which compares the
cost of the policy with the benefit and weighs the
difference. The main weakness of this method is its
inability to accunt for a wide array of qualitative
aspects which cannot be quantified.
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2. Comparison between goals and achievements--assuming
that all the direct and indirect impacts can be
captured, there does not exist any external criteria
to determine the level of achievements.
3. Comparison among various instruments and mechanisms
to achieve the goal--the main weakness lies in the
hypothetical nature of the comparison, Moreover, it
is difficult to capture the unintended consequences
of the policies.
The main deficiency of most studies stems from the
way criteria for evaluation have been constructed. In many
cases it was solely the result of the availability of the
data.
It seems that the evaluation of the population
dispersal policies in Israel is deficient in all the
mentioned above possible weaknesses. Beginning with lack of
data through frequent changes in priorities to changes in
policies. (A detailed analysis of studies conducted in
Israel will be given in chapter II.)
The most comprehensive research which has been done
so far, was conducted by the Economic Planning Authority
(Zilberberg, 1973). The study evaluated the policy using
two criteria: The relative demographic development of each
region and the economic development in terms of investment,
employment, sectorial structure, etc. The study did not
deal with the social and welfare aspects: e.g., the extent
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to which the policy has achieved national goals such as
social integration, immigration absorption, etc. The study
has concentrated on the comparison between goals and the
achievements of the goals, and used simple statistical
indices to express it. The main findings (for 1972) were:
1. Throughout the years, the various plans to disperse
the population have been successively less ambitious
regarding their objectives, i.e., in stating the
objective of changing the share of the periphery
compared to the share of the central parts of the
country.
2. The population dispersal goals were not achieved.
There were deviations to a greater degree in the
northern part of the country, the Gallil, and to a
lesser degree in the southern parts--the Negev, and
Tel-Aviv and the metropolitan areas. The deviations
from the original plan were in the rural sector as
well as in the urban one.
3. The development towns have not grown according to the
stated goals, especially the small urban centers
which have not developed due to their small scale.
Another study (Shachar, 1971) found that between
1948 - 1967 the center of gravity of the population has
moved to the south. This study showed also that there
periods of freezing in the policy especially between the
years 1963-1967--the economic recession period.
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The main conclusions of these studies and others
were:
1. A relative success in the southern part.
2. Failure to achieve goals in the northern part.
3. Some success in Jerusalem.
4. Failure to curb the growth in the central parts of
country.
The development towns which were planned to be the
principal mechanism to achieve a more balanced distribution
of the population, have not fulfilled the expectations.
Moreover, throughout the years, some of them have become
sources of social and economic difficulties.
Among the various issues which can be evaluated,
starting from the rate of success of the development towns
in general, to the different policies and mechanisms in
particular, this study will concentrate on the results of
the industrialization policies and the methods suggested and
used for the evaluation.
CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
The issue of "the suitability of industries to
non-metropolitan communities" in general, and in particular
"the industrialization of development towns in Israel"
touches a wide range of theoretical areas of study, as well
as research and empirical analyses done all over the world
and in Israel.
The multi-dimensionality of the subject expands from
various sub-areas of the regional science - "the study of
those social, economic, political and behavioral phenomena
which have a spatial dimension" (Miernyk, 1976) through
"selection of appropriate industries" methods to studies on
the "development towns in Israel."
In the following chapter, the main theories relevant
to this study will be briefly surveyed with a main emphasis
on the weakness of the literature to deal with the issue at
hand. (Theoretical and empirical studies which were used in
this study are discussed in chapter 6.1.)
The study suggests - based on analysis of the
industrialization process of two development towns - a
normative way to analyze the industrialization process of
non-metropolitan communities in a dynamic time perspective,
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and an operational definition for "suitability" of
industries to development towns. It is believed, that both,
the community and the time factors are the most crucial
components in achieving a successful industrialization
process, and that most of the literature - the existing
theoretical ones and the empirical ones - do not fully
account for these factors.
This chapter is divided into two main sections. The
first one analyzes several established theories, relevant to
the study, among them: location theory, national and
regional planning theories, appropriate technology for
developing countries theories, and rural industrialization
studies. The second section discusses research and studies
conducted in Israel on the development towns in general and
on the industrialization of these towns in particular.
2.1. General Theories and Studies
2.1.1. Industrial Location Theories
The location decisions of firms and households, and
the merging of these industrial decisions into a pattern of
urban and rural land uses and concentrations of activities
is the domain of economic location theory.
Location theory is the oldest branch of regional
economics. It is a well established field which has not
been changed much over the last decade.
36
The early work on general location theory has been
developed by Lbsch (1954). One branch of it has emphasized
the role of transport costs (Weber, 1929; Hoover, 1948), and
another branch has developed the profit-maximizing
locational model with variable costs and demand (Greenhut,
1965).
The main areas in which there has been significant
development is the challenge to the profit-maximization
principle and the prediction of locational determinacy.
Some researchers showed deviations from the formal
models due to differences in information available, the
occasional importance of personal factors in location
decisions, the difficulty of controlling for risks and
uncertainty, and the need to economize on time, information
collection and other resources in choosing a site. Weber
analyzed the rate of uncertainty in location and showed that
it tended to reinforce agglomoration even in the absence of
external economies (as in the case of developing countries).
Most of the studies of locational agglomoration have
focused on the agglomoration of firms in the same industry,
but a different approach was brought by Isard (Isard, 1956),
who studied industrial complexes, i.e., firms in a group of
industries connected by significant flows of goods and
services. In the last decade, this area was studied
extensively. Most of the studies have been preoccupied with
different ways of measuring interindustry linkages and
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little attention has been given to the more critical
question of why and under what conditions agglomoration will
take place.
Industrial location theories have variously
considered raw material location, transportation costs and
availability of labor to be the most important determinant
of the specific location of a manufacturing enterprise
(Alonso, 1968a). The classical "Location Theory" is based
on the assumption that the firm tries to minimize
transportation costs by minimizing distances to the various
markets, including raw material, energy and the consumer's
market.
In an elaboration of the theory, based on empirical
studies - a new term of "foot-loose" industries was coined
to describe those plants which were found to be indifferent
to distance and transportation costs as the result of the
nature of their product. A "foot-loose" industry, defined
in a simple way as ". . . an industry is foot-loose if its
long run profitibility is the same for any location in an
economy" (Klaasen, 1967).
Most of the locational models, determined by
distance and transportation were based on
industrial-technological factors, while other factors like:
social, demographic and economic characteristics of the
location were ignored unless they had a direct connection to
the industrial-technological structure.
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Aside from the reservations regarding evaluating
alternative locations only on the basis of costs (e.g.,
revenues might differ considerably between alternative
locations on account of variations in the size and structure
of the markets and in elasticities of demand), other factors
which have an important role in the location decision but
cannot always be quantified (certainly not always by
measuring cost levels) were overlooked.
L. H. Klaasen has done the first step to substitute
"transportation" with a wider concept of "communication" to
include the economic, social and cultural distances as
factors in estimating cost, in addition to the physical
distance. In regard to the "foot-loose" industries, he
claims:
the most fruitful approach to the question [of
"foot-loose" industries] is to consider all
locational requirements, including those of a
non-economic nature, and not to regard almost any
industry as 'foot-loose' simply because
differential transportation costs, for example,
have become of negligible importance.
He suggests therefore to consider the hypothetical sum of
transportation costs and communication costs for markets and
supplies individually, and tries to discover how far these
costs determine the location of the industries studied.
Klaasen indicates three kinds of communication costs which
are important for the producer: communication with other
producers linked either forward or backward to the producer
in question, communication with consumers and communications
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with the local government. In a study supervised by Klaasen
and other researchers, it was found that economic and social
distance appears to be, on the average, ten times as
important as physical distance, and this effect is more
pronounced in the case of complex rather than in the case of
simple raw materials plants.
In brief, Klaasen claims that the concept of
"foot-loose" is relevant only so far as transportation costs
are concerned, which means that factors other than
transportation have become relatively more important, and
that the industry is not at all footloose in a general
sense.
Some other factors, like: policies set by the
government or the importance of the quality of the labor
force, are proofs for the superiority of the comprehensive
definition of location rather than the narrower one set by
the classical "Location Theory." The definition of
"development areas" by the government while encouraging
industrialization is based on various criteria including:
national priorities, strategic importance, etc. While the
traditional factors like distance disadvantages to location
do not necessarily play a major role. Governmental
policies, in their support for plants to locate in the
development areas, do not differentiate between industries
with locational advantages, and those which do not have
them. Governmental support is given more on the basis of
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the indirect effects of distance like: the size of the
place - which has an effect on the availability of the
auxiliary services, or the availability and the quality of
the labor force.
The quality of the labor force has an effect on the
operation of the plants and on the cost of labor. The true
cost of labor is not measured by what the employer has to
pay, but by what he gets for what he pays. Locations may
vary in the quality of the labor force. They may differ in
factors like: labor attitudes which are reflected most
significantly in productivity, turnover and absenteeism.
They differ in labor supply which has an effect on the
organization of industrial undertakings which may be
reflected in costs and they may differ in their need for
special skills.
Governmental policies, management and especially the
quality of the labor force, have been factors which
determined, among other factors, the success or failure of
the plants.
When "Location Theory" is used to understand the
causes for the success or the failure of a plant, it is
assumed that the rate of success depends upon the
appropriate location. Nevertheless, there maybe some other
causes, for example:
1. The selection of the product, and especailly its
export market.
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2. The labor force, its quality and quantity.
3. Government policies over the years to encourage
industrialization of preferred areas.
All three sources of difficulties cannot be
explained by the classical location theory. The extended
theory (developed by Klaasen) can partially explain some of
the above causes, because it takes into account the problems
of the quality of the labor force, lack of auxiliary
services and difficulties in communication stemming
indirectly from the location, e.g., disadvantages stemming
not necessarily from the distance but rather from the
history and the development of the place. But apart from
taking into account these factors, even the extended theory
cannot explain the dynamic development of a situation, or
the causes for its creation which is crucial for this study.
The theory can be of help for description but not
for explaining the development and possible prediction of
future perspective.
It should be noted that "Location Theory" was
developed under the conditions of free economy, assuming
unlimited managerial resources, full information,
predictability of the future, and all other things being
equal. These assumptions are unsuitable for countries in
the initial stages of development. Planned economy and a
massive intervention by the government would be a more
approppriate and relevant background for the proposed
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analysis of the policy to industrialize the development
towns. The optimization function of this policy includes
national goals and various priority considerations which the
"Location Theory" does not deal with. Nevertheless,
"Location Theory" may help in the following subject:
"Location theory" represents the logic behind the
decision of an entrepreneur where to locate its plant, and
hence enables evaluating his decision to locate in a
non-metropolitan community like the development town. The
logic of location theory may be used to examine a partial
aspect of the "suitability" issue: the efficiency of the
locational decisions, taking into accunt transportation
costs, raw material location, agglomoration factors and the
existing mixture of industries, availability of physical
infrastructure, labor supply and some other locational
factors.
The "efficiency" criteria of "Location Theory" may
be sometimes adopted by the government when trying to
optimize location of new industries or to provide subsidies
to the more efficient industrial plants.
Since the entrepreneur's decision to locate his
enterprise in an underdeveloped area may be - from the point
of view of the "Location Theory" - economically inefficient
to him, the government steps in with compensations in the
form of economic incentives. However, the government's
objectives are different from those of the entrepreneur and
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thus the matching between industries and locations in the
context of government intervention should utilize a broader
notion of suitability.
One of the important issues is identifying the
additional criteria the government should apply in the
process to create a broader definition of "suitability."
The theories of national and regional planning, and the
literature on "appropriate technologies for developing
areas" may give some clues.
2.1.2. National and Regional Planning Theories
In contrast to the location theory model, in which
location of an industry is considered as a profit-making
venture by a private enterprise, in the evolving area of
national and regional planning, the issue of the location of
an industry is being considered as a "project" by a
government agency (Alonso, 1968b). In these cases, the
government is interested in the costs and benefits occurring
outside the industry. Regional planning is concerned with
the external effects within the region, and national
planning with the effects among regions.
The field of regional planning covers normatively
oriented or policy studies. These take their cue from the
problematics of planning practice and attempt to put
potential interventions in ongoing spatial processes on a
"rational" basis. Five major policy issues have been
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investigated: the question of optimum city size and size of
hierarchies, national urban growth policies, growth center
policies, location policy and subnational policies for full
employment. The fourth subject - "location policy" - is the
most relevant one for this study.
The main issue, discussed in the subarea of location
policy is: "How should governments decide on the question
of where to encourage industrial development?" The
literature on regional growth theories - the idea that
scarce resources would yield larger economic benefit when
applied to a limited number of centers having a high
potential of economic growth - provides some knowledge that
may facilitate governmental choice in this matter.
There are two groups of ideas under the heading of
"regional growth theory." The first one deals with
"structure and growth of urban systems," while the second
can be described as dealing with "polarized development."
The first subject deals with hierarchical systems of
cities and the statistical laws attached to their growth.
It asks the following sample of questions:
- What is the relation between a country's level of
urbanization and the percentage of its labor force in
manufacturing industry?
- Under what conditions does primacy arise in the size
distribution of urban population size?
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- What consequences does an accelerated rate of urban growth
have for social, economic and political changes within a
given country?
These studies deal with the national level and with
the country as a whole, and from this perspective it may not
be helpful for a study which is concerned with the local
level or the regional level at the most. But since it deals
with stages of development it may help in understanding the
stages of development, both for the country and for the
specific community, necessary for studying trajectories of
industries and suitability of industries over the
community's stages of development.
The second subject - "polarized development" - deals
with the theory about the role of power relations in spatial
development. Originally it was formulated as a nonspatial
economic theory that provided an elaborate rationale for the
concentration of economic powers in a few technologically
advanced industries tied into the rest of the economy
through an elaborate system of input-output linkages. It
was soon "translated" into spatial terms. Richardson (1973)
developed a model of regional growth that emphasized the
role of agglomoration economics, locational preferences and
locational constraints. Regional agglomoration economics
play a critical multiple role: they promote technical
progress and higher productivity, they attract industry and
capital, they influence migration decisions and they affect
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the efficiency of the intraregional spatial structure.
Locational preferences help to explain why investment
subsidies may fail to persuade firms to relocate away from
core regions and why many households do not necessarily move
in response to income and welfare differences.
Understanding polarized development and the
different forces affecting the spatial distribution of
social and economic activities is crucial for designing any
effective regional policy. Empirical studies in this
subarea like the one by Henderson (1981) on the location of
immigrant industry withinn a U.K. assisted areas, or by
Carlton (1979), are helpful in clarifying why some firms are
attracted to a specific area while some are not, or why some
stay and some leave.
Except for the literature on growth centers and
poles, relatively little work has been done that would
facilitate governmental choice on the issue of where to
encourage industrial development.
No theory, for example, addresses itself to the
dilemma of the policy maker or planner who must find a path
between efficiency and equity issues in allocating resources
to industrial development in particular locations, or who
may be asked to select viable industries for promotion in
economically backward and declining regions. Both questions
have been addressed to some extent in the literature, the
first by Alonso (1968b) and the second by Klaasen (1967).
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The definition of suitable industry in the regional
and national planning literature is: the industry which has
the highest potential to achieve national or regional goals
(increasing export, equalizing regional income, promotion of
industrial production, etc.) under some locational
constraints.
The theory does not deal specifically with the
socioeconomic characteristics of the community to be
industrialized, nor does it consider local policies. In
this regard, this study goes one step beyond the regional
theories. Nevertheless, it explores policies and methods
designed to achieve regional goals in order to find out if
they can be modified and used to achieve local ones.
In addition, the following issue is examined: to
what extent policies designed to benefit the region may
benefit the local communities in the region? And to what
extent policies towards regional or national goals may
conflict with policies towrds local objectives?
2.1.3. Appropriate Technologies for Developing Countries
This topic has tended to concentrate on the factors
thought to be important in promoting national or regional
growth, in Less Developed Countries (LDC). The traditional
theories have emphasized the predicted consequences of the
non-metropolitan industrialization processes which might
have generated in the national and regional level.
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In his book "Appropriate Technologies for Developing
Countries," Eckaus argues that the only standard of
"appropriateness" of technological decisions is in reference
to the general goal of development (Eckhaus, 1977). This
approach to appropriate technologies has been criticized on
the ground that he does not consider the adequacy of the
technology to specific factor endowments, informal
restrictions and other institutional aspects of LDC.
A different perspective which examines the adequacy
of the technology to factors -- not mentioned by Eckaus --
states the following issues:'
1. Can the support mechaniism and organizational
arrangements which go with the technology in one
country be adopted to fit a new situation in a
different place?
2. An issue which deals with the non-material resource
requirements of any technology: for example the
question whether a technology developed with a
hierarchical organizational arrangement in mind can
be suitable for an area in which work has
traditionally been organized along collective or
cooperative lines.
3. Issue which has gained attention only recently, but
has not been dealt with yet, is the less tangible
basic needs, like: self fulfillment, participation,
'Based on an article by Mary B. Anderson, 1979a.
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quality of access to knowledge, etc., which have not
been included among other measures of appropriateness
in the process of applying technologies to meet human
needs.
In a paper "Rural Development through
Self-Reliance," Anderson (1979b) suggested a framework for
assessing appropriateness of technologies. This framework
helps to answer the question: "To what set of circumstances
should an appropriate or modern technology be responsive?"
The answer:
1. In terms of the resources which a technology uses -
Resource Appropriateness.
2. In terms of the degree to which it helps meet
identified needs - Needs Appropriateness.
3. In terms of the extent to which it supports the
achievement of longer term social and economic goals
- Goals Appropriateness.
The author concludes:
In resource terms, suitable technologies .
should be designed to be responsive to local
organizational and cultural styles, the
non-material resources. Basic needs would be
defined, initially in local terms.
Anderson relates to two important factors in
defining suitable industries: the importance of selecting
industries which will use appropriately the local resources,
and the significance of the needs of the local level while
contemplating industrialization.
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Following similar considerations Klaasen (1967)
develops methods of selecting industries for depressed
areas. The method is based on considering simultaneously
both the structure of the area and that of a given industry.
The method tries also to incorporate growth rate of an
industry into the method.
This is done to emphasize that the present
location factors will change and draw attention to
the fact that long-term forecasting in this field
would contribute greatly to the achievement of
more rational location decisions in the present.
(Klaasen, 1967)
This body of literature dealing with "Appropriate
Technologies for Developing Countries" seems to be the most
relevant one to this study, with some modifications. In
spite of the fact that some of its versions have the same
weaknesses as the previous body of literature has (Regional
and National Planning) of stating national and regional
objectives as goals rather than local ones, it considers
more seriously (especially in the last two examples) the
social and economic background of the community, and
inquires into the issue of fulfilling material and
non-material needs. (A detailed analysis of the specific
characteristics of the suitable industries is given in
chapter 6.1.)
51
2.1.4. Rural Industrialization
The closest body of literature which addresses
itself to the issue of non-metropolitan communities, is the
literature on rural industrialization.
Industrialization of rural areas has been, for the
last twenty years the main answer to the problem faced by
many communities, this of the higher demand for employment
in rural areas than the supply which can be provided by
agriculture. The high demand is a result of high rates of
natural population growth in rural areas, as well as of a
trend of population flow from the big cities to rural areas
and small towns (mainly in more developed countries). This
high demand may be also enhanced by a national policy of
population dispersion. The quantity of employment supplied
by agriculture is restricted by the increasing technological
level of production, in many cases due to limited resources
of land and water. Besides the quantitative limitations,
the supply of agricultural employment suffers often from
qualitative deficiencies, such as low levels of income and
insufficient diversity of jobs in relation to the needs of
younger and more educated labor force. Beyond the problem
of low income levels, in many countries the existing
agrarian structures lead to an extreme inequality in the
distribution of income (Bar-El, 1983).
In many aspects, the causes and results for rural
industrialization resemble the industrialization process in
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the non-metropolitan communities in general and in the
development towns in particular. For example, both face
problems of distance and remoteness--being far away from
metropolitan industrial centers, both operate usually on a
small scale due to the sparsely populated areas which
characterize the rural and the non-metropolitan areas, both
supply employment in areas in which agriculture cannot
supply enough employment (this was the initial objective of
the industrial plants in the development towns--see chapter
I), and both suffer from qualitative deficiencies, i.e., low
levels of income, insufficient diversity of jobs, etc.
Nevertheless, there are major characteristics which differ
between the two and therefore, make the literature on rural
industrialization less suitable as a background for this
study. The most important feature is the point of
departure. The rural industrialization sees the employment
in the agricultural sector as the most important sector,
while the industrial employment is the residual. This does
not imply only that industrial employment gets less
priority, but mainly that the rural labor force is treated
differently in the industrialization process since it has a
"past" in agricultural employment, i.e., work ethics, work
experience and especially the existence of supportive
agricultural organizations and social structures (see Weitz,
1979). On the other hand, the labor force in industrial
non-metropolitan communities, suffer usually from inadequate
work experience and lack of supportive social organizations.
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The second important difference is that most of the
literature on rural development deals with countries in the
very initial stages of development, compared to Israel which
is considered to be in a more advanced stage of development.
This implies that the objectives of rural industrialization
in less developed countries, as well as the quality of the
labor force and its expectations differ considerably from
those in Israel. In spite of the fact that Israel has a
wide spectrum of population groups, differing in their
socioeconomic background and the quality of their labor
force and expectation--which is the main cause for the
creation of the "island phenomenon" (see chapter
IV)--nevertheless, the majority of the groups are more
developed compared to the situation in the developing
countries.
A lion's share of the literature on
industrialization in developing countries discusses how to
provide the minimal necessities for the settlers in the
rural areas, i.e., food, clothing, etc. While in the
Israeli reality, the objectives of rural industrialization
have objectives for higher standard of living for the
communities in the development areas.
On the industrial side, most of the industries
suggested for rural industrialization manufacture goods for
local demand, i.e., consumer products, agricultural
machinery, etc. While in Israel due to the small size of
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the rural population the whole country is the market, as
well as manufacturing for export.
Nevertheless, in spite of the many differences,
several works (Don, 1977; Bar-El, 1980) have helped in
formulating the suitability model (see chapter VI).
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2.2. The Literature on the Industrialization of the Israeli
Development Towns
The lion's share of the research and the studies
dealing with the Israeli development towns in general was
conducted in the late 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s.
Studies dealing specifically with the industrialization of
the towns have been conducted in later years, towards the
end of the 1970s.
The studies and the research can be divided into
several groups, according to the discipline in which they
were done. The disciplines are: sociology, geography,
economics and planning.
a. Sociology
Sociological research on the divelopment towns was
conducted mainly either by the research units of several
governmental ministries, i.e., the welfare ministry, the
housing ministry and the ministry of labor, or in the
academic institutions. Most of the studies concentrated
around the issues of immigration absorption and ethnic
integration (Lissak, 1964; Eisenstadt et al., 1967;
Eisenstadt, 1970; Peres, 1976; Cohen, 1979; Cohen, 1983).
The studies did not restrict themselves to the development
towns, although due to the uniqueness and remoteness of the
towns the towns have been used as case studies (Shuval,
1959; Zamir, 1959; Soen, 1960; Abeles, 1960; Cohen, 1964;
Cohen, 1969; Cohen, 1970). The studies have concentrated on
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the social, ethnic and educational side of the communities
and on the various social groups. They have emphasized
social and political processes, especially the works by
Cohen (Cohen, 1970a, 1970b), who studied issues like the
"dependency of the development towns." None of these
studies has incorporated economic or employment issues.
The Israeli sociological literature was used in this
study to describe the social aspects of the "island
phenomenon" (see chapter 4.1) as well as in the analytical
chapter (chapter VIII).
b. Geography
The studies conducted by urban geographers are
descriptive, using geo-statistical indices to describe
population movements, changes in the population
distribution, etc. without qualitative characteristics of
the results of the processes.
In his article "Israel's Development Towns:
Evaluation of National Urbanization Policy," Shachar (1970)
has applied geo-statistical techniques for measuring changes
in the spatial distribution of the population. He has found
a gradual spatial shift of the Israeli population towards
the south, and has concluded that the development towns were
the main agent in changing the settlement pattern under the
national urbanization policy. Nevertheless, this success
has been accompanied by a failure to achieve regional
integration.
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In later years, and for the last decade, several
urban geographers were among the first ones to begin
studying the industrial structure of the development towns.
Gradus et al. (Gradus and Karkover, 1976; Gradus and Einy,
1980) have studied extensively the level of
industrialization and its characteristics in the central and
developing towns, as well as the changing spatial structure
of manufacturing in Israel. Their work was the first one to
describe the laggard industrial situation in the developing
areas.
The main weaknesses of this type of studies are: 1)
The studies use quantitative measures like number of
employees to describe the level of industrialization while
the qualitative characteristics of the available jobs and
their impact on the labor force and the community are
neglected. Quantitative measures by themselves may mislead.
Does an increase in the number of employed persons mean an
increase in the level of industrialization? To what extent
do capital-intensive industries which employ less people
contribute to the increase in the level of
industrialization? What is happening to the level of
industrialization when industrial plant replaces boring and
monotonous jobs with robots and more advanced technologies?
2) The studies were conducted on the regional level rather
than on the local one. A region may include other types of
industrialized communities as well as regional plants (like
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the chemical plants in the case of Yerucham and Dimona)
which may mask the real industrial situation in the towns.
3) The studies were done on an aggregate level,
diversification of the industrial structure was evaluated on
the regional level rather than looking into the extent to
which the jobs are diversified in each plant, the whole
region was defined as "advanced" or "laggard" rather than
each plant.
Another group of studies were conducted by Kipnis
(1976, 1977). His studies, as the studies of other
geographers, deal with indices and descriptions. The major
indication used is the number of employees--the size of the
plant. The main finding of his study is: "Medium size
manufacturing plants, achieving increasing scale economies
by a disintegrated production process within the urban
economy, are more favorable for urban growth than larger
plants" (Kipnis, 1976). The disadvantages of these studies
are: 1) When evaluating the optimal size of a plant to
achieve urban growth, the stage of development the town is
at is not considered at all. The study surveyed 150 plants
in several development towns without differentiating among
the various towns according to their history, size,
function, etc. The study failed to distinguish between the
different locational, economic and social characteristics of
the various communities. The development tcwns have been
treated as if they formed a homogeneous settlement category
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with regard to the various qualifications. Moreover, no
connejction has been made between the plants and the
locality. 2) The study does not differentiate between the
various types of plants and their characteristics.
In brief, the geographical studies are descriptive,
emphasizing usually one aspect of the industrialization
process--usually the 6ne that has a spatial dimension. The
studies are done on an aggregate level, which may help in
making generalized conclusions but may be biased. They are
less helpful for planning purposes.
c. Economics
Only a few studies were done by economists, and they
have concentrated on the effects of the government
incentives on the dispersion of the industrial plants
(Ben-Bassat, 1974; Berkowitz et al., 1970).
One of the most comprehensive studies was done in
1973 by the Economic Planning Authority (a unit in the
Treasury) to evaluate the dispersion of the population in
Israel between the years 1948-1972 (Zilberberg, 1973). It
is a descriptive study on the regional level which analyzes
the dispersion of the government investments in various
sectors and accordingly, the changes in the dispersion of
the population over several sub-periods. This material was
used as background for chapter VII--"Analysis of the Case
Studies."
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Some researchers have collaborated with sociologists
to study migration and mobility issues in the development
towns (Don and Hovav, 1971; Kirschenbaum and Comey, 1973).
In the study by Kirschenbaum and Comey, the main factors
attracting new immigrants to the development towns were
studied. Among the ten factors, employment and unemployment
(measured by the ratio of the employed and unemployed per
1000 in the labor force) were considered. Bar-El (1980,
1981, 1983) has studied the issue of industrialization in
Israel in general and in the rural areas in particular. His
studies--although used as background material for this
study--were done on an aggregate level (regions) which is
too general for the purpose of this study. Bar-El and Don
(1972) have studied one aspect of "suitability"--the
sensitivity of plants in several development towns to the
recession (1965-1967).
None of the studies conducted by economists has
dealt with the issue of the success and failure of the
industrial plants in non-metropolitan areas, nor with the
suitability issue--connecting the community to the industry.
One study, conducted by an economist and social
scientist is exceptional in this sense. The study,
"Development Towns in Israel: The Role of Community in
Creating Ethnic Disparities in Labor Force Characteristics"
(Spilerman and Habib, 1976), tries to connect the industrial
structure of the communities and their social, economic and
demographic characteristics.
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By relating the occupational composition of the
development towns to the demographic features of their
residents, they have found how the development towns have
patterned the industrial affiliation of the immigrant groups
and influenced their consequent occupational distributions.
"We conclude that the overrepresentation of Asia-African
ethnics in the development towns (which contain industries
different from those common elsewhere in the country) and
their further concentration in certain of these settlements,
has served to expose them, to a severe disproportionate
extent, to particular industrial opportunities" (ibid., p.
798).
The authors give also some explanation for the
development of this situation:
While the skill levels of the inhabitants may have
been influential as initial cause in attracting
certain kinds of enterprises, once an industrial
base has been established the occupational
structure of a settlement is an immediate
resultant of its mix of industries. (Ibid., p.
801)
This study describes actually the beginning of the
"island phenomenon" (see chapter IV), and how it has
evolved. Nevertheless, it does not explain why the
phenomenon has continued to exist and was reinforced. This
is mainly because of several weaknesses: 1) The time range
between the development of the phenomenon and the study was
too short (the study is based on data from 1961). 2) The
study does not look into the industrial side of the
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phenomenon and the "behavior" of the industrial plants. 3)
The study does not differentiate between types of
communities and plants. Nevertheless, it gives a real and
accurate picture of the initial stages of the "island
phenomenon."
d. Planning
The planning discipline is the closest discipline to
this study. Not many studies have been conducted by
planners, and only few studies have contributed to this
research.
Most of the major works by planners were conducted
in the late 1960s and beginning of the 1970s (Spiegel, 1966;
Berler, 1970; Brutzkus, 1970; Lichfield, 1971), and this
accounts also for their main disadvantage because of the
following reasons: First, they lack time perspective. The
industrialization of the development towns had taken place
by the late 1950s, and was at its peak in the 1960s. While
these studies were conducted most of the newly established
industrial plants were still in their infancy, enjoying
massive support from the government, and therefore it was
difficult to evaluate their performance, viability and
impact on the community after such a short time. Second,
most of these studies were conducted in a period of economic
growth and prosperity in the whole country (after the "Six
Day War" and the recession period) which has benefited also
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the development towns. This was quite a brief period which
cannot be considered as a typical and representative one. It
introduced therefore a bias to the analysis of the real
situation in the development towns. (For more details, see
chapter VII.)
More specifically, the work by Spiegel gives a
comprehensive view on the development towns, nevertheless,
it was conducted in 1965, and could not evaluate the
situation from an adequate time perspective. In the work by
Berler there is one chapter on industrialization. The
indicators used to evaluate the level of industrialization
are: the number of employees, the size of the plants and
initial governmental investments. These indicators give
only a partial view of the real situation. The most
comprehensive work till now was done by Lichfield et al.
This work, commissioned by the Ministry of Housing, was
conducted as well by the beginning of the 1970s. The main
weaknesses of the work are: 1) The study analyzes the
situation in the development towns by sectors: community,
industry, employment without trying to connect between the
sectors and to show the interrelationships. 2) The work is
quite general, analyzing all the development towns without
making distinctions in regard to their history, location,
population, relative advantages, etc. 3) The employment in
the industrial sector is considered to be as a residual to
employment in other sectors. 4) Level of industrialization
is measured by number of employees.
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None of the works done by planners or in the
planning area has studied thoroughly the industrialization
of the development towns issue.
Another group' of studies which has been given
special attention is the group of studies conducted in
Israel on the rural industrialization of two unique types of
communities: the Kibbutz and the Moshav (cooperative
villages).
These two types of communities based on agriculture
have been undergoing for the last decade a process of
industrialization due to the inability of agriculture alone
to support the communities. Because of their unique social
and ideological backgrounds, the process of finding and
adopting "suitable" industries has been done very carefully,
expecially in the case of the Kibbutz's industry. The
Kibbutz's industry is confined, among other things, by
restrictions on hiring outside labor and has therefore to
match carefully the existing and available labor force and
the specific requirements of the proposed industrial plant.
Many of the industrial plants in the Kibbutzim, were
found to be successful. The process of industrialization in
the Moshav is still in an initial stage and therefore it is
difficult to evaluate it.
The literature on the Kibbutz' industry was written
either by economists (Barkai, 1974) or by sociologists and
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organizational psychologists (Ben-Dor et al., 1976; Rosner,
1978; Golomb, 1980), who studied the "Quality of Working
Life" (QWL) in the industrial plants since Kibbutz puts the
human factor as the most important factor when contemplating
industrialization.
The main work on the Moshav industry was done by Don
(Don et al., 1977). The work presents a theoretical
comprehensive model for the industrialization of the Moshav.
This work has helped in formulating the main factors
contnributing to the definition of "suitability."
Since the industrialization in the Moshav is still
in its initial stage, there are not many empirical studies
on the process. A work by Bar-El (1983) studied the rural
labor-force supply for nonfarm employment and pointed to the
difficulties of-the unemployed to find suitable jobs in the
industrial and service sectors. The work deals with the
social and community aspects while it does not analyze the
industrial areas.
The Kibbutz and the Moshav share with the
developments towns problems of remoteness and small size
regarding industrialization. Nevertheless, being rural
communities, based mainly on agriculture, coupled with the
social and ideological constraints make their experience
less suitable for comparison.
For the last few years a great volume of studies and
research were done as part of the urban renewal project
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which planned to include some 160 deteriorating
neighborhoods in the big cities and in some of the
development towns. Only few of these studies considered
employment and industrial plants as part of the renewal
programs (Karsel, 1980).
Summary
The main disadvantage of the literature, both the
general one and the Israeli is in its inability to deal with
dynamic processes, i.e., with phenomena which have been
evolved gradually as a result of several other processes.
Most of the theories are "static" describing situations in a
specific time. In the case of the Israeli studies, the
problem stems from lack of time perspective and from
evaluation studies which were conducted too close to the
time that events actually occur.
The second disadvantage is in the sectoral nature of
the theories and studies, i.e., they relate to one component
of the whole system, either the industry, or the economy, or
the society, or the government policy. Only few theories
and studies try to look into the interrelationships between
two or more components in the system like the "suitability"
issue. Since the roots of the problem analyzed in this
study are found in the development of these
relationships--the problem of "unsuitability" and its
effects, the gap in the literature makes it less adequate to
analyze the issue presented in this study.
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Nevertheless, the studies and the theories from the
broad spectrum of subjects have helped in the descriptive
parts of this study (chapters III and IV), the theoretical
part (chapter VI), as well as in the analytical part
(chapters VII and VIII).
CHAPTER III
THE SOCIOECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF YERUCHAM AND
DIMONA
Yerucham and Dimona, both towns were established in
the period in which mass migration was directed mainly to
rural areas and development towns (1948-1955). Yerucham was
established somewhat at the beginning of the period (1951)
and Dimona towards the end (1955).'
Yerucham was one of the first development towns
established in the South, after few years in which
development towns were set-up mainly in the central and the
Northern districts. The town was established 35 km.
southeast of Beer-Sheva (see Map 3.1).
It is not quite clear today, what the considerations
were for selecting the town's exact location. Apparently it
was thought that quarrying in the nearby Great Crater,
together with small farms to supplement the resident's
incomes, would provide an economic base for the community
(Ben-Gurion University, 1980).
'This chapter is based mainly on Amiran and Shachar
(1964), Ben-Gurion University(1980), Dror (1982), Friedman
(1980), Smith (1972, 1974, 1975), T.H.L. (1980).
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Despite the fact that Yerucham was the first town in
the region, its development, from the start, was extremely
slow. Towns established later profited from the development
of the region, while Yerucham lagged far behind them.
Dimona is the name of one of the towns which were
established in ancient times along one of the most important
roads in the Northeastern region of the Negev. The road
which connects Beer-Sheva and the northern part of Arava
Valley (see Map 3.1).
The establishment of Dimona and its location is
associated to a greater extent with the renewal of the
chemical plants in the Dead Sea and the Sodom areas. Under
the regime of the British Mandate, the workers in these
plants used to live in nearby camps, while their families
have stayed in the big cities of Tel-Aviv and Jerusalem.
The workers used to join their families every few weeks.
The main reason for this arrangement was the harsh climate
conditions in the area which have prevented the families
from establishing themselves in the region. This separation
has created a lot of problems for the families and for the
workers in the camps.
After the Independence War (1948), the Israeli
government decided to establish a town within commuting
distance from the plants. It was argued that workers who
live close to their families would create a better and more
efficient body of workers. Another factor which had an
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impact on the decision to establish the town was the
erection of the phosphates plants in Oron.
All the above considerations were taken into account
when Dimona was established on the 35th km. on the.road
leading from Beer-Sheva to Sodom (45 km. from Sodom). The
traveling time is approximately forty-five minutes from
Sodom and twenty-five minutes from Oron. Another advantage
of this location was its proximity to a significant
crossroad from where the main roads to Sodom and Eilat
diverged, passing through Yerucham and Mitzpe Ramon.
Unfortunately, Yerucham, the then four year old
town, was completely disregarded in the planning process.
Moreover, later in the 1960s, a new road to Eilat was paved,
leaving Yerucham and Mitzpe-Ramon off the main road, which
had economic and social effects on the town (see chapter 4.3
on the "Subjective perception of the 'island phenomenon'").
Both town's climate is extremely dry, which weakens
the influence of the high temperatures in daytime. Dimona
was located in a way which enables winds to enter and to
ventilate the air, although it also causes strong
sandstorms.
Inspite of their close physical proximity, the towns
have led very different courses of development. While
Dimona was considered to be one of the most successful
industrial towns in the 1970s, Yerucham has always been an
example of an unsuccessful town. Nevertheless, for the last
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few years both have experienced similar difficulties and
problems stemming from their industrial character. This
chapter, and chapters IV and V, will describe the situation.
3.1. Population
By 1980, there were approximately 6250 residents in
Yerucham, 50 more than in 1979. This rate of growth,
although quite slow (0.8 percent yearly) may indicate the
beginning of a process of population growth, after several
years of decrease in population growth compared to the
national averages.
The trajectory of population growth in Dimona was
different. After overcoming the first several problems and
difficulties in the initial stages of development, the town
has grown rapidly. The rate of growth outpaced the rate of
growth in most other development towns. (Between the years
1962-1963 it was double the average rate of growth in other
towns.) Until 1976 Dimona was outstanding in the stability
of its population, only a few residents have emigrated.
A closer look into the three sources of population
growth will highlight the process of development in the two
towns. The three sources are:
a. Natural growth
b. Immigration (Aliya)
c. Internal migration
TABLE 3.1
The Population of Yerucham, 1961-1980
Year No. of Annual Rate
Residents of Growth (%)
1961 1570
1962 2630 67.6
1963 4o0o 52.1
1964 500 12.5
1965 461o 2.4
1966 700 2.0
1967 4750 1.1
1968 4940 4.,
1969 5050 2.2
1970 5400 7.0
1971 5650 4.0
1972 5800 2.6
1973 6200 6.9
1974 6300 1.6
1975 6450 2.3
1978 6150 -4. 9
1979
1980 6250 0.8
Source: Friedman, 1980, c. 29.
TABLE 3.2
THE POPULATION OF DIMONA, 1955-1981
Year No. oIf Annual Rate
Residents of Growth (%)
1955 311
1961 7,400
1967 19,000 0.5
1968 20,300 6.8
1969 21,600 6.4
1970 22,500 4.2
1971 23,200 3.1
1972 23,700 2.2
1973 26,300 10.9
1974 27,100 3.0
1975 27, 400 1.1
1976 27,600 0.7
1977 27,400 -0.7
1978 27,300 -o.4
1979 27,800 1.8
1980 28,000 0.7
10/1981 28,300 '1.1
Source: C.B.S.,
1976.
MuniciTalities in Israel, 1975,
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a. The Natural Growth
The natural growth has been an important component
of the population growth of both towns. Dimona's natural
growth at the initial stages was double that of the
country's natural growth. Between the years 1964-1966, it
was 1.6 percent in Israel and 3.3 percent to 3.5 percent in
Dimona. In other development towns, the average natural
growth between the years 1961-1974 was 2.56 percent. Over
the years, the rate decreased to 2.8 percent in 1976 and 1.9
percent in 1980. In Yerucham the natural growth has
declined to the rate of 2 percent (1977-1978), which is
lower than the average rate in other development towns--2.5
percent. Despite the fact that the rate of birth in the
town is relatively high, the main reason for the decrease in
natural growth is the negative balance of emigration,
especially among the young generation (more than 50 percent
are discharged soldiers and young couples), who are in the
"childbearing" years. There are some fluctuations in the
natural growth rates in Yerucham, and therefore, the trend
is not clear.
The situation is similar in Dimona, but on a larger
scale. Since the beginning of the 1970s, the natural growth
has been the main source of population growth of the town.
Since 1974 it has balanced the negative migration and has
prevented a negative balance of migration. For the last few
years the population has grown altogether by 1.4 percent.
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A closer look into the birth rate in Dimona shows a
great decrease in the number of newborn--a 15 percent
decrease, while the national average has decreased by only 3
percent. Similar to the case of Yerucham, this can be
explained by the emigration of young families (55 percent of
the people who have emigrated).
In 1976 there was a decrease of 1.7 percent in the
birth rate, while in 1980 there was an increase of 9.4
percent. It is therefore, difficult to indicate a clear
trend, but if the decrease in the rate of birth is connected
to the emigration of youngsters and young couples from the
town, the town will face a severe problem of a negative
migration balance.
b. Immigration (Alyah)
Until 1962 the main source of growth in both towns
was immigration from foreign countries. The newcomers were
transferred directly from the ships to the towns by the
Jewish Agency. Each wave of immigrants has its share in the
towns. Between the years 1955-1970, on the average, some
2.2 percent of the immigrants were sent each year to Dimona.
By the end of the 1960s, the rate of immigration
slowed down, and by the beginning of the 1970s it almost
stopped. Since then, it has ceased to play a major role in
the population growth. Nevertheless, in the case of Dimona,
several hundreds of immigrants have been successfully
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absorbed each year over the last few years. In the case of
Yerucham, the call of of the policy to direct new immigrants
to the town is a result of a recent failure in which thirty
families from Russia, which had been directed to the town,
were not successfully absorbed and have left.
c.- Internal Migration
For the last ten years the balance of migration of
Yerucham has been negative. The problems with the migration
balance are due to the high rate of emigration (63 people
per 1000 leave compared to a national average of 40 per
1000), while the rate of immigration is only somewhat lower
than the national average (35 per 1000 in Yerucham, and 40
per 1000 in the whole country).
The main problem with the high rate of emigration is
the large percentage of the young generation which leaves
the town (40 percent of those who leave are in the age group
15-29), and the high percentage of those who come from
Europe and America.
In Dimona, since 1962, the internal migration was
the principal source of population growth. Towards the end
of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s, the balance of
migration has begun to be negative. The year 1962 was the
peak year in terms of immigration (1500 have entered), but
was also a peak year in terms of emigration (23.5 percent
have left the town). In 1966, this rate decreased to
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emigration of only 5.4 percent. In 1976 the rate of
emigration was 5.8 percent and in 1980 it was 4.06 percent.
The percentage of emigrants (out of the total number of
residents) is similar to the percentage in towns from the
same category as Dimona, but the percentage of immigrants
(out of the total) is significantly lower. In 1980 it was
3.9 percent for Kiryat-Gat, 4 percent for Ashdod, and only
2.85 percent for Dimona.
A more refined analysis of the age structure of
those who leave reveals that most of those who are leaving
are among the young generation, i.e., ex-soldiers and young
couples with or without children.
In a survey conducted in Dimona in 1967, it was
found that 30.3 percent of the heads of families in the town
have immigrated to the town voluntarily. The main reasons
for the immigration were: availability of jobs (60 percent)
and relatives and friends (23.4 percent). It was found also
that 46 percent have immigrated from urban settlements, 29
percent from other development towns and 25 percent from
rural settlements.
The study concludes also that heads of families, who
have transferred to Dimona directly from abroad, are the
least mobile, and the longer they stay they have less
tendency to leave the place. Most of those who have left
have done so during the first two years. The main reasons
for staying are:
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1. Insecurity--stemming from lack of knowledge and
information about other places.
2. Loyalty which has developed towards the place over
the years.
3. Being older--the average age of the heads of the
newcomer families is 48 compared to 42.3, the average
newcomers' age of the families in Dimona.
4. Larger families--which increase immobility.
3.2. Demography
a. Age Structure
The age distribution in both towns is similar and
comparable to the age distribution in most of the
development towns. The most outstanding feature is the
share of the age group 0-14. In Yerucham, this age group
constitutes 43 percent of the population, in Dimona it
constitutes 40 percent, while it is 37.1 percent in other
development towns and 30 percent among the Jewish population
in Israel. The share of the age group 15-29 is 29 percent
in Yerucham and 27 percent in Dimona. This share is similar
to the share of this age group in the Southern region, and
somewhat higher than the national average. The share of the
adults (the age groups 30-44 and 45-65) is lower in both
towns compared to the national average. In Yerucham, the
share of the age group 65 and over is especially low. This
Dhenomenon is typical to places in which population is
unstable and many leave at younger ages.
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The average age in Yerucham is 20.3 years and in
Dimona, 24.1 years. The implications of this type of age
structure are:
1. A great share of the resources have to be invested in
education, vocational education and recreational
facilities for the age group 0-14. This means a
financial burden on the family and the local
municipality.
2. Low rate of participation in the labor force. The
dependency ratio2 is relatively high. The dependency
ratio in Dimona was 1.17 in 1977 and in Yerucham 1.33
compared to the natioan ratio of 1.02. In 1978 the
ratio was 1.13 for Dimona, and 1.23 for Yerucham.
3. The percentage of those who are entering the labor
force is high which means that more jobs have to be
supplied to satisfy the increasing demand.
b. Country of Origin
Most of the groups of newcomers who were sent to
Dimona and Yerucham were of Asian-African origin. (In
Dimona, it totaled to 70 percent of the immigrants.) Over
the years, the share of those who have immigrated from
Europe and America--among the other immigrant groups--have
decreased because of their lower birth rate compared to the
share of those from Asia and Africa, and because they have
2Dependency ratio = the age groups 0-19 and 65+ / the age
group 20-64.
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consisted of a larger part among those who have left the
towns relative to those who have entered.
In Yerucham, the lion's share of Yerucham residents
(91 percent) originated from two countries: Morocco (70
percent) and India (20 percent), the rest (10 percent) are
from Iran, Anglo-Saxon countries and others. More than half
of the population (in 1980) has immigrated to Israel between
1948-1965, and only 6 percent came between 1965-1972. This
explains the large share of large families and other
demographic, economic and social characteristics.
Following is a short description of the main
communities in Yerucham:
The Moroccan community. Most of the Moroccan
residents have immigrated to Israel in the late 1950s and
early 1960s. They came from different places in Morocco,
and organized themselves mainly on the basis of extended
family groups ("Hamulot"). In the beginning of the
absorption process, these units have gained political power.
The phenomenon is quite common in some urban neighborhoods
and in development towns, and is common in Yerucham as well
as in Dimona. One of the main motivations for Moroccans to
immigrate to the town is the willingness to live close to
family and relatives.
The Indian community. The Indian community
comprises some 20 percent of Yerucham's population. (In
1980, there were about 350 families.) Most of them arrived
TABLE 3.3
THE POPULATION OF YERUCHAM BY ORIGIN (1972)
Origin Yerucham (%) Israel (%)
Ye'rucham's Residents 100 100
Israel 37 47
Asia - Africa 58 25
Europe - America 5 28
He ads of families 100 100
Israel 1 8
Asia - Africa 91 47
Europe - America 9 h
Source: Friedman, 1980, p. 34.
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to Israel in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Their
absorption process was accompanied by many difficulties,
sometimes even violent conflicts, mostly with the Moroccan
community. Today, there is not any apparent conflict
between the Indian community and others, however, it seems
that the Indian population feels discriminated against.
This feeling is caused by several factors: the language of
this community is Amharic, which is not a Sematic language,
many of the youngsters have difficulty in learning Hebrew,
and others have difficulties in understanding them. Another
factor is their religion--most of the Indian population of
Yerucham belongs to the "Bnei-Israel" ethnic group, and the
chief Rabbinate of Israel placed their Jewishness in
question. This led to such discrimination against them that
for quite a while they were forbidden to marry Jews of other
ethnic background. This prohibition no longer exists, but
they tend to marry among themselves. The third factor is an
institutional factor. Most of the key positions in
Yerucham's agencies were already filled by people of other
national backgrounds when the Indian immigrants arrived in
Yerucham. Relatively well-established political groups were
already in existence as well. The result is that not one
member of the Indian community has managed to become a
senior official in the local council, in any other public
service agency or in the local plants and service
facilities.
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The other communities--the Persian community and
Ashkenazim make up about 10 percent of Yerucham's
population. They include: the Rumanian community which was
the founding group of Yerucham in 1951. There are about
thirty families of Rumanian origin in the town today, most
of whom are elderly. Most of the original group of
newcomers, especially the younger generation have left.
In Dimona, historical data on the distribution of
the population by country of origin shows that the share of
those who were born in Israel, has increased considerably
(see table 3.4). This is due clearly to the high birth rate
which characterizes this population. The share of those who
were born in Asian and African countries has decreased. The
same is true for those who were born in European and
American countries but to a lesser extent. Most of those
who were born in Israel are children of parents who were
born in Asian and African countries. A more refined
analysis of the data will show that in 1972, the share of
those whose origin is in one of the Asian/African countries
is larger.
When the distribution by country of origin in Dimona
is compared to the distribution in the Southern Region and
in Israel, it shows that the share of those who were born in
Israel is smaller relative to their share in the Southern
Region, and in Israel. The share of those who were born in
Asian-African countries is higher compared to their share in
TABLE 3.4
THE POPULATION OF DIMONA BY ORIGIN
Year
Origin
1967 1972 1977
100 100 100
Israel 5.5 37.1 43.9
Asia - Africa 73.1 44.8 43.2
Europe - America 21.4 18.1 11.1
Heads of Families 100
Israel 20.5
Asia - Africa 63.7
Europe -Ameri ca 15. 8
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the Southern Region and in Israel, and the share of those
who were born in European and American countries is
considerably lower.
c. Size of Family
The average size of a family in Yerucham is 5.1
persons per household while the average size among the
Jewish population is 3.6. The families with 6+ persons per
family constitute 40 percent of the families in the town
compared to 14 prcent in the Jewish population (1972). A
similar situation existed in 1977.
The average size of a family in Dimona is higher
than the national average as well. In 1967 it was 4.6
persons per household (3.7 in the Jewish population).
Approximately 23 percent of the families have seven and more
persons per family. In 1975, 38.2 percent of the families
had four and more children compared to 14.5 percent among
the Jewish population.
3.3. Years of Schooling
Most of Yerucham's population (age 14+) is in the
lower level of schooling. The median age of schooling in
1977 was 7.5 years compared to the national average of 10
years. Outstanding is the high percentage of those lacking
formal education, which is double the average in the whole
region (which is itself low, relative to the national
average). The low level of formal education can be also
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seen in the small percentage of those with high education
(3.6 percent) compared to the whole region (11.9 percent).
Dimona's population is characterized by a higher
level of education compared to Yerucham, but a lower level
compared to Arad, the Negev (Southern) Region, and the
national average. Half of the population have elementary
education and less, and 15 percent of them do not have any
formal education. Only 30 percent have secondary education
compared to 55 percent in Arad and 40 percent in the Negev
and the whole country. The percentage of those with high
education is smaller compared to the average in Arad,
although it is close to the average in the Negev.
3.4. Standard of Living
The standard of living of the population in Yerucham
and Dimona is significantly lower compared to the national
averages. In Yerucham the income per capita was 60 percent
of the national average (for 1977).
Another characteristic of the low standard of living.
can be found in the rate of motorization which is 25 per
1000 persons in Yerucham (for 1978), and 43.5 in Dimona.
The national average is 116.
The low level of income and standard of living stem
from various reasons: low-skilled and non-skilled labor
force, large number of persons per family who are dependent
on one wage earner, and the low rate of female participation
in the labor force.
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The low level of income is combined with a high rate
of welfare recipients. Although there was a decrease of
45.4 percent in the number of families who get public
assistance (from 9.4 percent of the families getting help in
1973 to 3.9 percent in 1978), relative to the national
average it is still quite high. (The national average in
1978 was 1.3 percent.) In Dimona there was also a decrease
(from 7 percent in 1975 to 5.0 percent in 1978) but relative
to the national average and even compared to Yerucham the
percentage of families getting public assistance is quite
high.
The rate of social workers per 1000 residents in
Dimona is 2.5 times the rate in the whole country (0.99 in
Dimona and 0.40 in the whole country), but the-percentage of
the social work positions filled is 66.7 percent compared to
the national rate of 84 percent. This percentage shows that
there are welfare problems in the town, and that there is an
institutional awareness, but it also indicates that the
necessary services are not supplied adequately. In
Yerucham, the rate of social workers per 1000 population is
even higher--1.47, but the percentage of social work
positions filled is only 66.7 percent.
Another indicator for the low standard of living in
the towns is the average income from local taxes per capita.
In Dimona it was 248 I.L. in 1976, in Yerucham 257 I.L.,
while the national average was 987 I.L.
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The housing density in both towns is high. The
percentage of the population which lives in high density (3+
per room) was 11.7 percent in 1972 compared to a national
average of 6.2 percent and only 1.9 percent of the residents
of Arad lived in such a high density. In Dimona, 17.1
percent of the residents lived in the high housing density
of 3+ per room. (In israel, adequate housing density is
considered to be 1.5 persons per room.)
3.5. The Education System
The systems of formal and informal education in
Dimona is quite impressive in its range and in the variety
of studies and activities during the day and in the
evenings.
The formal education system consists of 10,000
students, starting from day-cares to high schools. There is
a school of music (conservatory) with 700 students. Various
youth movements are active in the town, and lately two
groups were formed tending to go to the rural settlements
after their military service. Although it may mean, from
the town's point of view, a loss of young people, it
indicates a successful absorption process into the Israeli
society.
56.25 percent of the municipal service employees are
employed in education services (1125 employees). The school
buildings are used in the afternoons and evenings as
community centers and libraries.
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Secondary education. Rapid progress has been taking
place in the area of secondary education. In the 1960s
there was only one vocational school, and in the 1970s there
were three schools for grades 7 to 10, and two for the llth
and 12th grades.
In 1980, the rate of high school students was 61.7
(per 1000 population) compared to 25.0 in 1967 and 8.1 per
1000 in 1961. The national average was 54.1 in 1980. The
ratio in Dimona is, therefore, quite high, nevertheless, a
different calculation will reveal a slightly different
picture: the rate of students per children in the age group
14-17 in 1980 was 72 percent, while the national average is
83.1 percent.
Vocational education. In 1974, there were 420
students in the vocational school studying mainly: fashion,
blacksmithy, electronics and drafting. In 1980 there were
some 600 students in the vocational system.
In addition to the school there is a center which
provides basic vocational education to pre-military students
in carpentry and blacksmithy.
Yerucham enjoys a variety of educational
institutions and services. In the eight schools it has
(elementary, secondary and vocational), there are 2,264
students. In addition, there is a special vocational school
("Mviftan") for drop-outs. A large number of institutions
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does not indicate that the quality of education is high.
Due to the small size of the place and the large number of
educational institutions, it is difficult to provide a
variety of educational programs. Moreover, as in many of
the development towns, there are problems in filling the
vacant jobs. As a result, the quality of the teachers is
lower, there is a low percentage of experienced and
qualified teachers, most of the teachers have just finished
school and they lack experience, teachers stay for short
periods (one-two years) and the turnover is very high, many
of the teachers live outside the town and do not contribute
to the social and community life after work hours, and there
is a shortage in professional teachers. This situation is
severe especially because of the existence of a very high
percentage (90 percent) of students who need special
assistance.
A unique phenomenon which characterizes the
development towns in general and Yerucham and Dimona in
particular is the tendency to send children to boarding
schools outside the towns. The reasons are: 1) to provide
better education opportunities for the children; 2) to
decrease the economic burden from the family, since these
schools are highly subsidized. The chances are that most of
these children will not come back to the towns after
graduating.
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3.6. Labor Force
In 1980, 1484 employees from Yerucham have been
employed in the various sectors (industry and services) in
the town and outside. This labor force consists of 24
percent of the population which is a low ratio compared to
the national average (35.8 percent). In Dimona the ratio is
approximately 30 percent.
The main reasons for this low ratio in both towns
are: 1) the population is young. In Yerucham only 54
percent are of working age compared to the national average
of 62.5 percent. 2) Increasing rate of students among those
in the age group between 14 and 17. 3) High rate of
housewives who are reluctant to go to work either because of
traditional customs or lack of available jobs.
a. Distribution by Occupation
From the distribution of the employed by occupation
(table 4.13 in chapter IV), it can be seen that half of the
employees from Yerucham concentrate in blue-collar jobs.
Another quarter are in the services (low level), and the
rest are scattered among white-collar jobs while the
percentage of academicians is almost nil. This type of
distribution of occupations indicates that the level of
income is low which implies also a low standard of living.
The situation in Dimona is quite similar.
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b. Distribution by Branches
The main employment branches in Yerucham are:
industry and services. In 1961, some 26 percent were
employed in the industry, and in 1973, 65 percent of the
labor force was employed by manufacturing and mining, and
29.7 percent were employed by the service sector. In
Dimona, almost half of the labor force was employeed by
industri-al plants in 1962--48 percent and 29.8 percent by
services. These numbers increased to 55.5 percent in
industry and mining in 1973, and 37.4 percent in the service
sector. The rate of those who were employed by the
construction sector has decreased from 16.5 percent to 6.4
percent between the years 1961 and 1973 (see table 4.12 in
chapter IV). This structure has not changed till today.
In Yerucham, out of those who are industrial
employees, about half are employed in the town while
approximately a quarter are employed by the various regional
plants, and the rest work in other plants in the region.
The workers in the industrial plants in Yerucham
include also 218 workers from Dimona and 21 commuters from
Beer-Sheva and the northern parts of the country. The
industry is therefore the main employment branch the town is
based on. The percentage employed in the industrial sector
is high compared to the national average and it is similar
to the percentage in Dimona.
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Out of those employed in services, the lion's share
works at the local municipality and in the neighboring
college in Sede-Boker. The rest are employed by various
institutions in the town. The share of those employed by
the service sector is low due to the undeveloped service
sector in the town. Most of the services (accountants,
legal services, engineering and auxiliary facilities) are
supplied by Beer-Sheva and the central part of the country.
The percentage of workers in the service sector in
Dimona is slightly higher (36 percent), but the town shares
the same problems faced by Yerucham. Most of the needed
services are supplied by agencies in Beer-Sheva and in the
metropolitan region. In Dimona itself, some 2880 workers
are employed in the service sector. Two thousand of them
are in public and municipal services (most of them
teachers), 480 in personal services and 400 in commerce.
Data on the development of the commercial sector shows that
the standard of living has improved. There are many more
stores for electronics, appliances and clothing, and new
stores for carpets and housing articles.
Another employment source is the tourist resorts and
especially the hotels along the Dead Sea. Only fifty from
Dimona are employed there due to lack of commuting
arrangements, and increased demand for cheap Arab labor
force.
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In 1980, some 66 workers from Yerucham and some 300
from Dimona (80 males and 220 females) were employed by the
American company which built the military airports in the
Negev area. This is a solution for the short run (two-three
years). The work with this company is not as attractive as
it had been thought, because of the "American work ethics"
demanded from the workers and the "Israeli salary" paid.
Employment in the construction sector has decreased
considerably over the years. The amount of work depends on
the demand for housing.
3.7. Employment
Dimona was established in an area with a strong
industrial potential.' Its location was dictated by the
distances to various existing and future industrial zones.
Over the years, more natural resources have been discovered
and they are in the process of exploitation.
In comparison to most of the development towns which
were established under the pressure of mass migration
without any employment or industrial infrastructure, Dimona
was established with a strong indsutrial potential, but has
not actually always benefited from this potential.
In order to analyze the employment situation in
Yerucham and Dimona, the whole region should be considered.
(See table 3.5 on the regional distribution of employment.)
3A detailed description of the industrial plants is given
in chapter V.
TABLE 3.5
SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF WORKERS IN THE NEGEV REGION
Total Yerucham Dimona Arad Beer-Sheva
Name of Plant No. of Remarks
Workers Total A* B** C*** Total A B C Total Total
Yerucham
Foenicia 475
Negev Ceramics
Lon
Brand Metal
Tempo Zippoi
Long John
Zevi Hovala
300 10 110 180
80 43 3 12 28
34 23
20 10
165 15 100 50 1
33 4 14 15
10 13 10
4 6
25 15 3 2 10 10 1
12 12 1
10
3
3 top managers
from Beer4Sheva
General Director
from Tel-Aviv
10 Manager from
Tel-Aviv
10 I4 managers
9
1 3 Manager and tech-
nical workers
from Tel-Airiv
15 15 8 . 7
Dimona
Kittan Dimona
Dimona Textile
Sodom Metal
1250
630
250
55 1
50
5
900 -3 00- 600
50 375 75
5 200
320 Arab workers
155 from the
West Bank
Some workers from
Arad and Beer-
Sheva
Plasteco 10 1
16
9 3 6
TABLE 3.5--Cont.
Yerucham Dimona Arad Beer-Sheva
Name of Plant No. of Remarks
Workers Total A* B** C*** Total A B C Total Total
Region
Dead Sea Works 1365 400 300 600
Negev Phosphates 1692 174 776 243 391 108 from Tel-Aviv
and the central
parts
Periklas 180 80 80 20
Comments:
A* - Managers, engineers.
B** - Technicians and professions--skilled and semi-skilled.
C***- Unskilled workers.
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The distance from Dimona to the farthest place of
employment ("Dead Sea Works") is 45 km. The distances to
other places ("Periklas" and "Negev Phosphates") are 20-30
km. In order to provide jobs to those heads of families who
could not find adequate jobs in the regional plants, and to
supply jobs for the women, two big textile plants were
established close to the town--"Kittan Dimona" in 1958 and
"Sivi Dimona" in 1960. (See table 3.6 on the industrial
development of Dimona.) Both plants employed, in 1966, 1788
employees which consisted of 43.4 percent of the town's
employees. Most of the employees were semi-skilled and
unskilled workers. The regional chemical plants have
employed as well semi-skilled and unskilled workers from
Dimona. These jobs were adequate for the educational and
professional level of most of the newcomers. For the last
decade, the number of employees and their share among the
total employed has decreased. In 1980, 1295 workers have
been employed (16 percent out of the employees in the town).
This decrease indicates to some extent a decrease in the
dependency of the town on labor-intensive, less developed
plants. Despite this decrease, a great share of the workers
(45 percent) are concentrated in few plants (eight). There
is a risk in this concentration since any economic crisis in
one of the plants may bring unemployment.
Out of the eight big plants, there are the two
textile plants and the glass plant in Yerucham, "Foenicia,"
TABLE 3.6
THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE PLANTS IN DIMONA
(by number of employees)
Year
Plant
E* 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
Kittan Dimona
Dimona Textile
Yerucham Textile
Dagan (Bakery)
Haroshet Barzel
Shmuelevitz
Dimona
Defus Dimona
Hamarkivim
Aviad
Glima
Kal amit
Magen
M.G.M.
Iriyat Dimona
Sakom
Sodom Metal
Azulai,
Plasteco
Demi -Or
Alvo
1958
1958
1342
650
1959 24
1961 26
1961 25
-- E.35
1350
480
24
26
25
40
E.2
1356
520
24
26
25
C.
1350
550
E. 133
24
26
25
5 8
E. 20
E. I
E. 16
E.12
E. 11
1350
550
140
24
26
25
5
20
6
5h
13
20
E.12
1457
800
513
14
25
8
5
26
4
C.
C.
30
30
E.12
1511
943
469
27
25
18
6
30
6
1501
1000
400
32
23
23
10
6
14 21
17 12
15 22
E.17 67
E.100 130
E. 11
1501 1501 1538 1439 1500 1450 1425 1425 1250 1050
1000 1000 545 490 495 495 514 600 630 600
32
23
23
10
6
6
C.
12
22
67
130
11
32 32 42 4o 62 60 60 60 60
C.
23 22 24 28 23 22 22 22 22
10
41
6
12
22
67
130
11
7
40
10
13
23
71
200
10
E .
E.
7
5
8
13
25
77
200
17
7
5
9
13
23
35
150
20
7
5
5
6
9
28
130
25
0U 15 15 -
25
9 5 15 75
7
10
5
7
6
5
7
6
5
5
6
5
11 17 17 17
C.
28
190
C.
130
33
70
32 30 22
250 200
115
33
60
10
33
60
10
12
100
TABLE 3.6--cont.
Year
E* 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
Ceramic Casting E.8 150 300 73 66 41 C.
Friction Material 350 306 216 C.
Maas E.21 21 34 36 27 18 18 21
Isragil E-15 27 26 25 13 13 10
Mifali Tovala E.20 24 24 25 25 25 25
Mor E.15 20 20 20 20
G.D.G. E.17 11 11 11 40
Total # Plants 1  20 24 28 33 33 44 51 51 51 51 79 79 80 81 72 48 48 64
# of employees2 2102 1921 1950 2179 2245 2924 3198 3299 2878 2855 2559 2563 2740 2880 2989 2726 2477 2225
# of employees3  56 279 235 121 780 267 291 356 777 800 711 718 614 525 1117 1953 1623 1706
(in other plants)
14
Total # employees 2158 2200 2185 2300 3025 3191 3489 3655 3655 3655 3270 3281 3354 3405 4106 4679 4300 3931
Notes: E--Established
C--Closed down
*-In the first column, the date of establishment of the first five plants is indicated.
1. Total number of plants--includes some small plants and workshops which are not specified in the list.
2. Number of employees--number of employees from Dimona and other places who are employed in Dimona.
3. Number of employees in other plants--number of employees from Dimona employed in small plants and workshops in Dimona
and in the region.
4. Total number of employees-- (2) + (3).
Source: Ministry of Commerce and Industry, The Department for Development Regions. "Survey of the Industrialization of
Development Towns," for the years 1.963-198].
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which is similar to the textile plants in its
characteristics (the types of jobs available, technology,
difficulties in the world markets, etc.).
One unique plant which belongs actually more to the
auxiliary services sector is "Sodom Metal." This plant
gives the needed blacksmithy and welding services to most of
the industrial plants in the region and employes 250
workers.
After a long time in which no new plant was
established in Dimona (except for small workshops,
experiencing high turnover as table 3.6 shows), two advanced
plants began to operate in 1975. The two plants, "Friction
Materials" and "Ceramics Castings" have produced various
accessories for cars and heavy machinery. Large
governmental investments were made to assure rapid
industrial development. The plants have created hopes and
expectations for future adequate jobs and an overall
economic development. At the beginning some ninety workers
were employed, and the forecast for 1977 was for eight
hundred employees. After two years of operation, both
plants were closed down. The main reasons were continuous
managerial problems which have affected the working life in
the plant. This closing down was a blow to the town.
The other four plants are the three regional
chemical plants and the defense related industrial plant.
They are actually "national projects" which were established
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due to national consideratioris. As such, they are least
vulnerable to economic fluctuations and risks.
Inspite of the close distance to these plants, only
42 percent of the workers in the plants (1280 out of 3045)
are from Dimona, the rest commute from Beer-Sheva and Arad.
This is a result of processes which have been taking place
over the last thirty years in which people who have improved
their socioeconomic status have moved to towns like
Beer-Sheva and Arad which have higher socioeconomic
standards of living. The commuters are subsidized by the
plants for the time and money spent on commuting. The
plants offer also assistance in acquiring housing in all
three locations for their employees.
Yerucham, in contrast to Dimona, was established
without any sources of employment. Between the years
1962-1964, in which the size of the population had increased
threefold, there were only eighty jobs in industry. (See
table 3.7 on the industrial development of Yerucham.)
Only in 1968 was the first big plant
established--"Foenicia" and later on "Tempo," both
manufactured glass. In 1972 "Negev Ceramics" was
established. Due to the lack of income sources, most of the
population relied on welfare payments between the years
1962-1968. It is believed that this phenomenon had an
impact on the place till today.
TABLE 3.7
THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE PLANTS IN YERUCHAM
(by number of employees)
Year
Name of Plant
1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
Lon Laboratory E. 10 16 16 16 16 10 19 19 19 19 70 67 50 39 40 40 40 34
E.
E.5
E. 42
E. 5
E.14
Fiberglass
Kristal Hanegev
Bagi r
Feingold
Pipelines
Avi tan
Israglass
Tempo:
Bottles
Beverages
Corks
Foeuil cia
Yerucham Threads
Zaltsberger
Negev Ceramics
Novam Textile
Ben Ivry
A. B. Textile
Miftan
Univers
5
9
26
5
C.
E.2
E,10
5
C.
C.
C.
C.
C.
E.
5 5 6 5 5 5 5 9 9 C.
533 450
300 340 500 500 500 500 595 549 452
E.52
E.23
55
23
55 60
C.
550 48o 475
60 60 6o 81 94 96 90 100
E.16 C.
E.100
E.80
170
50
E.6
E. 14
90
60
6
15
87
40
C.
C.
E.37
. 85
41
4o
E.25
85 8o 75
C.
40
25
40 44
C.
TABLE 3.7--cont.
Year
Name of Plant
1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
Basmat E.4 5 4 4
Brand's Metal E.10 10 14
Avisror E.6 22 22
Tempo Zippoi E. 27
Long John E. 16
Zevi Havola E.25
Total # of Plants 1 6 11 8 7 10 10 12 9 9 9 13 13 15 11 14 14 14 19
# of Employees2  76 73 21 96 399 411 600 684 684 684 935 959 769 826 785 761 676 736
# of Employees in
other plants) 10 8 5 8 3 223 187 139 202 479 500 420 310 313 362 454 404
Total # of Employees 6 83 29 101 407 414 823 771 823 886 1414 1459 1189 1136 1098 1123 1130 1140
Notes: E--Established
C--Closed down
1. Total number of plants--includes some small plants and workshops which are not specified in the list.
2. Number of employees--number of-employees from Yerucham and other places who are employed in Yerucham.
3. Number of employees in other plants--number of employees from Yerucham employed in' small plants and workshops in
Yerucham and in the region.
h. Total number of employees--(2) + (3).
Source: Ministry of Commerce and Industry, The Department for Development Regions, "Survey of the Industrialization of the
Development Towns," for the years 1963-1981.
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Since then, only a few small plants and workships
have been established, and the turnover is quite high.
The Regional Distribution of Employment
Table 3.5 indicates that more than one-third of the
workers from Dimona are employed outside the town. From
Yerucham, some 35 percent are employed outside the town.
These are commuters who travel everyday to their work
places. For some (those who are employed by the chemical
plants), the traveling and the time spent are paid by the
plants. The employment issue in both towns should be
studied on the regional level since it will give a more
comprehensive picture of the employment situation in the
industrial sector.
The regional distribution of the workers from Dimona
and from the region has changed over the years. In 1967
only 1.8 percent of the employed came from outside. In
1972, the percentage grew to 17 percent and has stayed the
same in 1980. Most of the outside workers are Arabs who
commute from the West Bank. They are employed in
low-skilled jobs refused by Jewish workers.
A smaller fraction of these outside commuters are
managers, engineers and other professional and skilled
workers, since the town cannot yet supply all the industrial
requirements for these top job holders.
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In a comparative analysis (between the years 1972
and 1980) of the work place of Dimona.'s residents it was
found that there is a decrese in the percentage of workers
from Dimona who work in their town. It went down from 82.4
percent in 1972 to 63.5 percent in 1980.
Although it may imply that there is a shortage of
available jobs in the 'town, it mainly indicates that there
is an occupational advancement of the workers who find
better and challenging jobs in the region. The decrease in
the percentage of the workers from Dimona in the two textile
plants is another indication of this phenomenon.
In Yerucham, between the years 1972 and 1978, there
was a decrease in the number of employees in the industry,
but between 1978 and 1981 the share of the industrial
employees has increased.
A closer look into the data shows that the
increasing share refers to the employees in the industrial
plants outside of Yerucham. This phenomenon has happened as
a result of the curtailment in employment in local plants,
especially in "Foenicia" and in the expansion of employment
in plants outside Yerucham. Since the textile plants have
curtailed their labor force as well, it seems that the
increase in employment is mainly in "Negev Phosphates."
In 1978, 160 outside employees have commuted
everyday to Yerucham, and in 1980 this number increased to
218. This shows that the rate of ccmmuting in the region is
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increasing but it also indicates that a process of
polarization is taking place among the various settlements
in the region, i.e., each town is "specializing" in a
specific quality of its labor force, based on the level of
skills. In the case of Yerucham, it turns out that the town
exports to the industrial plants in the region, non-skilled
and semi-skilled labor force, while importing the medium and
high skilled labor force, including management.
The impact of this phenomenon is crucial for the
town. Except for the negative image it gives to the town,
there is a reluctance of the professional and managerial
labor force to settle in the town. This in turn reduces the
amount of expenditures made in the town and, therefore,
decreases the level of services and quality of commercial
services and altogether the attractiveness of the town.
3.8. Unemployment
In contrast to many of the development towns, both
towns have not experienced high rate of unemployment
throughout the years, even at the recession period,
1965-1967. In the case of Yerucham it was due to the
relatively high percent of people employed in relief work up
to 1968 (when the two glass plants were established).
From 1979 on there has been an increase in the
unemployment rates. In Dimona in 1980, the number of
unemployed per 1000 for the age 17+ was 40.06 compared to
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the national average of 38.06 per 1000. (The number of
unemployed does not include those who have not registered or
those who have refused to take jobs offered.)
In Yerucham, there has been a gradual increase in
the number of unemployed, approximately 5 percent of the
labor force.
In both towns 'the unemployment problem is severe
especially among the ex-soldiers, high school graduates who
refuse to take the available jobs in the labor-intensive
plants and do not have other job options.
Summary
The social, demographic, and economic pattern of the
developments of Yerucham and Dimona is not unique. All the
development towns have experienced in one way or another
similar patterns. Nevertheless, due to the remoteness of
these two towns these patterns are more prominent.
The next chapter will analyze the situation in
Yerucham and Dimona compared to the situation in other
development towns and in the country which will highlight
the severity of the problem in these two towns.
CHAPTER IV
DESCRIPTION OF THE CURRENT SITUATION OF THE
DEVELOPMENT TOWNS--THE "ISLAND PHENOMENON"
In order to understand the roots of the problematic
situation in the development towns in general and in Dimona
and Yerucham in particular, it is hypothesized that the
"island phenomenon" concept can serve as a basic f-amework
for analyzing the current situation of the development
towns.
The "island phenomenon" is defined as a situation in
which the development towns possess characteristics of
developing countries, within the context of the developed
society of Israel itself. The notion of "island" is a
relative one. When one studies the absolute performance of
the development towns in the seventies and eighties,
compared to the one in the fifties, there is no doubt that
the situation in later years is far better and that the
development towns have been progressing since their
establishment. The roots of the problems lie in the
relative success of the non-metropolitan industrial towns
compared to the other towns and to the rest of the country.
In this relative progress, measured by a wide range of
socioeconomic indicators: the level of education, income,
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housing conditions, rate of motorization and other
indicators of the standard of living, one may find the roots
of the problem.
In addition to this gap, measured by 'objective"
indices, part of the crisis in the late seventies and
eighties, seems to be the subjective perceptions and
impressions of this gap by the local residents as well as by
outsiders who are involved with the economic and social
development of the development towns, e.g., industrialists,
policy makers in various levels, etc. These perceptions
have their reflections on the behavior of -the different
groups. Moreover, it is not only the proportions which have
been distorted, there are also the growing expectations of
the inhabitants in the development towns who have been
exposed in various ways to these differences. Employment
policies, motivation to work, and work ethics are all
influenced by this perceived gap.
In the following chapter, the existence of the
"island phenomenon' will be examined from three angles:
4.1. The socioeconomic perspective--based on
statistical data on the socioeconomic status of
selected development towns, it will be shown that the
non-metropolitan industrial towns are still lagging
behind the rest of the country and even behind the rest
of the other development towns.
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4.2. The industrial and employment perspective--based
on statistical data and studies conducted on the
industrial structure of the development towns, a
comparison will be made between the latter and the
industrial structure of the whole country, in order to
highlight the gap between the two, and to show the
effects on the socioeconomic structure of the towns.
4.3. The subjective perception of the phenomenon--the
image of the development towns in general, and of
Yerucham and Dimona in particular as it is perceived by
their inhabitants and by policy makers in the local,
regional and national levels.
4.1. The Socioeconomic Perspective
The "island phenomenon" is a relative concept. It
describes a situation existing in the industrial,
non-metropolitan development towns,' relatively to the
'There is no single, universally accepted definition for
a development town. Each governmental department uses
different criteria to give a town a status of a development
town. For a working definition, the following criteria,
based on several studies will be used: A development town
is a town which meets one of the following criteria:
1. An urban settlement, established after 1948 as part
of the government population dispersal plan.
2. An old settlement which received a significant number
of immigrants through government direction, and whose
population at present is mainly composed of persons
of Asian and North-African descent (see table 4.5).
3. A settlement located in either an underdeveloped area
or on the outskirts of a large city, having the
character of a slum town.
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situation in other towns.
The group of industrial non-metropolitan development
towns consists of some twenty-nine towns (90 percent). The
development town concept was introducted into the
settlements system in the beginning of the fifties, and the
towns have become the primary mechanism for pursuing the
goal of population dispersal. Since then, some thirty new
towns have been established. (The essential statistics on
these towns are described in table 4.1)
Approximately, half of the towns were built or
reestablished in the period up to 1951. Between 1952 and
1957 a further eight were built. The pause which followed
was broken only in 1961 when a start was made on two more
towns: Arad and Carmiel.
The main function envisaged for most of the
development towns was to be the service centers--providing
administrative and economic services in the regional
level--for the rural settlements in their respective
regions. (Kiryat-Gat is the classical example for the
Lachish region.) However, adequate links between the new
towns and the already existing and self-sufficient
infrastructure built up among the collective villages were
not established. There was indifference or antipathy
4. A settlement which is greatly dependent upon
government development aid beyond what is usually
granted for local development.
TABLE 4.1
THE ESSENTIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DEVELOPMENT TOWNS-
Settlement Year of Size-1978 Distance FunctionEstablishment (thousands) (km)
Afula
Akko
Arad
Ashdod
Ashkelon
Beer-Sheva
Beit Shdan
Beit Shemesh
Carmiel
Dimona
Eilat
Hatzor
Kiryat Gat
Kiryat Malachi
Kiryat Shemona
Lod
Maalot
Migdal ha-Emek
Mitzpeh Ramon
Nahariya
Netivot
Of akint
Or-Akiva
Ramle
Sederot
1925
Ancient
1961
1956
1949
Ancient
Ancient
1951
1965
1955
1951
1953
1965
1951
1949
1948
1957
-1952
1956
1934
1956
1955
1951
19148
1951
18.9
37.2
10.1
58.7
50.6
103.3
12.8
11.8
9.7
27.3
18.2
5.9
23.1
10.5
15.8
33.2
3.7
12.7
4.5
27.6
7.5
11.2
7.5
38.7
8.3
44
22
154
40
61
110
70
32
43
149
342
84
60
44
109
15
50
25
199
31
80
87
142
20
65
industrial, service
industrial
industrial, tourist, bedroom
industrial, port city
industrial, service
industrial, service
industrial, bedroom
industrial, bedroom
industrial
industrial, service
port city, service
industrial
industrial, service
industrial
industtial, service
industrial,
industrial
industrial
industrial
industrial,
industrial
industrial,
industrial
industrial,
industrial,
bedroom
tourist
service
bedroom
service
TABLE 4.1--Cont .
Settlement Year of Size-1978 DistanceFEstablishment (thousands) (km) Function
Shlomi 1950 8.3 60 industrial
Tiberias 18 B.C. 27.5 70 tourist, service
Yavne 1949 11.5 20 industrial, bedroom
Yokneam 1950 4.0 15 industrial
Yerucham 1951 6.1 143 industrial
Zefat Ancient 14.9 73 tourist, service
Upper Nazareth 1957 19.9 38 industrial
Distance--As measured from the development town to the closest metropolitan centers: Tel-
Aviv, Haifa, Jerusalem.
Source: Berler, 1970; Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, 1979.
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expressed by the rural inhabitants towards the new "planted"
urban centers (Cohen, 1970). Thus the development towns
were bypassed by the settlements, while the central cities
and especially Tel-Aviv became the main service center.
However, one significant link between the two types of
settlements has emerged and the development towns became the
source of hired labor for the rural settlements. (In table
4.12 the percentage employed in agriculture demonstrates
this situation.) Consequently, the development towns had to
develop an economic base of their own.
Despite a certain uniformity among the development
towns, the rate of development in individual towns has
varied greatly. Some have developed dynamically, while
others, due to social, economic and political disabilities
of various kind, have tended to stagnate. Table 4.1
demonstrates the existence of types of development towns
according to their size, distance and function. The
distance is measured from the specific development town to
the closest metropolitan center along the coast line (Haifa
in the north or Tel-Aviv in the south) as well as
Jerusalem. 2 The distance indicates the physical remoteness
of the town from the metropolitan centers. The function
2Beer-Sheva has emerged as a center of the Negev only
since 1967 due to the renewed waves of immigration from the
U.S.S.R., and to the important role the town has played
since the occupation of the Sinai peninsula. Nevertheless,
it cannot be recognized yet as a metropolitan center,
although Arad for example was defined in table 4.1 as a
"bedroom" community for Beer-Sheva.
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indicates the actual direction of development of the town
(in contrast to the intended or the planned one). Distance
and function seem to be the most adequate lines of
categorization for serving the purposes of this study, while
the size of the town was found to be, in many cases,
affected by distance and function.
Following the table, it is quite clear that most of
the development towns are heavily based on industry, as the
main source of employment, nevertheless, some towns have
actually become service centers.
Outstanding in its volume and impact is the city of
Beer-Sheva, which has become for the last decade the
southern center of the country. Beer-Sheva is mainly a
service center though it has a wide range of industrial
plants. Some other towns have developed a small service
centers beside industrial plants, e.g., Dimona, Kiryat-Gat,
Tiberias, and Zefat. It is not surprising that all of the
industrial towns are characterized by being more than 50 km.
from the metropolitan centers, since none of them could
compete on attracting industrialists and resources with the
metroplitan itself.
Three towns: Tiberias, Zefat and Arad, have
established themselves as tourist centers due to their
locational advantages for tourism. Eilat and Ashdod have
become port cities. In this case, the location by the
seashore has outweighed any other locational advantages.
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Five towns have become "bedroom" communities--Arad,
Beit-Shedn, Beit Shemesh, Lod, Ramle, Yavne. Arad is a
bedroom community to the workers in the regional
plants--"Dead-Sea Works" and "Negev Phosphates" and for some
who are employed in Beer-Sheva.
Today, there are twenty-nine industrial development
towns which differ in their location and historical
development. Some of them like Dimona, Arad and Yerucham
are located close to the sources of raw materials used in
industrial plants, some rely on "foot loose" plants like
Kiryat-Gat and Carmiel, and some on both. From historical
point of view, the towns were established in various periods
and were populated by different groups of immigrants, as
such they have enjoyed different capital and human
resources, and benefited from different governmental
policies. Among the industrial towns, those which are 50 km
and more away from the metropolitan area (Tel-Aviv, Haifa
and Jerusalem) are the focus of this study. The main reason
for this selection was to capture the "distance" issue in
industrialization, as will be discussed later.
In order to choose among the twenty-nine industrial
development towns a representative sample for this study,
the following criteria have been employed:
1. Size of the town: "Small" - up to 15,000
inhabitants; "Medium" - up to 50,000 inhabitants;
"Large" - 50,000 and up.
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2. Distance: "Close to the Metropolitan Area" - less
than 50 km from one of the central cities (50 km was
chosen because it is half of the way between Haifa
and Tel-Aviv); "Far from the Metropolitan Area" - 50
km and up.
For the purpose of the analysis of the "island
phenomenon" from socioeconomic perspective, eleven towns
were selected: three groups of towns, each consists of two
southern towns and one northern one, and two new
(relatively) towns. Each group represents different mixture
of the criteria used: size and distance. The groups are:
1. Small and remote towns: Dimona and Yerucham in the
south and Kiryat-Shemona in the north.
2. Smalr and close towns: Yavne and Or-Akiva in the
southern part and Yokneam in the northern part.
3. Medium and Large towns and remote: Beer-Sheva and
Kiryat-Gat in the south and Afula in the north.
In addition, the analysis will consider the two
development towns of Arad and Carmiel, which were
established during the sixties and introduced a new version
to the development town concept.
The statistics on the variety of development towns,
and similar statistics on the whole country will clarify the
socioeconomic status of the industrial towns.
Table 4.2 demonstrates clearly, on one hand, the
various stages through which the population dispersal
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policies have gone through, and on the other hand the extent
to which each town was successful in attracting new
inhabitants.
The years 1961-1967 were years of extensive
industrialization policies and directing of immigrants to
the towns. 1966-1972, were years of freezing in the
population dispersal due to recession and the 1967 War which
diverted human and capital resources to the new territories.
The rate of growth declined. The years 1973-1978 indicate
an almost halt or decline in the rate of growth in all
towns. In these years the rate of immigration was smaller,
and the population dispersal goal got lower priority among
other national goals. Those towns which were better off
still attracted new inhabitants. The last column in table
4.2 can be used as an indicator for the attractiveness.
(One should keep in mind, that in the case of the bigger
towns like Beer-Sheva and Kiryat-Gat, 10 percent growth is
quite a considerable growth.)
Another phenomenon which should be noticed are the
stages of development. In each case, the towns passed
through a stage of high growth (some--60-70 percent and some
200-300 percent), then a stage of medium growth (for some 10
percent and for some 30 percent) and then a slower growth or
decline (between 10 percent and -3.0 percent). In the third
stage there seems to exist some growth, but a decline
indicates a clear situation of unattractivenes's, since the
TABLE 4.2
SIZE OF THE SELECTED DEVELOPMENT TOWNS (IN THOUSANDS) AND
RATES OF GROWTH (IN PERCENTAGE) 1961-1978
Year Population Growth
Settlement
1955 1961 1967 1973 1978 1961-1967 1967-1973 1973-1978
Dimona 0.3 5.0 19.0 26.3 27.3 28.0 38.4 11.11
Yerucham 0.5 1.6 4.8 6.3 6.1 20.0 37.5 -3.0
Kii-yat Shemona 6.3 11.8 15.2 16.1 15.8 28.8 6.0 -1.8
Or-Akiva 1.7 3.2 5.9 6.6 7.5 87.0 11.8 13.6
Yavne 2.0 5.4 9.5 10.5 11.5 (6.0 10.5 9.5
Yokneam 2.8 2.8 3.7 4.0 4.0 32.0 8.1 0
Afula 10.3 13.8 16.4 19.0 18.9 18.8 15.8 -0.5
Beer-Sheva 20.5 43.5 77.14 90.3 103.3 77.9 16.6 11.0
Kiryot-Gat n.a. 10.1 16.3 21.0 23.1 61.4 28.8 10.0
Arad n.a. n.a. 2.0 7.5 10.1 n.a. 275 34.6
Carmiel n.a. n.a. 1.25 6.0 9.7 n.a. 380 61.6
Source: C.B.S. Yearly Statistical Books for the years:
--- - ----
1956, 1962, 1968, 1974, 1979.
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volume of those who leave outnumbers the natural growth of
the town.
Table 4.3 may further clarify the situation. It
seems that the smaller towns (except for Arad and Carmiel)
are suffering the most in times when governmental policies
are not extensive in encouraging population and industrial
plants to move to the 'towns. The larger towns have created
some attractiveness independently of governmental policies.
The two towns of Dimona and Yerucham are
experiencing a high rate of outmigration. The balances are:
-22.3 and -35.4 respectively. Arad and Carmiel are the most
attractive towns.
Tables 4.4-4.8 highlight the various demographic
characteristics of the development towns compared to the
rest of the country.
Table 4.4 summarizes data on places of birth and
period of immigration. From the table it can be concluded
that the majority of the residents in the new towns are
immigrants who have arrived in Israel after 1948. In most
cases, they represent some 60 percent-70 percent of the
total population of the town. At the same time, these new
comers account for 45.6 percent of the total Israeli
population, and only 25 percent-30 percent of the population
in the large, older cities (Jerusalem, Tel-Aviv and Haifa).
In the medium sized and small old towns they account for 45
percent of the population.
TABLE 4.3
INTERNAL MIGRATION RATE'
1956-1961 1973 1978
Settlement In- Out- Balance In- Out- Balance In- Out- Balance
migr. migr. migr. migr. B c migr. migr.
Dimona 63.5 10.1 53.4 27.8 62.7 -24.9 22.5 44.8 -22.3
Yerucham 29.5 37.4 -7.9 26.5 61.9 -35.4
Kiryot Shemona 14.9 21.8 -6.9 16.7 46.9 -30.2 25:1 33.8 -8.7
Or-Akiva 15.3 29.3 -14.0 15.0 60.6 -45.6
Yavne 22.4 30.9 -8.5 16.5 37.0 -20.5 21.8 36.7 -14.9
Yokneam
Afula 12.4 18.6 -6.2 30.2 59.3 -29.1 29.2 38.2 -9.0
Beer-Sheva 25.6 9.8 15.8 29.0 32.8 -3.8 28.5 36.6 -8.1
Kiryat-Gat 164.9 1o.4 154.5 27.0 30.1 -3.1 32.6 42.5 -9.9
Arad n.a. n.a. n.a. 128.1 90.5 37.6 122.2 102.2 20.0
Carmiel n.a. n.a. n.a. 131.3 119.6 11.7 123.6 51.5 .72.1
1Migration rate number of in (or out) migrants
total population in settlement
Source: Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, 1979; C.B.S. Internal Migration, no.
33 (vol. II), 1967.
x 1000
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The high percentage of new immigrants in the
development towns is undoubtedly the most striking
characteristic of the towns. If one limits itself to the
adult population solely, the new immigrants make up 85
percent-90 percent of the population.
In all the towns, the rate of those who were born in
Israel is rapidly increasing due to the high rate of birth
which characterizes the majority of the population in these
towns.
Among the eleven development towns, Dimona and
Yerucham have absorbed over the years more newcomers
compared to the other industrial towns. In Dimona the rates
of "born abroad, immigrated after 1948" were 74.9 percent in
1961 and 76.1 percent in 1967, while in Yerucham they were
80.9 percent and 80.5 percent respectively. In the rest of
the development towns the rates were lower (except for
Or-Akiva).
The population of the development towns is much more
heterogeneous compared to the population in the older towns.
Newcomers, from all points of the globe are found in the new
towns. The immigrant population of the development towns,
consists mainly of people who were born in underdeveloped
countries in Asia and Africa (see table 4.5). However, in
the older towns (established before 1948) the majority of
immigrants were born in European countries which have
attained a greater degree of economic and social
TABLE 4.4
POPULATION DISTRIBUTION IN THE SELECTED DEVELOPMENT TOWNS AND IN ISRAEL
ACCORDING TO PLACE OF BIRTHI AND PERIOD OF IMMIGRATION (PERCENTAGES)
1961 - born in: 1967 - born in: 1972 - born in:
Settlement Abroad Abroad Abroad
Israel Israel Israel
<1947 >19)48 <1947 >1948 <1947 >1948
Total Israeli
Population 37.8 16.6 45.6 42.8 12.0 45.2 46.8 10.3 42.9
Dimona 23.7 1.4 74.9 23.0 0.9 76.1 36.4 0.7 62.9
Yerucham 18.4 0.7 80.9 19.0 0.5 80.5 37.0 - 63.0
Kiryat Shemona 27.8 1.5 70.7 30.9 0.9 68.2 45.5 1.8 52.7
Or-Akiva 21.0 0.3 78.7 21.8 0.2 78.0 35.8 0.4 63.8
Yavne 30.1 0.5 69.4 34.0 2.0 62.0 43.1 0.6 56.3
Yokneam 35.4 7.4 57.2 42.4 1.1 56.5
Afula 33.7 7.8 58.5 34.0 5.3 60.7 44.2 8.1 67.7
Beer-Sheva 31.6 3.8 64.6 33.9 2.7 63.4 43.3 2.2 54.5
Kiryat-Gat 21.5 2.5 76.0 24.8 1.4 73.8 37.6 1.9 60.5
Arad n.a. n.a. n.a. 55.5 10.6 33.9
Carmiel n.a. n.a. n.a. 42.6 5.9 51.5
(Vol. IV), table no.Source: C.B.S., The Settlements of Israel, publication no. 18
VI.
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modernization. This fact has strongly influenced the
development of the new towns. As experience in Israel and
elsewhere has shown, those originating in backward countries
have a need of a lengthy period of adjustment to modern
technology and to modern patterns of social life and family
structure (Berler, 1970).
From table 4.5 one can see that the first group of
the development towns--the small and remote ones--have the
highest rate of Asian- and African-born residents (higher
than 81 percent). (The only town which does not belong to
this group, and has a similar characteristic, is Yavne).
This phenomenon can be explained in two ways: 1) the waves
of immigration from Asia and Africa in the mid-fifties have
created these towns. 2) These towns have experienced a high
rate of outmigration. The stronger groups of
population--those from Europe and America tend to leave the
towns first.
The immigrants from Asian and African countries are
characterized by a high birth rate. Consequently, the
development towns are characterized by large families. The
average family size in the development towns far exceeds
that in the older cities. The average size of a Jewish
family in Israel was in 1972--3.6 persons per family, while
the sizes in the development towns were between 4.1 and 5.1
persons per family (see table 4.6).
TABLE 4.5
IMMIGRANTS IN SELECTED DEVELOPMENT TOWNS BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN (PERCENTAGE)
Country of Origin
Settlement Asian and African born European and American born
1961 1967 1972 1961 1967 1972
Total Jewish
Population 43 48 46.7 57 -52 53.3
New Towns 70.7 29.3
Dimona 85 83.8 81.9 15 16.2 18.1
Yerucham 82.1 90.4 91.8 17.9 9.6 8.2
Kiryat Shemona 78.0 83.6 82.8 22.0 16.4 17.2
Or-Akiva 70.9 73.4 74.6 29.1 26.6 25.4
Yavne 82.0 90.9 18.0 9.1
Yokneam 54.8 69.6 145.2 30.4
Afula 52.8 61.9 61.2 47.2 38.1 38.8
Beer-Sheva 60.8 67.7' 66 29.2 32.3 34
Kiryat-Gat 63.6 74.8 75.9 36.3 25.2 24.2
Arad n.a. 63.9 n.a. 36.1
Carmiel n.a. 68.5 n.a. 31.5
Note: For each year, all foreign born in a town totals 100%.
Source: Berler, 1970,
Vol. 25, 1974
Table App. 111-3, p. 76; C.B.S., The Yearly Statistical Book,
TABLE 4.6
SIZE OF FAMILIES--AVERAGE NUMBER OF
PERSONS PER HOUSEHOLD IN THE
SELECTED DEVELOPMENT TOWNS
Year
Settlement
1961 1972
Total Israeli Population 3.8 3.6
Urban Communities 3.8
Dimona 4.6 4.5
Yerucham 4.8 5.1
Kiryat Shemona 4.7 4.7
Or-Akiva 4.1 4.3
Yavne 4.8 4.8
Yokneam 4.0
Afula 4.1 4.1
Beer-Sheva 4.3 4.2
Kiryat Gat 4.3 4. 4
Arad n.a.
Carmiel n.a.
Source: For 1961--C.B.S., The Settle-
ments of Israel, Vol. IV, publi-
cation no. 18, Table no. VI, 1966.
For 1972--C.B.S., Yearly Statis-
cal Book, Vol. 25, 1974.
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The high percentage of large families in the
development towns creates serious problems. The burdens
weighing on a large family are heavy. The number of
breadwinners in such a family is relatively small in
comparison with the number of non-working dependents.
Among the eleven development towns in table 4.6,
Yerucham and Dimona are quite outstanding in the average
size of their families--4.5 and 5.1 respectively. The same
is true for Kiryat-Shemona and Yavne.
Due to the high percentage of large families and the
high birth rate, the percentage of children under the age of
fourteen is very high in the development towns (see table
4.7). The percentage of children under the age of fourteen
is 40 percent-45 percent in the development towns and only
30 percent-35 percent in the older and more established
towns.
As in the case of the average size of the families
(table 4.6), Yerucham, Dimona and Yavne have the highest
percentage of children under fourteen years of age. This is
another indication for the lower income level per capita and
high rate of poverty.
Another important socioeconomic indicator is the
level of schooling table 4.8 lacks data for years other than
1961, and therefore it is impossible to find out to what
extent the level of education has increased. From the data
in 1961 it is obvious that the level of education in the
TABLE 4.7
THE PERCENTAGE OF CHILDREN UNDER 14 YEARS
IN DEVELOPMENT TOWNS
OF AGE
Year
' Settlement
1961 1967 1973 1978
Total Israeli Population 36.1 32.8
Dimona 45.8 42.9 39.4 38.3
Yerucham 47.5 46.1 41.9 40.4
Kiryat Shemona 46.0 45.0 37.8 36.5
Or-Akiva 41.1 39.1 35.9 34.7
Yavne 47.8 39.0 37.9
Yokneam 40.2 34.9
Afula 41.0 38.0 20.6 31.2
Beer-Sheva 42.8 40.4 34.6 32.2
Kiry at-Gat 43.3 42.1 36.3 33.6
Arad n.a. 37.6 36.6
Carmiel n.a. 34.2 35.9
Source: Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, Social Profile
of Cities and Towns in Israel, Jerusalem, December, 1979.
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non-metropolitan towns was lower, at the initial stages of
development, than in any other development town (except for
Yavne).
Tables 4.9 and 4.10 give more indication towards the
economic status and the standard of living in the towns.
Table 4.93 shows quite clearly that the first group
of towns consists of the poorest communities, while the last
two groups are richer.
Table 4.10 indicates rate of motorization and
presents similar picture as table 4.9. The towns in the
first group have the lowest rate of motorization.
Tables 4.11, 4.12, 4.13 describe the employment
situation in the development towns.
Table 4.11 presents the labor-force participation
rate. It is high among males and very low among females.
The highest rate of labor participation is among those
living in the non-metropolitan industrial towns since due to
the town's small size and the strong governmental commitment
towards their inhabitants a situation was created in which
the local employment agency takes care of each person
individually. The lower rate of female participation is
caused by the reluctance of women to work during
child-bearing years and by the lack of available jobs for
3In table 4.9 a comparison should not be made across
years since the high rate of inflation was not taken into
account. The only way to look at this table is to compare
at the same year between towns.
TABLE 4.8
POPULATION AGED 14 YEARS OF AGE AND OVER,
MEDIAN YEAR OF STUDY: 1961
Settlement Total Males Females
Total Israeli Population 8.3 8.6 7.9
Dimona 6.8 7.2 6.1
Yerucham 4.2 5.9 0.9
Kiryat-Shemona 5.9 4.9
Or-Akiva 5.0 6.0 3.6
Yavne 3.8 5.2 1.0
Yokneam 1.4 8.4 5.9
Afula 7.7 8.1
Beer-Sheva 7.7 8.0 7.3
Kiryat-Gat 7.1 7.7 7.0
Arad n.a. n.a. n.a.
Carmiel n.a. n.a. n.a.
publi-Source: C.B.S., The Settlements of Israel, Vol. IV,
cation no. 18, Table no. XIII, 1966.
TABLE 4.9
AVERAGE INCOME FROM LOCAL TAXES PER CAPITA (IL)
Year
Settlement
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977
Total Israeli Population 403 311 772 987
Dimona 93 100 202 248 443
Yerucham 97 82 258 257
Kiryat Shemona 88 116 245 350 671
Or-Akiva 76 79 123 184 363
Yavne 94 151 269 444 538
Yokne am
Af'ula 186 179 507 597 859
Beer-Sheva 199 233 460 658 1040
Ki ry at -Gat 134 156 332 496 709
Arad 229 191 580 642 887
Carmiel 150 150 389 645 910
Social Profile of
Cities and Towns in Israel, December 1979.
Source: Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs,
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women.
Table 4.12 points to a striking phenomenon, the rate
of those employed in industry is the highest in those towns
which belong to the first two groups of small towns. The
main explanation for this may be found in the governmental
policy, which has directed a large share of its industrial
investment into the small development towns. The small
towns, close to the metropolitan centers like Yavne and
Yokneam have a high rate of employed in the industry also
because the residents work in the industrial plants in the
metropolitan areas. The towns have not developed yet a
strong service center due to their reliance on the services
provided by the central cities.
Another index for examining the economic structure
of the development towns is the precentage of the population
employed in services. It is assumed that the level of
services increases as the town grows and the level of
services needed becomes high. In effect the data in table
4.12 demonstrates a clear tendency towards expansion of the
service sector as the town grows.
The third table (4.13) shows a static picture (as a
result of lack of data for other years) of the occupational
structure of the development towns. It is clear that the
small towns (both groups) are lagging behind the bigger
cities and the rest of the country as a whole in the number
of professionals residing in these communities. Almost half
TABLE 4.10
MOTOR VEHICLES PER 1000 POPULATION
Year
Settlement
' ' 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
Total Israeli
Population 88 113.3 125.6 126.4 127.2 115.5
Dimona 28.8 31.8 36.2 37.3 39.1 43.5
Yerucham 18.3 18.1 21.3 22.5 23.5 24.8
Kiryat-Shemona 46.1 52.3 64.3 68.4 73.5 72.6
Or-Akiva 26.8 31.1 37.3 39.7 36.6 36.9
Yavne 50.7 58.6 61.3 67.9 68.7
Yokneam
Afula 69.9 74.8 82.7 85.1 86.2 91.8
Beer-Sheva 82.8 93.2 103.6 105.7 107.8 111.9
Kiryat-Gat 51.3 57.1 68.2 68.3 70.2 69.5
Arad 100.3 100.5 114.8 107.8 105.9 113.3
Carmiel 85.1 92.8 105.7 98.6 99.7 102.3
Source: Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, Social Profile of
Cities and Towns in Israel, Jerusalem, December 1979.
TABLE 4.11
POPULATION BY SETTLEMENT AND BY LABOR-FORCE
PARTICIPATION RATE
Labor-Force
Participation Rate - 1961
Settlement
Total Males Females
Total Israeli Population 53.5 77.5 29.3
Dimona 53.0 82.1 21.6
Yerucham 57.0 80.2 32.5
Kiryat-Shemona 50.6 78.0 21.3
Or-Akiva 46.4 72.1 22.1
Yavne 49.0 76.6 20.4
Yokneam 56.3 80.1 33.3
Afula 53.4 78.4 28.8
Beer-Sheva 53.0 80.0 26.0
Ki ryat-Gat 52.9 78.4 25.5
Arad n.a. n.a. n.a.
Carmiel n.a. n.a. n.a.
Vol. IV, publi-Source: C.B.S., The Settlements of Israel,
cation no. 18, table XIII, 1966.
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of their inhabitants are skilled- and semi-skilled workers
employed in industry.
The last three tables emphasize the important role
industry plays in the remote-industrial development towns.
Summary and Conclusions
The socio-demographic data on the small industrial
towns like: high rate of immigrants, majority of residents
who were born in Asian-African countries, large
families--four and five children per family and low level of
education, all help in explaining why there are problems,
rather than describing the results--"how well are those
towns doing?" The few economic indicators can partially
explain what were, relatively to the rest of the country,
the actual achievements.
This partial description of the situation lays the
ground for understanding the people's perceptions of the
remote industrial towns as "islands."
It is quite clear that some small towns, close to
the metropolitan share the same characteristics (Yavne and
Or-Akiva have similar features like Kiryat-Shemona, Dimona
and Yerucham, as well as some other towns like Maalot and
Hatzor which were not described here), but apparently their
physical closeness to the metropolitan centers eliminates
the subjective feelings of isolation--an issue which will be
discussed in the third part of this chapter. These close
TABLE 4.12
EMPLOYED PERSONS BY ECONOMIC BRANCH
Year and Economic Branch
1961
Settlement a
4-)
'H
V4 '
0
4-)
0
U)
U)
4.,
C)
In4)
Total Israeli Population
Development Towns
Dimona
Yerucham
Kiryat-Shemona
Or-Aki va
Yavne
Yokneam
Aful a
Beer-Sheva
Ki ryat-Gat
Ar ad
Carmi ei
i.1 24.7
10.14 25.4 14.3 46.1 3.8
1.0
8.1
29.5
9.7
23.5
22.7
8.1
3.2
16.6
48.0
25.7
18.1
34.9
11.6
42.6
25.5
20.6
38.0
16.5 29.8 3.2
17.0 30.6 4.8
20.0 39.0 5.9
14.3
19.4
8.8
48.9
51.9
33.3
3.2
4.7
3.3
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
6.8 85.0 7.7 
60.5
6.1 42.8 11.9 38.9
0.7 55.5
- 65.3
11.4 52.2
4.1 83.5
- 65.3
4.5
4.2
7.5
42.2
37.5
56.1
- 44.2
6.4
5.0
11.4
37.4
29.7
25.0
3.5 8.8
5.0 29.7
8.1 45.2
8.3 50.0
9.1 27.3
5.2 50.7
1966.
1973
WO
0~-
+) *Ho
0
U
U)
0
C)
(I)ci)C)
U)
U)
Sources: For 1961--C.B.S. , The Settlements of Israel, IV, publi cation no. 18, table XIII,
For 1973--Ministry of Labor, Survey of Cities and Development Towns, 1973.
7.7 6o.5
TABLE 4.13
EMPLOYED PERSONS (AGE 14+) BY OCCUPATION
Occupation
rd d
1 4-) u H 0-
Settlement ' 0 E 4 M - 4-)
0r-- -A i v a- Z 9
C 00 4-3 4 V H C0 0 J)0 F
Y n..3 1 . 6. 5. 9
Total Israeli Population 5.7 10.9 3.1 15.3 8.3 12.6 7.8 29.8 6.5
Dimona 1.8 8.8 2.3 12.1 4.6 11.3 1.9 47.9 6.2
Yer*uc1am - 8.6 2.9 7.14 2.0 26.6 2.9 36.1 13.5
Kiryat-Shemona 1.8 8.3 1.3 8.7 5. 3 12.0 8.3 42.5 i.6
Or-Ak iva
Yavne 1.1 4.2 - 9.7 3.8 19.0 6.6 45.7 9.9
Yok ne amx 1.5 8.2 1.5 io. 4 6.( 19.14 3.0 44.0 5.2
Aful a 2.14 10.2 1.1 13.2 7.8 16.-5 4.-8 35.3 8.7
Beer-Sheva 6.3 15.7 2.1 15.14 7.6 12.0 1.5 32.5 6.8
Ki ry at -Gat 1.8 8.3 1.3 8.7! 5.3 12.0 8.3 42.5 11.6
Arad 6.0 18.8 0.6 13.1 4.8 16.5 1.4 32.1 6.8
Carmiel 2.1 16.6 5.1 11.9 4.7 13.6 1.7 34.9 9.4
Source: C.B.S., Statistical Abstracts of Israel, Table XII/16, Jerusalem, 1978.
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and small industrial towns may experience a different
problem, e.g., that of sharp differences between them and
the neighboring affluent communities, but the impact and the
results of this situation is of a different nature compared
to the situation in the remote towns.
Except for the distance, the size of the town may be
found to play an important role as well. Dimona is a remote
industrial town, but its size (27,300 inhabitants in 1978)
gives the town some strength which the small towns lack.
Data on population growth as well as other indicators of
achievements (level of motorization, local taxes, etc.) show
that among the small remote industrial towns, the bigger
ones are better off.
4.2. The Industrial and the Employment Perspective
The "island phenomenon" is a situation which is not
confined solely to the socioeconomic structure of the
communities in the development towns, but also prevails in
the industrial and employment areas. More specifically,
this chapter will try to show that the industrial structure
of the remote non-metropolitan industrial towns is different
from this in the central regions. This difference can be
described as a situation in which the industrial structure
of the development towns carries characteristics of the
industrial structure in developing countries in a country
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with well-developed industrial structure--and therefore
resembles an "island phenomenon."
Regional differences may be a result of regional
specializaiton based on different relative advantages of
each region, but in the case of the remote industrial
development towns, the differences are not due only to these
relative advantages (for example, industries based on
quarrying and mining) but also as a result of
historical-social-economic cirsumstances and developments
which this study will dwell on in the following chapters.
In this chapter, the situation as it prevails today will be
described.
The dispersion of the industrial employment has been
one of the central objectives of the development policy of
the government. The main instrument used was providing
financial incentives for private investment coupled with a
free industrial infrastructure. As a result of more than
two decades of industrialization policy, the share of the
workers in the industrial sector in the development regions
has increased significantly. In the subdistrict of the
Kinneret it increased from 12 percent in 1965 to 20 percent
in 1977, in Yizrael it increased from 14 percent to 25
percent, in Beer-Sheva it increased from 18 percent to 21
percent (Beer-Sheva has started with a high rate of
employment in industry), and in the country as a whole it
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has increased from 21 percent to 24 percent (see table
4.14).
Table 4.12 (in the previous section), demonstrates
the high rate of the employed in the industry in eleven
development towns. The most outstanding employment
characteristics of the development towns are: a) A sharp
increase in the rate of the employed in industry. For
example, in Yerucham it has increased from 25.7 percent in
1961 to 65.3 percent, and in Kiryat-Shemona from 18.1
percent to 52.2 percent. b) The small share of the employed
in the service sector. Spiegel claims that this is a result
of the nature of the development process:
Service industries, as secondary or even tertiary
steps in the economic process, can hardly be
systematically encouraged dur'ing the development
period of a new town, with the exception perhaps
of tourism which, however, is restricted to very
few places. (Spiegel 1966)
Inspite of the fact that the share of the employed
in industry in the development regions has increased in
absolute terms, it still lags behind the share of the
central regions.
Table 4.15 shows that the shore of the employed in
industry in the central regions has decreased from 82
percent in 1961 to 69 percent in 1978, while it has
increased in the development regions from 18 percent to 51.1
percent. But, table 4.16 reveals that the increase is
lagging behind the increase in the population. Though the
TABLE 4.14
THE PERCENTAGE OF THE INDUSTRIAL WORKERS IN
THE LABOR FORCE BY REGIONS AND SETTLEMENTS
Year
Settlement
1965 1971 1977
Israel - Total 21 22 24
Kneret 11 12 20
Akko 12 17 24
Zefat 13 20 16
Yizreel 14 20 25
Rehovot 14 16 25
Hasharon 14 15 24
Je rus alem 15 12 13
Hiadera 17 22 20
Beer-Sheva 18 21 21
Ashkelon 23 30 28
Haifa 25 25 23
Tel Aviv 25 23 26
Petah Tikva 26 27 30
Ramla 29 58 4o
144
data in table 4.15 covers only the years 1961-1967, it is
apparent that in the years 1961-1964 in which extensive
industrialization policies have been implemented the
increase in the total industrial employment (as it is
demonstrated by the increase in the share of the employed in
industry in the development towns) has outpaced the increase
in the total population (as it is demonstrated by the
increase in the share of the population in the development
towns). But since 1967--the beginning of the recession
period--the situation has changed: The share of the
population in development towns has been 14.1 percent while
their share in the total industrial employment has been only
12.7 percent (see table 4.16).
Table 4.17 emphasizes the process that was described
in table 4.16. The share of investment in industry in the
development regions has decreased since 1963. It was 41.9
percent of the total gross investment in 1963, and in 1966
it consisted only of 39.8 percent of the total investment.
The regional distribution of investment in fixed
assets has not changed much since 1961 except for Jerusalem
that has gained priority in the allocation of resources
since the 1967 War (see table 4.18).
From the data on the major characteristics of the
industries in the development regions, it is quite apparent
that there is a high centralization of specific industries
in these regions. These industries are capital intensive,
TABLE 4.15
THE DISTRIBUTION OF EMPLOYEES IN INDUSTRY, IN THE
CENTRAL AND DEVELOPMENT REGIONS
Year
Region
1961 1965 1971 1978
Total (thousands) 154.6 188.9 229.6 308.0
Total (percentage) 100% 100% 100% 100%
Total: Central Regions 82.0 78.0 73.5 69.0
from these: Tel Aviv 45.5 42.4 33.3 32.5
Haifa 19.1 15.2 13.0 11.4
Total: Development Regions 18.0 22.0 26.5 31.0
from these: Jerusalem 5.7 5.7 5.2 6.0
Beer-Sheva 3.9 4.7 5.6
1961.
Series, 178,
Source: Gradus and Einy, 1981, Table no. 1, p. 3.
C.B.S., Industry and Craft Survey, Special
TABLE 4.16
THE SHARE OF THE DEVELOPMENT TOWNS IN THE POPULATION
AND THE INDUSTRIAL EMPLOYMENT, 1961-1967
Share of Development Towns in:
Total Industrial
T'otal Population (%) Employment (M)
1961 1964 1967 1961 1964 1967
Development Towns 10.8 14.2 14.1 11.4, 16.2 12.7
The Rest of the Country 89.2 85.8 85.9 88.6 83.8 87.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Berler, 1970, Tables no. 111-32, 111-33, pp. 113-114.
TABlE 4.17
POPULATION INCREASE AND GROSS INVESTMENT BY DISTRICT , 1963-1960
Year
1963 196h 1965 1966
District Total Total. Total
Population Gross Population Gross Ppulation Gross Population ross
Increase ncrease Investment Increase Investment Increase Investment
000s IL.M 000s I L. M 000s IL.M 000s IL.M
I/rael C Total 98.3 1,964.7 95.5 2,366.1 72.8 2,605.7 59.0 2,186.3
Fercentage 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Development District 52.1 41.9 44.5 110.0 42.3 38.7 40.4 39.8
(total)
Jerusalem 7.3 7.1 7.7 7.2 6.7 7.4 7.14 8.5
Northern 19.2 16.6 15.7 13.4 14.6 13.7 15.2 14.8
Southern 25.6 18.2 21.1 19.4 21.0 17.6 17.8 16.5
Coastal Districts 47.9 58.1 55.5 60.0 57.7 61.3 59.6 60.1
(Haifa, Central,
Tel Aviv)
Source: Lichfield, 1971, Vol. II, Table 5.3.6.
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big in size, they have lower rate of professional and
skilled workers, lower rate of expenditure on research and
development (R&D), and their employees earn lower wages
compared to employees in the industrial plants in the
central subdistricts.
In the rest of this chapter this issue will be
further analyzed.
4.2.1. The Structure of the Industries
The branch structure in the development towns
differs from that in the country as a whole (see table
4.19). In the development towns the food, textile,
non-metalic minerals (due to the town's location) and basic
metal industries are well represented while the clothing,
plastics, machinery and equipment, electrical and
electronic, and transport equipment industries are almost
non-existent. The iondustries which are poorly represented
are those which require highly skilled and well-trained
labor, and where the distance from marketing outlets
constitutes a limiting factor (printing and publishing
paper, cardboard and their products and the like).
There is a clear predominance of the textile
industry, accounting for 34.2 percent of all employers, 37.8
percent of the invested capital and 47.5 percent of public
loans (Spiegel, 1966). The labor intensity, the short
TABLE 4.18
NET INVESTMENT IN FIXED ASSETS
Year
Subdistrict
1961 1976
Tctal 100% 100%
Jerusalem (including city) 2.5 6.3
Northern Subdistrict 18.6 18.2
Haifa (city) 11.9 14.0
Haifa Subdistrict 10.4 4.9
Central Subdistrict 16.6 17.8
Tel-Aviv (city) 7.7
Tel-Aviv Subdistrict 8.9 14.8
Southern Subdistrict 23.2 23.9
Source: C.B.S., Industry and Crafts Survey, Special
Series, 178, 1966.
Gradus and Einy, 1981, Table 6.
150
training period, the easy construction of the plants made it
seem particularly suitable for combating unemployment in the
development towns.
In eleven of the twenty-eight new towns, textile
factories are the largest (and often the only large) source
of employment: in the north in Kiryat-Shemona, Zefat,
Afula, Beit-SheAn; in the centre, Or-Akiva; in the south,
Ashdad, Airyat-Gat, Netivat, Ofakim, Beer-Sheva and Dimona.
(This was particularly true for the first decade of
industrialization: 1955-1965.)
In the 70's the textile and clothing industry is
still the largest branch in the Israeli industry, though the
number of employees has not changed since the 1960s. In
1979 the textile and clothing branch employed 50,000
employees (approximately 18 percent of the total). In the
70's a fundamental change has taken place in the industry
itself: the weight of the clothing branches has increased
from 35 percent (number of employees in clothing out of the
total) in 1969/70 to 57 percent in 1976. The same trends
can be seen in the share of the amount of product and in the
total numbers of approved investments. This change is a
result of governmental policy as a response to the
unbalanced structure of the branch. Second in importance is
the food industry, often based on indigenous if not local
products, and exemplified by the big sugar factories in
Afula and Qiryat Gat and the large bakeries which are found
TABLE I4.19
DISTRIBUTION OF THE SHARE OF THE MANUFACTURING BRANCHES
IN ISRAEL AND IN THE DEVELOPMENT REGIONS
(BY PERCENTAGE OF NUMBER OF EMPLOYED PERSONS)
Year
Branch 1961 1965 1971 1978
1. Quarrying and Mining
2.0
5.4
Is rael
Development Regions
2. Foodstuffs
Israel
Development Regions
3. Textiles, Clothing, Leather
Israel
Development Regions
4. Wood, Paper, Printing
Israel
Development Regions
5. Rubber, Chemicals, Non-metalic Minerals
Israel
Development Regions
14.8
18.0
24.7
35.1
6.3
3.4
-14.14
-18.2
2.2
15.6 15.1
14.7
21.4 20.0
36.4
12.6 14.5
10.9
14.2 13.8
18.6
1.9 1. t
14.5
20.8
10.4
16.9
13.1
20.3
11.3
11.6
-going
TABLE h .19--Cont.
Year
Branch 1961 1965 1971 1978
I II
6. Basic Metals, Metal Products
Israel 10.8 12.0 10.0 13.5 16.3
Development Regions 4.9 8.4
7. Machinery, Electrical Products
Israel 8.2 10.0 12.4 12.6
Development Pegions 5.2
8. Transport Equipment 199
Israel 10.1 6.3 8.3 7.6
Development Regions 4.0
9. Diamonds
Is;rael 3.8 1.7 4.6 2.0 2.3
Development Regiods 4.4 2.4
10. Miscellaneous
Israel 2.0 4.0 2.1 3.5 2.8
Development Regions 1.4 0.2
TOTAL: Israel 100% 100% 100% 100%
Development Regions 100% 100% 100% 100%
TABLE 4.19--Cont.
Sources: For 1961--C.B.S., Industry and Crafts Survey, 1961, Special Series, no. 178.
Development regions are defined as: Jerusalem (including the
city), Northern region,, Southern region.
For 1965--Industry and Crafts Survey, 1974, Special Series, no. 446.
Spiegel, 1966, p. 52. (The 100 percent does not include quarrying
and mining.)
For 1971--Industry and Crafts Survey, 1974, Special Series, no. 446, Jerusalem,
1974.
For 1978--Gradus and Einy, 1981, Table no. 5.
wo,
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everywhere. Most of these, however, offer only seasonal
employment.
In the 1960s, equally widely scattered were the
manufacture of building materials which accounted for almost
twice as much employment as on the national average. With
some exceptions, the industry supplied local needs.
Since 1969-1970, there has been a drastic change in
the directions of the industrialization policies. In those
years, the rate of investment in textile, clothing and
leather went down to 6 percent in development regions and 16
percent in the country as a whole. The rate of investment
in basic metal went up in the development regions to 45
percent and to 35 percent in the whole country.
4.2.2. Capital Intensity
The capital intensity in the industrial plants in
development regions is higher on average compared to the
rest of the country.
In 1975, the capital per employees (thousands of IL
in 1975 prices) was 96.2 in the development regions and 73.7
in the central regions in the textile branch. In quarrying
and mining it was 486.2 and 231.3 respectively. In metal
and electronic it was 92.3 and 84.2 respectively, and in the
industry in general it was 139.2 and 100.2 respectively
(Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Tourism, 1977, p. 169).
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In general capital per employee in 1969 was higher
in 87 percent of the development regions in comparison to
the central subdistricts. Since then, the difference has
been narrowed. In 1972 it was 68 percent and in 1978 it was
56 percent.
4.2.3. Size of the Plants
Comparatively, large firms are found more frequently
in the new towns than in the rest of the country: 8.7
percent of all businesses had one hundred or more employees
as against 2.7 percent on the national average (see table
4.20).
This is partly due to the general efforts to assist
primarily big enterprises which soon make a noticeable
difference to the labor market. Moreover, big industries
owned by the state or public companies or by potent overseas
investors, with greater technical, organizational and
financial backing behind them, find it easier to hold their
own in the development regions.
Among the industries in the development towns, the
textile industry is characterized by high centralization.
According to 1975 data, 70 percent of the textile firms
employ less than twenty workers each (12 percent of the
total number of employees in the textile industry) and only
5 percent of the firms employ more than three hundred
TABLE 4.20
"APPROVED ENTERPRISES" IN INDUSTRY AND CRAFTS IN NEW-TOWNS
BY NUMBERS OF EMPLOYED PERSONS (1964 )
New-Towns Israel-Total
# of Employed Enterprises Employed Persons Enterprises Employed Persons
Persons________
Absolute Absolute Absolute % Absolute
1-4 280 38.0 634 2.3 4,6o4 44.1 13,963 7.8
5-9 141 19.2 885 3.2 2,789 26.7 18,695 10.4
10-24 132 17.9 1,984 7.2 1,690 16.2 26,449 14.9
25-49 74 10.1 2,495 9.1 750 7.2 25,062 14.1
50-99 45 6.1 3,119 11.4 326 3.1 22,252 12.5
100-299 39 5.3 6,562 23.9 198 2.0 33,416 18.7
300+ 25 3.4 11,800 42.9 73 0.7 38,471 21.6
Total 736 100 27,479 100 10,430 100 178,308 100
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employees each and represent 49 percent of the total
employed in the textile branch.
In a study on "The impact of factory size on urban
growth and development," it was found that: ". . . Medium
size manufacturing plants, achieving increasing scale
economies by a disintegrated production process within the
urban economy, are more favorable for urban growth than
larger plants" (Kipnis, 1976, p. 295).
4.2.4. Other Characteristics of the Industries
Table 4.21 demonstrates other characteristics which
distinguish between the industries in the central regions
and those in the development regions. (The data is based on
the study by Gradus and Einy, 1981).
Industries in the central regions enjoy high share
of value added (the share of value added indicates the
ability of the industry to compete and to export). The rate
of professionals in industries in the central regions is
higher in comparison to their rate in the development
regions. The same is true for the expenditure on research
and development (R&D) which is an indicator of the extent to
which the industry is a high technolgy one. The last column
in table 4.21 shows the differences in salaries and wages
between the various industries, and the gaps between the
regions. The workers in the plants in the central regions
TABLE 4.21
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MAJOR INDUSTRIAL BRANCHES IN
CENTRAL AND DEVELOPMENT REGIONS
THE
Year
Region (1) (2) (3) (4)
1971-1976 1975-1976 1976 1978
Central Regions:
Machinery +11 6.5 5.9 +12.5
Electricity and Electronics + 3 45.9 40.2 +15.3
Transport Equipment +31 11.2 21.5 +65.3
Printing and Publishing + 9 0.2 0.5 - 7.2
Development Regions:
Foodstuffs -25 4.2 2.4 -22.3
Textile 0 2.1 1.2 -1I4.8
Wood + 7 1.5 2.5 -21.0
Rubber and Plastics -21 3.0 2.9 -11.0
Chemicals and Oil Products -13 22.9 20.7 +22.7
Metal Products . + 8 2.5 2.2 + 8.1
(1) Change in value added--the deviation
(percentage).
from the growth of the whole industry
(2) The percentage of professionals out of the total number of professionals in
the whole industry.
(3) Percentage of expenditure on R&D out of the total expenditure on R&D in the
whole industry.
(4) Average salary per man-day worked--deviation from the average in the whole
industry (in percentage)
TABLE 4. 21-- Cont.
Sources: C.B.S., Industry and Crafts Survey 1976, Special Series, no. 607.
C.B.S., Industry and Crafts Survey 1971, Special Series, no. 446.
C.B.S., Industrial Research and Development Survey 1972/T 4 /75,
Special Series, no. 581.
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(except for the workers in the printing and publishing
branch) enjoy higher wages and salaries compared to their
counterparts in the development regions (except for the
workers in the chemicals and oil products plants, and those
in the metal products).
Summary
Over the last twenty-five years Israel has invested
a large amount of capital and human resources to
industrialize the development regions. Consequently, the
level of industrialization increased significantly, measured
by the number of employees. Moreover, the policy had
succeeded in dispersing industrial plants all over the
country.
Nevertheless, while the process of industrialization
continues in the development areas, an important trend is
becoming apparent--the formation of two distinct groups of
manufacturing branches, the "growth" and the "laggard"
branches (a definition by Estall, 1972--based on growth and
sophistication criteria). Recent study on the process of
industrialization in the 1960s and 1970s (Gradus and
Krakover, 1977) showed thet the growth branches are
predominant in the centrally located areas, among them:
electronics, transportation, pharmaceuticals, metal and
machinery, while the laggard branches are predominant in the
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development areas, among them: textiles, leather and food.
Though this dichotomy should be studied more carefully, it
is hypothesized that the type of the industrial structure
has various effects on the communities and their labor
force. Moreover, this dichotomy alludes to the existence of
a "dual market" in the country's employment structure.
Underlying the development of the dual labor market
lies a sharp split between two different kinds of working
situations: one kind of working experience involves what is
called "primary labor process," the other involves the
"secondary labor process." Work is organized in different
ways in the two processes. The primary labor process is
structured internally, there are job ladders, promotional
channels, customary practices, a variety of jobs, high
wages, employment stability and job security. The secondary
labor process is unstructured, there are no job ladders, few
opportunities for promotion, unpredictable working
relationships, primitive equipment, little variety in the
range of jobs available and uniformly low wages (Piore, in
Gordon 1977, p. 93).
In terms of the dual market theory the industries in
the central parts of the country belong mainly to the
"primary market," while most of the industries in the
development regions (except for quarrying and mining plants
and several others) belong to the "secondary market." The
effect of each type of industry on the labor force and on
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the development of the community will be further examined in
the following chapters.
A follow up on the 1978 study (Gradus and Einy,
1981) found that the trend of bridging the industrial gap
(measured by the number of employees) between the center and
the periphery has been slowed down over the last decade and
actually has almost stopped. The level of industrialization
in the southern part of the country has decreased.
4.3. The Subjective Perception of the Phenomenon
The existence of the "island phenomenon" was
described so far, using objective measures (socioeconomic
statistical data and industrial measures) which highlight
the distinct characteristics of the non-metropolitan
industrial development towns in comparison with the
metropolitan towns. It is hypothesized (as will be
discussed later) that the phenomenon is the result of given
circumstances coupled with various policies and
developments. However, it is suggested that a major factor
in the creation of this phenomenon is the remoteness and
seclusion--both in its physical and mental senses--of these
towns. This factor strengthens the community's negative
self-image that the community is different in the
demographic and social structure of its population, its
economic base and therefore in its performances and future
perspectives.
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A negative image may become a self-fulling prophecy,
i.e., the way the community perceives itself, has an impact
on its performance. Moreover, various outsiders (i.e.,
officials on the regional and national levels, managers of
local plants, and residents in other communities) dealing
with this community may adopt--without much inquiry--the
image reflected by the' community which then reinforces the
negative image.
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the
"island phenomenon" from its third angle--the subjective
feelings of being a part of an "island." The chapter will
consist of three parts:*
1. The physical distance.
2. Realities and policies stemming from the distance.
3. Subjective feelings of the "island phenomenon."
4.3.1. The Physical Distance
Yerucham is located some 56 km. from Beer-Sheva (via
Dimona), and Dimona is located some 41 km. from Beer-Sheva.
The center of the region--Beer-Sheva itself, is 120 km.
apart from the main metropolitan center of the country,
Tel-Aviv (see map 3.1 in chapter III).
'This chapter concentrates on the "island phenomenon"
which manifested itself in interviews with local residents
as well as with "outsiders." Some examples will be brought
from Dimona, although Yerucham serves as a better example of
the physical remoteness.
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Until the 1960s the main road from Beer-Sheva to the
southern town of Eilat passed near Yerucham. Since then, a
new road was paved-- passing through Dimona and the Arava
Valley. The old road--so-called the "oil road" connecting
to the old main road was abandoned and since then
deteriorated. A veteran citizen claims: "The place was
overpassed by the new road."5
Recently, as a result of the resettling of the army
camps in Negev, there are discussions regarding the
reopening of the road. There is a sharp debate in the town
concerning this issue which illustrates clearly the
importance not solely of the distance itself, but the
realities and policies built on the physical fact.
The proponents of the reopening (mainly officials)
are very enthusiastic. They claim that this old road will
shorten the distance between Beer-Sheva and Yerucham and
therefore will help in integrating the town into the
regional labor market. Workers from Yerucham will be able
to look for jobs in the new industrial park of Ramot-Chovav,
new employees from Ramot-Chavav will settle in Yerucham, and
it will be more convenient for the local inhabitants to do
their major shopping in Beer-Sheva.
5A1l quotations, unless differently noted, came from the
interviews with local residents of the communities.
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The opponents--among them the head of the local
Histadrut (labor union) branch and the secretary of the
local labor party--claim that is it a "two-way road":
workers may continue working in Yerucham but will find it
more convenient to live in Beer-Sheva, since it is a more
developed town and the distance is shorter. Moreover, they
point to the fact that the plants in the new industrial park
in Ramat-Chovav, have already begun hiring workers from
Beer-Sheva and Dimona, and once the road is opened there
will not be any available vacancies for the Yerucham
workers.
Another group is quite skeptical (among them the
head of the local employment agency) and dismiss the
significance of the physical mean. The group argues that
the opening of the road itself will not change a situation
which is not the result of the physical distance but rather
the outcome of various policies and regulations like: the
regional employment policy, transportation arrangements,
etc. The next chapter will elaborate on this issue.
4.3.2. Realities and Policies Stemming from Distance
The physical distance itself, is not the sole factor
in creating the feelings of living in an "island." It is
the low rate of accessibility (transportation, communication
systems, etc.) and the distorted system--the result of the
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development of bureaucratic and administrative arrangements
and regulations--which further hinder mobility and free
access to and within the region.
There are three issues which highlight this reality
which has evolved due to the physical distance: private
transportation, public transportation, and the
commuting-to-work system.
Private Transportation
The rate of motor vehicles per 1000 population was
in Yerucham 24.8 in 1978 which has gradually grown from 18.3
in 1973 (see table 4.10, "Motor Vehicles per 1000
Population").
In comparison to the national averages (88.0 in 1973 and
115.5 in 1978) and to other development towns, Yerucham's
rate of private transportation is one of the lowest in the
country.
The low rate of private transportation implies that
the local inhabitants are highly dependent on various public
means of transportation of several agencies, namely: the
police, Maagen David Adom (Israel 'Red Cross' society), and
transportation arranged by the plants, schools,
kindergartens, etc. But mainly, it leaves the people at the
mercy of the public transportation of "Egged."
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Public Transportation
Public transportation consists of an hourly bus from
Yerucham to Beer-Sheva and vice versa (starting at 5:00 A.M.
and ending at 9:00 P.M.). A one-way trip takes
approximately forty-five minutes.
The main disadvantages of this service are:
1. Low frequency which causes tiresome waiting. Local
residents complain bitterly about the waste of time
and inflexibility caused by the dependency on this
only means of public transportation. The low
frequency is justified by the number of passengers,
since buses are full only during peak hours, and
although the service is already subsidized, higher
frequency will demand higher subsidies.
2. The services goes indirectly, passing through Dimona.
This arrangement adds another fifteen to twenty
minutes to the ride. In the case of Yerucham, it is
another arrangement adding to the feeling of being
dependent and inferior. Dimona has its own direct
Dimona-Beer-Sheva bus service, while Yerucham has the
one which goes through Dimona. In addition, the bus
stops frequently along the way to pick up Bedouins
(Arab Nomads) which slows the ride down considerably.
3. The last bus leaves Beer-Sheva around 9:00 P.M. It
cuts off Yerucham's and Dimona's residents (the last
bus to Dimona runs later than the one to Yerucham)
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from any cultural events in Beer-Sheva, unless they
have alternate means of transportation. Rarely are
there any alternative arrangements for transportation
after a late- night event, and it depends on the
initiative of an interested public agency.
There is not an organized call service (cab
service). Cabs run occasionally driven by drivers who
happen to live in Yerucham and therefore pick up people on
their way to or from work, especially in the mornings and
evenings.
In a remote town like Yerucham, the lack of private
car ownership coupled with the relatively low frequency of
public transportation further strengthens the feelings of
seclusion and isolation.
The Commuting to Work System
The transportation arrangements to the work places,
and especially to the regional plants contribute further to
the reinforcement of the "island phenomenon."
Every locality in Israel has an employment agency
(an agency of the Ministry of Labor and Welfare). This
agency is in charge of recruiting the local people to jobs.
This is an information center regarding vacancies and
job-openings. This center is also in charge of various
courses for occupational training, when needed. A person
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who is looking for a job can come to this agency in order to
find one, but in any case, he/she has to come even if he/she
has heard about a job-opening from a friend. The region is
divided into subdistricts and there is "Chovat Zika"
(obligation to be attached) which means that a person has to
get a referral from its local employment agency to the
specific plant which is seeking an employee. Moreover, the
plant is not permitted to hire anybody, unless he/she has
been referred to the plant by the agency. Each local
employment agency is in charge of several plants in its
designated area. Only in case the plant cannot find the
needed worker, can it apply to the neighbouring region.
(This regulation does not hold for managerial, professional
and top technical jobs. In these cases the search for an
employee is all over the country.) The head of the local
agency in Yerucham claims that the purpose of this
arrangement is to avoid discrimination among those who are
looking for jobs. An official at the national level claims
that this regulation was made in order to make accurate
employment information available, i.e., securing equal
access for each one to sources of information about job
availability.
The consequences of this procedure are
counter-productive. There is a rigidity and lack of
mobility in the region between work places, since the plant
which does not 'belong' to a specific locality will not hire
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and supply commuting arrangements for workers outside its
employment region. It also creates discrimination among
employees by the place of their residence. Living in one
place actually determines--without considering the
qualifications of each individual--the work places offer.
In the case of Yerucham it is quite a crucial
factor. It is probably impossible for someone living in
Yerucham to work in the "Dead Sea Works" which is considered
to be one of the most desirable work places in the region.'
As a result, some of Yerucham's residents who wanted to work
in this company, had to move from Yerucham to other towns in
the region from where commuting arrangements are available.
Moreover, as a result of this historical development, when
the head of the labor union in the "Dead Sea Works" was
asked why there are not any employees from Yerucham in the
plant, he answered : "It was proven over the years that the
quality of the workers from Yerucham is lower than the
quality of the workers from other localities." An
arrangement which has started with the intention to regulate
the regional labor market has ended as a distorted factor.
In contrast to the rigidity in the sytem in respect
to the employment policy, there is a high rate of commuting
in the region between the communities and the regional
plants--the chemical ones. Masses of workers commute from
'A detailed description of the industrial plants appears
in chapter V.
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Beer-Sheva and Arad to these plants. This is a situation
which has evolved as a result of the different courses of
development the various towns in the region have taken.
Namely, the chemical plants were planned to draw on the
development towns as the main source of manpower. As the
result of the laggard development of these towns a
considerable amount of the professionals and the technical
workers in these plants chose to live in Beer-Sheva or Arad
and to commute everyday. In all cases the rides are
organized and paid for by the work places. In the case of
the "Dead Sea Works," half of the daily communting time is
considered as work time.
The heavily subsidized commuting system weakens any
spatial advantages the towns of Yerucham and Dimona have by
being closer to the plants. Moreover, the various
arrangements contribute to the creation of a negative image
to the towns.
4.3.3. Subjective Feelings of the "Island Phenomenon"
The socioeconomic structure of the community
relative to other communities and the whole country, coupled
with the physical distance and the administrative
arrangements, have probably created a "mental distance"
between the community and the central parts of the country.
The commuting time is one and a half-hour each way from
Beer-Sheva, and three-quarters of an hour from Arad.
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They have contributed to the evolvement of the feelings of
being a part of an "island." These feelings which are part
of the negative image of the town by its residents and by
outsiders are being expressed in various areas.
In the rest of this section these feelings will be
described. The existence and the effects of these negative
perceptions will be described with a special emphasis on the
employment and industrial areas.
The industrial plants in both towns face quite many
difficulties and problems managing the local manpower. The
problems stem from the size of the localities, their
remoteness, the socioeconomic background, etc. (For details
see chapters V and VII.) But the various objective measures
to describe the employment situation do not suffice to grasp
the whole phenomenon. The subjective perceptions of the
local bureaucrats, politicians, outside industrialists and
the local residents themselves, have a unique and
significent ro.e in understanding the phenomenon. The
following section will elaborate on this issue.
The local bureaucrats like the head of the
employment agency claims: "The people here can be employed
only in simple work" and " We have to deal with the labor
force that was left after everybody else left the place."
He complains about the low work ethics: "People are fired
from good jobs at the military air-bases built by the
Americans in the Negev because their work ethics are very
low: they come late to work, demand too many breaks, etc."
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This local bureaucrat as well as some local
politicians are losing their confidence in the capabilities
of the workers. One of the local politicians who is also
the head of personnel in a large factory says: "It is very
difficult to persuade a more advanced company like an
electronics company to come to this place."
Most of the managers commute from Beer-Sheva and the
metropolis of Tel-Aviv. "If you need somebody for a senior
position you would not look for the person here" claims the
head of personnel, or "no senior manager lives in Yerucham"
claims a local bureaucrat. Inspite of several attempts by
local industries and regional ones, professionals and
managers do not reside in the place, they prefer to commute
from Beer-Sheva and even Tel-Aviv. This attitude by local
officials is self-perpetuating. They do not believe anymore
in the ability of the place to attract managers or
professionals.
It is quite evident that there are very few
incentives for the managers to move to the town. The
disadvantages outnumber the advantages. "Being a manager,
living in the community, means being a manager for
twenty-four hours-a-day," says one of the managers. Another
manager who commutes everyday from a prestigious
neighburhood near Beer-Sheva states: "In such a small
place, it is preferable for the manager, not to be socially
involved with the employees." (It should be noted that some
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of these disadvantages stem from the size of the town and
its location rather than its special character.)
The industrialists themselves perceive the main
characteristics of the labor force and the industrial
climate of the towns as follows:
- There is not an industrial climate in the towns,
industries are managed differently than in Tel-Aviv or
Haifa.
- There is a high political involvement in the work
place, primarily by the Histadrut activists.
- The work ethics are very low, and there is low
motivation. Workers do not try to improve their
occupational capabilities. "There is no professional
and technical manpower available, and workers sometimes
hold position they are not capable of holding--they do
not have the needed skills."
By comparison' they claim: "The worker here is inferior to
his colleague in the central parts of the country. You
cannot get from a worker here the same output that you can
get from a worker in the other parts of the country."
It seems that the industrialists base their
perception of the labor force, not only on their own
experience but also adopt the image reflected to them by the
local people and officials. An interesting element in the
8There are at least two cases in which the managers are
familiar with another branch of the same plant in a
different location.
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industrialists' perception is the way they refer to their
workers, i.e., most of the time they group them by their
place of residence, namely, "The workers from place A are
better or worse from those in place B." Employees are
stereotyped by their place of residence. This is a very
common attitude in the Negev region.
The workers tend to stereotype themselves as well.
They tend to consider their fellow-workers as workers from
Yerucham or workers from Dimona rather than individuals.
They claim "the industries here are primitive and therefore
we do not have chances to progress."
Problems with the employment of the youth can
further illustrate the existence of the phenomenon and the
effects of the subjective feelings on employment.
One of the most crucial problems the local
employment agency faces is trying to find jobs for the
youth, especially those who are after their service in the
army. One of the main obstacles in recruiting the youth to
available jobs is their high expectations regarding- their
future life in general and employment in particular.
They complain bitterly against the available jobs:
"The job does not pay social payments" and "The work ethics
in this place are too high, they demand too much," "The
salary is too low" and "This is a primitive job" are
repeated statements made by youth seeking jobs in the local
employment agency.
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The high expectations reveal another angle of the
"island phenomenon." High expectations and the refusal to
be employed in certain jobs--because they are considered to
be "inferior"--are probably the outcome of the encounter of
the local youth with the metropolitan life during their
military service. "Once these youth experience the life in
the metropolitan area they develop high expectations which
sometimes do not fit their capabilities," states the head of
the employment agency. "Yerucham is not the place to bridge
the personal gap which was 'discovered' during the military
service. Therefore, 80 percent of the youth do not come
back" adds one of the youth who was just released from the
army.
It should be mentioned that the youth-employment
problem is a national issue, but the employment problems in
development towns make the problem even harder to solve.
The gap between the life in the development towns
and the central parts of the country is sometimes
'discovered' much earlier. There is a common tendency to
send children at high school age to "Pnimia" (boarding
schools) outside the town. This further reveals the
inferiority feelings towards the "outside" world. The main
reasons for sending the children are: economic--less
economic burden on the family since many of these schools
are subsidized by various agencies and parties,
educational--trying to find better educaticnal opportunities
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than the local school system offers and social--an
anthropologist found out that "It is an honor for a family
to succeed in sending its child to an outside boarding
school."' Needless to say, that most of these students do
not return to the towns after graduation.
Another aspect of the "island phenomenon" is the
traditional beliefs and customs among the various ethnic
groups which are expressed in the employment area.
In a study on the Moroccan (Bar-Yasef, 1970), it was
found: "It must be remembered that the problem of
occupation has also a social aspect. Most types of
employment open to the Moroccan immigrant with no profession
are considered lowly since they symbolize a drop in the
social status. Occupation is, after all, not merely a means
of breadwinning, but also determines, to a large extent, a
person's status in his society." The inferior image of most
of the jobs done by the Moroccan employees has undoubtedly
its impact in creating the "island phenomenon." These
traditional perceptions have their effect on the female
work. One of the most disadvantaged groups in the labor
force are the women. Their chances of finding decent jobs
are fewer. The most disadvantaged segment among them are
the younger women who face both the same problems as youth
and as women. Due to traditional beliefs and
custcms--"women should be at home, raising children
'Ori Shachak, Beer-Sheva University.
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Their problem, as perceived by the residents is considered
to be less crucial and therefore attains less attention.
They are employed mostly as: secretaries in the lower level
(there is a shortage in professional secretaries),
production line workers, sanitary-women, cleaners and
packers in seasonal agricultural jobs.
The manager of a big company claims:
There is an opposition--to give a woman any
managerial or inspection task--among the workers
who come from traditional background. All the
attempts to do so failed, except for one case in
which a professional-Russian immigrant woman was
promoted to an inspection position. It seems that
to the workers who came from Morocco or India a
Russian woman was not considered to be a threat to
their traditional beliefs.
In another case some twenty women were trained as
solder-workers in the metal industry. After a few weeks on
the job none had stayed due to the subtle but effective
opposition by the male workers.
Summary
One of the most important factors in creating the
"island phenomenon" is the subjective feelings of the
residents in the development towns of being isolated and
secluded from the various centers (physical, political,
cultural, et.), but also heavily dependent on them.
These subjective feelings are difficult to describe
and analyze, but they are revealed in the various spheres of
the communities' life. The dependency on governmental
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agencies to supply housing, education, employment,
transportation, etc., adds to the inferiority feelings the
community has already by being different in its
socioeconomic characteristics from those in the central
parts of the country.
This study restricted itself to the existence and
the effects of the phenomenon on industrialization and
employment in those towns.
The low socioeconomic well-being of the community,
as a starting point, coupled with inadequate
industrialization and employment policies have contributed
in reinforcing the phenomenon.
CHAPTER V
THE INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE OF YERUCHAM, DIMONA
AND THE REGION
In the following chapter, the industrial structure
of Yerucham, Dimona and the region is portrayed. In order
to make this chapter compatible with the next chapter
discussing the theoretical "suitability model," each
industrial plant is described following the main factors
composing the theoretical model.
Out of the three main elements which construct the
model, the industry, community and the government, this
chapter will dwell on two elements:
a. The suitability of the industry to the community -
which emphasizes the extent to which local manpower is
exploited adequately and the contribution of the plant
to the community especially in terms of the Quality of
Working-Life (Q.W.L) and wages and salaries.
b. The suitability of the community to the industry -
which emphasizes economic factors of location and other
factors which help to create a viable industrial plant.
Fifteen plants are described in detail, and they can be
grouped to everal subgroups, according to the following
categories:
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a. Location: a distinction should be made between the
local plants - those which are located within the
boundaries of the development towns--Yerucham and
Dimona--and those which are located in the region. The
main impact the location has is on the labor market and
the spatial distribution of the workers, as well as on
the advantages and disadvantages of the plants.
b. Raw materials: plants which need to be located
close to the source of raw materials versus
"foot-loose" plants is another characteristic
distinguishing between plants. It obviously has a
strong connection to location.
c. Period of establishment: The period of
establishment has an impact on the purpose of
establishment (depends on social, economic and
political circumstances), the technology chosen and on
the future development of the plant.
d. Size: Big plant consists of approximately
one-hundred employees, while the small one has a
hundred or less.
Along these lines, four groups can be distinguished:
1. Regional plants - consists of three plants:
"Dead-Sea Works," "Negeve Phosphates" and "Periklas."
All three are chemical plants, located near the
needed raw-materials. Their labor market consists of
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the whole region. All three are big plants,
employing more than one-hundred employees (between
180-1700 workers).
2. Local plants- among the plants in this group, several
distinctions have to be made:
a) Raw material plants: plants located in the town
because of the raw material available in the
location, among them: "Foenicia," "Negev
Ceramics" and "Lon."
b) "Foot-loose" plants: which are called also
"neutral" plants, among them: the textile
industries ("Kittan Dimona" and "Dimona Textile").
These five plants belong also to the "first generation" of
industrial plants, established around the 1960s during the
industrialization period of the development towns. Their
main purpose was to supply employment to the residents of
the newly developed towns. These plants (except for "Lon")
are characterized also by their large size (between 100 and
1250 employees).
A second group among the "foot-loose" ones are small
plants like "Dimona Sakkom" and "Plasteco."
c) "Service plants" - plants which supply services
rather than manufacture industrial products. Among
them: "Tempo Zippoi," "Sodom Metal," "Zevi Hovala,"
"Brand Metal."
FIGURE 5.1. CATEGORIZATION OF THE PLANTS
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These plants belong to a "new generation" of enterprises,
enjoy relative advantage of being located closely to their
clients, and operate in a competitive market without much
governmental subsidy and support which the first generation
of plants have enjoyed. These plants are medium-size and
small-size plants.
This chapter is based on extensive interviews with
managers, heads of personnel, members of the labor unions,
employees, and on data collected in each plant.
5.1. THE INDUSTRY IN YERUCHAM
FOENICIA (TEMPO)
History. The largest plant in Yerucham - "Foenicia"
(or as it is called by its previous name - "Tempo")
manufactures hollow glass (bottles). This plant is
associated with the town of Yerucham more than any other
plant. The double name stems from the integration of two
plants: "Tempo" - which was established and owned by Moseh
Borenstein, one of the big producers of soft drinks and
beverages in the country - and "Foenicia" - the biggest
glass producer in the country, owned by "Koor" - a concern
owned by the Labour Union (Histadrut). Today, "Koor" is the
only owner of the plant.
Both plants were established towards the end of the
industrialization period of most of the development towns.
("Tempo" was established in 1966 and "Foenicia" in 1967.)
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Both mark the inception of employment in industry in the
town which till then was based on relief work and several
jobs in the mining industry in the region.
The availabiity of the majority of raw materials
(approximately 80 percent in volume) the plant needed, in
the craters close to town, was the main factor in the
decision to build both plants in their current location.
Undoubtedly, the grants and the subsidized loans given to
"approved plants" in the developing areas were not least
important in their decision to locate in town.
In the case of "Tempo" a "Zionist Obligation" and
the personal connection of the owner with the Minister of
the Treasury iii those days, Mr. Sapir - (Sapir was known for
his ability to "almost" force industrialists to build their
plants in remote areas in exchange for better financial
arrangements) - were another significant factor in the
decision to locate the plant in town.
In the case of "Foenicia," a political consideration
- as an Histadrut plant - was mentioned as additional
incentive to locate the plant in Yerucham.
Both plants have been manufacturing bottles. The
"Tempo" conglomerate (the mother plant was established in
Holon, near Tel Aviv) was the major client of its plant in
Yerucham. This plant was used to manufacture also boxes for
the bottles, corks and beverages. The plant has supplied
the demand of the whole Negev for beverages and soft drinks.
Thirty percent of the bottles were exported.
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"Foenicia" mother plant is in Haifa and it produces
mostly flat glass. (It has also a small bottle factory.)
In Yerucham, "Foenicia" has produced bottles since 1967 and
has specialized in small ones.
In 1976, as a result of mainly economic
considerations (small market) and after long negotiations,
both plants have established a joint company named "Tamaz"
in order to manage and market the product together, while
each company has continued to produce its own bottles. At
that time, as a result of a decline in the demand for
beverages and unwillingness to mix the private business of
"Tempo" in filling bottles with beverages with the joint
production of bottles with "Foenicia," "Tempo" has stopped
filling bottles. The direct implication was reduction in
the number of employees.
In 1979, "Tempo" sold its part to "Foenicia." Since
then, the plant has been solely owned by "Koor." "Tempo"
has undertaken the obligation to buy bottles from
"Foenicia."
The main causes for this sale are explained by
various people in different ways: The tragic death of
Borenstein's son in Yerucham, pressures that were put on the
owner - as a religious person to stop the plant on
Saturdays, and the economic inefficiency which stems from
the obsolesence of the machines and equipmment and the
unwillingness to renew it since the owner found that the
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plant is not profitable. It seems that the last cause is
the main one for the sale. "Tempo" has found out that it
will be more economically efficient for the plant to
purchase the bottles from "Foenicia" rather than to produce
them by itself. "Tempo" had established in Yerucham, at
that time, a small plant to coat the bottles against
explosion.
A year after the transfer of the plant to "Koor"
ownership, the historical "Foenicia" plant was closed down,
and today the "Tempo" production lines are the only ones
operating.
Since April 1979 the plant has been encountering a
lot of difficulties and has lost money. There are several
causes for these difficulties:
1. The historical merger of the two plants and the poor
management of both are considered, by the current
manager, to be the main reason for the failure.
Moreover, in later stages, the plant was managed by
Haifa's branch whose managers did not know how to
deal with the local manpower - its training, culture,
customs, etc. - and could not develop a common
language.
2. Economic reasons: the close down of the Iranian
market which was the main export market, has resulted
in a smaller market and a decrease in production
which is economically inefficient for the plant of
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this size. Alternative export markets exist in East
Africa, but the high transportation cost and the
competition with the European manufacturers of
bottles - especially Turkey and Spain, which are
subsidized by their governments- make the export
unprofitable.
The current manager claims that under different
circumstances (different location, different policies) the
plant would have been closed down or at least would have
reduced the number of employees. But being an Histadrut
plant, in a developed area, in days in which the National
Party (Likud) is governing, makes it impossible for the
Histadrut to consider a closing down.
The product. "Foenicia" and previously "Tempo" have
manufactured bottles, using the local raw material: glass
sand - from the crater, 12 km. from Yerucham; limestone -
dug 5 km. from the town, and Dolomite. All three constitute
80 percent of the raw material needed. Another component
(soda) is imported from Kenya.
A bottle is relatively a cheap product, but as it
has a big volume, transportation cost becomes rather a
significant factor in the final product cost. The share of
transportation is approximately 80 percent of the total
cost. Another important factor in the production cost is
energy.
The structure of the production expenditures is:
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manpower - 48 percent - It has increased as a result of
inflation.
energy - 30 percent
raw-material - 20 percent.
There is a know-how agreement with a German company from
whom the plant bought the knowledge when it was established.
No R&D is needed in this stage.
Today,, some 180 tons of glass is produced daily (a
bottle weighs 0.4 kg.). The company is exporting 30 percent
of its products at a loss price.
The plant is highly sensitive to economic changes.
A bottle is a packing and not the product itself. Every
user would like to minimize the share of the packing in the
total cost. The product has a high demand elasticity, when
the price increases, the users will move to the
substitutions (plastic bags, cardboard or aluminum packing).
Moreover, when the demand for beverages and soft drinks goes
down, the demand for the bottles goes down. The profit
margins are narrow, and in order to make a reasonable
profit, the production should be in large volume.
The rest of this chapter will deal with the
contribution of the plant to the community.
Employment. The plant today employs 475 employees,
300 are from Yerucham and the rest from Dimona (165) and
from some other Northern locations. Among them, some 18-20
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percent are women. Most of the employees are unskilled
workers or operators of machines - a job which does not
demand any special training, and is actually on-the-job
training. The rest are technical workers and managers on
various levels (see table 3.5 in chapter III).
Since 1973, the number of employees decreased. In
1978, the line filling beverages was closed down, and in
1979, when the plant was transferred to "Koor" the employees
were given the opportunity to resign, but only a few have
taken advantage of this opportunity, since employment in
this plant as a Histadrut plant meant employment security.
"Foenicia" works all year around, twenty-four hours
a day. The existence of a melting furnace for the glass,
dictates these work arrangements which mean three shifts a
day. Since the transfer to "Koor," a fourth shift was
implemented as a result of transfer of workers to work on
Saturdays. Previously, only Arab workers used to work on
Saturdays.
Women. The women in the plant are basically
employed in sorting jobs, secretarial and sanitation jobs.
Some efforts, in the past, to employ women in male jobs
encountered opposition from the managers, claiming that
women have limitations, i.e., working in shifts, a sick
child, etc. On the managerial level, they have been
encountered by the opposition of the Moroccan and Indian
workers to obey women. Only, in one case, a Russian
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technician, a newcomer, has a managerial job and she did not
encounter any difficulty. It seems that her occupational
superiority and her different origin account for this
attitude.
Salary and wages. The salary paid in the plant is
considered to be one of the highest in the town and the
region. The tenured workers get between 20-25 percent
higher salaries than their colleagues in other local
industrial jobs. The high salaries are due to the plant
being an "Histadrut" plant. The extra pay for the second
shift is 30 percent and for the third one is 50 percent.
The employees enjoy various social fringe benefits,
and a special addition for working in conditions of dust and
sand. (A special addition which is enjoyed also by the
employees of the chemical industry.) As a result, the cost
of a worker to the plant is approximately another 80-100
percent of his/her salary.
There is an incentive system based on , but it
is claimed that it is used more as a tool for wage increase
rather than as its original task as an incentive to increase
productivity.
Work ethics. The work ethics are described by the
manager as well as by some workers in two extreme ways. On
one hand, one can find loyalty which is beyond the normal
level, and when it is needed, workers will volunteer for any
emergency or special operation. On the other hand, there is
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not "tradition of work." Lack of "tradition of work" means
low work ethics, low motivation and politization of the work
place (including a lot of intervention by the Histadrut
activists and workers from the local trade union.) The
workers do not have motivation to work after achieving a
specific standard of living, and the tax system in Israel
does not encurage working above a specific level (the 7
percent reduction in income tax for those who live in
development areas is meaningless). The rate of absenteeism
is high especially in the departments with the simple and
monotonous jobs, and among the daily labourer. The turnover
in these departments is very high. Among the workers in the
departments of quality control or the technical departments,
the rates of absenteeism and turnover are low.
In comparison with a similar plant in Germany, a
glass plant which produces 200 hundred ton per day, should
employ (including administration and maintenance) between
200-250 employees.
As a result of the low work ethics which are
expressed also by low work quality, and in addition to the
one-month reserve duty, the plant has to hire over the
needed workers, another 30 percent to compensate for the
disadvantages of the available labor force.
For the last few months, there has been a decrease
in the rate of absenteeism as a result of the employment
situation in the Israeli economy and the increasing rate of
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unemployment, as well as some loyalty to the current
difficulties the plant encounters.
Quality of working life. The work in the majority
of the plant departments (production line, packing) is
considered to be boring and monotonous. The high turnover
in these departments can be seen as an indication of the
situation. The workers who operate the machines have some
variety, but only one out of twenty can advance to a higher
position. Half of the managers on the various levels have
climbed the occupational ladder, while half were brought
from outside.
Among the youth, the work in the plant is considered
to be one of the least attractive, inspite of the high
salaries.
Spatial distribution. The spatial distribution of
the workers shows that among the unskilled workers, the
majority come from Yerucham (78 percent). Among the skilled
workers the majority come from Dimona. Among the management
in the various stages, the majority come from Dimona and
Beer-Sheva. Among the five top managers, one is from
Yerucham, one is from Arad and three from Beer-Sheva.
At the beginning, during the first stages of the
setting up of "Tempo," most of the employees in all ranks
resided in Yerucham, over the years, while the plant grew,
more and more employees came from outside, especially from
Dimona.
194
The plant pays for transportation, but prefers
workers from Yerucham and Dimona since it operates
twenty-four hours-a-day, moreover, the plant is not built
for mass travelling.
The managers who come from as far as Beer-Sheva, get
a car and gas for 4000 km. per month. Although the plant
would prefer workers from nearby locations, it cannot force
people to move to Yerachum. Some attempts to encourage
managers to moved to town have failed.
Contribution to the community. "Foenicia," and
especially the previous plant, "Tempo," are strongly
identified with Yerucham. The "Tempo" owners claim that a
special connection was formed between the plant and its
people, and that the plant has grown with the town. (When
"Tempo" was established there were 1000 resident in
Yerucham, while towards the end of its operation, the
population of Yerucham was 7000 people.)
Undoubtedly, the plant as the first plant in the
location has contributed in terms of education to work life
and work ethics. Until then, people have been employed for
ten years in relief work. In addition, "Tempo" has
established in cooperation with the Ministry of Labor a
vocational school which was planned to train the youth to
the technical jobs needed in the plant. The owners claim
that the school was not successful and did not fulfill
expectations.
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The majority of the Yerachum labor force is employed
in the plant, and Borenstein has been considered the
"father" of the town. The plant has invested in a program
to rehabilitate prisoners, and when the rate of juvenile
delinquency went up, the plant made special efforts to
employ more youth.
On the other hand, this close relationship between
the town and the plant is a source of some difficulties,
especially when issues of hiring and firing are considered,
and political and social considerations are involved rather
than professional ones.
Location advantages and disadvantages. The
outstanding advantage of the location of the plant is its
close distance to the source of raw material. "But, this
advantage, in the opinion of its previous owners and the
current ones as well, is outweighed by the many
disadvantages.
1. Managers on various levels living out of town - the
lack of attraction of the place caused many of the
managers to live out of town, as far as Tel-Aviv and
to commute to Yerucham. The long commuting distance
is a burden on the managers and prevents proper
management, especially when immediate decisions have
to be taken. "Foenicia" is an extreme case in which
the management of the "glass section" of "Koor" is in
Haifa (in the northern part of Israel) and the
financial and marketing systems are in Tel-Aviv.
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2. The long distance from needed auxiliary services
forced the owners to establish their own services.
It causes a higher production cost.. Moreover, the
services themselves are economically inefficient
since the auxiliary services could serve more then
one factory.
3. The quality of the labor force: low work ethics and
inferior junior managerial capabilities are the main
complaints regarding the quaity of the labor force.
As evidence of their complaints, the owners of
"Tempo" bring the new plant (Beer) they are
establishing in the industrial park of Holon - in the
central part of the country. Inspite of a lack of
any incentives, subsidized loans or interest due to
its location, it is still worthwhile for them to
locate the plant in the center and to overcome
difficulties regarding the labor force in the remote
areas.
4. The close relationship between the company and the
town is a source of high political involvement in the
plant and frequent disputes with the employee's
committees.
5. Post factum, it is apparent that the location
considerations of the plant do not play a critical
role when the production of glass is considered.
Transporting sand is possible and may be cheaper than
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transporting the final product - bottles, since
actually it is mostly a transportation of air. The
success of the glass factory "Foenicia" in the North,
in Haifa can be evidence of the little importance
location considerations have in this case.
Future Plans. The previous owners of "Tempo" claim
that the plant does not have any alternative use, and
therefore it should be kept supported and when needed -
subsidized. The current owners (Koor) wonder if glass can
be profitable at all these days, when energy costs are sky
rocketing, and the demand is quite low, but they admit that
at least losses can be minimized. Since the export
continues (due to the amount produced anyhow by the furnace)
and the local market is quite small, a better future can be
achieved if the production cost will be cut or
transportation cost for the final product will be minimized.
Suggestions for improvements include: more
efficient and better management and a new system of
equipment and machines to suit the local labor force.
Manpower is not cheap anymore as it used to be in the past,
therefore it should be minimized and substituted by
automation, control and sophisticated systems. A third
suggestion is to try to cut the cost of transportation for
the final product. This may be feasible when and if a new
market is opened in a nearby area, like Egypt.
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If the situation proceeds as it has been for the
last few years, and the demand for bottles continues to go
down, the management may decide to close down another
production line which means firing some hundred employees,
included skilled ones.
Summary. "Foenicia" belongs to the generation of
industries of which the most representative one is the
textile industry. It is a labor and energy intensive
industry which once suited the population in its location.
Today, it shares with other industries of the same
generation, some problematic symptoms: lack of relative
advantage - and therefore inability to compete in the world
markets, obsolete equipment and machinery - which demand
significant amounts of resources to renew and hidden
unemployment.
On the other hand, as a main source of employment
for the local town, it has been heavily subsidized through
the years of losses either by the government or by any other
public body. In the case of "Foenicia," "Koor" has at this
moment an interest in helping the plant to survive. The
explanation given by the heads of "Koor" for this interest,
is the willingness to have a monopoly on the glass
production in the country. But implicitly, this is probably
a political interest, i.e., "Koor" is an Histadrut company,
closely related to the Labor Party. In a country, currently
governed by an opposite party - the "Likud" (the National
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Party), controlling the employment of a large part of the
town's labor force is a source for political power.
Therefore, "Koor" will keep supporting the plant though it
can implicate reducing the volume of production, firing
employees and actually changing the nature of the plant to a
more sophisticated one, which implys more automation, but
also less emplolyees. The current manager argues that since
the quality of the available labor force is quite low it is
suggested that the technology will be changed to a more
sophisticated and automated one which does not demand much
training and not much will be left for the discretion of the
employee. The simplest worker can then operate a machine
which is highly controlled by automation and control system.
Changing the machines to more sophisticated ones may also
improve the image of the work in the place, and more young
employees will be willing to work at the plant with more
motivation. Today, young people are reluctant to work in
the plant because of the simple and monotonous jobs.
In the long run, a change in technology may mean
creating two groups of workers, one group of professionals
and highly trained workers to maintain the equipmment, and
one group of simple workers to operate them without much
training.
If there is not any change in the demand for bottles
in Israel or in the world markets, and if an alternative use
for the plant is not found the plant will be forced to close
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down either when the political circumstances change or when
"Koor" decides not to subsidize the plant anymore. For the
last few years there has been a tendency in "Koor" to
emphasize the economic and commercial aspects of its
enterprises rather than to operate as a political body
supporting the ideology, as it used to do in the past.
"Koor" and the industrial sector in Israel, 1970-1980
"Koor" was founded in 1944 and has operated since
then in the construction industry. Since 1970 its operation
has spread to other industries including: chemistry, metal,
electronics and food. A formal publication of the concern
claims that a fundamental change in the structure and
activities of the concern was made in order to give more
attention to the economic goals of the country.
Between 1970-1979 the real growth of production per
annum was 11 percent, while in the Israeli economy as a
whole the average growth over the last decade was 6.5
percent per year. One of the main causes for the high
production per worker (in 1979 each worker produced on the
average $7400 worth of production, while in the whole
economy it was $5000) is the concentration of most of "Koor"
plants in the chemistry branch ("Koor"'s share in the
chemistry industry in Israel is 21 percent) and in the metal
and electronics branch (23 percent) both are capital
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intensive industries. The expensive and modern equipment
increases the production per worker.
Half of "Koor" investments in the last decade were
directed to the development areas. In 1978, 35 percent of
"Koor"'s employees were in these regions.
Employment and wages. "Koor" is the industrial
branch of the labor union, and as such is obliged to
increase the worker welfare while keeping the company's
profitability. Therefore, "Koor" has concentrated in those
branches which demand advanced technology on one hand, and
on the other hand, highly professional workers. The
capital-intensive equipment in some of the plants means that
the production per worker is higher but also the
responsibility and knowledge demanded is high. All of these
are expressed in the salary and the work conditions. The
metal workers in "Koor" earn about 20 percent more than
their colleagues in the private sector, and those in the
chemistry branch earn about 30 percent more. The fringe
benefits and other social benefits are between 75-100
percent of the salary and wages and one of the highest in
the whole economy.
Until 1980, some 25 percent of "Koor"'s plants
shared profits with their employees.
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NEGEV CERAMICS
"Negev Ceramics" produces ceramic tiles. The plant
was established in 1972 by a private entrepreneur - Joseph
Peker who owns some other plants near the metropolitan area.
According to Peker, the main reasons for locating the plant
in Yerucham were:
1. The existence of the main raw material - the clay -
in the near crater (the Small Crater). Post factum,
it was found, after the plant had been established
that the clay does not have the proper quality, and
therefore, at the beginning the plant had to import
approximately 70 percent of the raw material. Over
the years, substitutions were found in some other
parts of the country, and today only a small fraction
of the raw material is imported (20 percent).
2. The incentives given to "approved enterprise." Since
the plant is a capital intensive one, it needed a
significant amount of initial capital investment,
therefore, the loans and subsidies, covering a major
part of this investment (approximately 75 percent),
were a major consideration in the decision to locate
the plant in Yerucham.
3. Similar to the case of "Foenicia," the owner
attributes his close relations with Sapir - the late
Minister of Budget - to the decision to locate in
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Yerucham, though he feels that he was almost "forced"
to be a pioneer.
When the plant was first established, two production
lines were operating, one produced porcelain and the other
ceramics. In 1975 the porcelain line was forced to close
down because of disadvantages to scale, it was too small to
operate profitably. The ceramics line suffered massive
losses between the years 1972-1976 as a result of expected
problems of a new organization and incompetent management,
but since 1976, the ceramics line has specialized in the
production of high quality ceramic tiles and in tones which
appeal to a specific segment of consumers in the world. The
plant actually has created its own market in some countries.
Although, initially, the plant has not had plans to export,
its export has expanded from 10 percent of its production in
1972 to 50 percent today, and the demand exceeds the supply.
The main countries to which the tiles are exported are:
Canada, South Africa, Singapore and Hong Kong.
The main sales offices are in Tel-Aviv, in which ten
salespersons are employed. The management services, i.e.,
lawyer, accountant, etc. are bought from the
mother-company, "Peker-Plada" in Tel-Aviv.
The product and the raw materials. The structure of
the expenditures is:
. 15 percent raw material
20 percent capital (financing and depreciation)
35 percent labour
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20 percent energy
10 percent sales and managerial expenses
The clay which comes from various regions in the country,
takes the lion's share of the raw material.
The plant is a continuous plant which operates 365
days a year, and the main risk is in the functioning of the
furnace. Therefore, the plant has to invest continuously in
maintaining and renovating the furnace.
Employment. The plant employs today eighty workers.
Fifteen have managerial and techriical jobs, and the rest -
sixty-five, are the operators of the machines. Out of the
eighty employees, forty-three are from Yerucham,
thirty-three from Dimona and three (the manager, the
production manager and the mechanical engineer) commute from
Beer-Sheva. Except for the four senior positions, the other
twelve managerial and technical workers come from Yerucham
and Dimona.
The plant pays commuting expenses but does not pay
for the time of commuting as some of the regional plants do.
At least one of the senior managers was willing to move to
Yerucham, but could not find suitable housing and therefore
has moved to Dimona. There is not an explicit policy to
force people to move to Yerucham, but it seems that the
majority of those who live in the place, have moved because
of the employment in the plant. On the other hand, few
senior employees who have once moved to Yerucham (the
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company owns three apartments in the place) have left after
a short period. The main cause was the dissatisfaction with
the education system in the place.
The plant's workers-union has an interest in
employing workers from the place. The plant itself would
save a considerable amount of resources if all workers
resided in Yerucham.
The wages in the plant (private ownership) are
considered to be lower than those in the Histadrut plant
("Foenicia") or in the regional industries, but higher than
those in the Textile branch. In the opinion of the plant's
trade union, the wages are higher than those ruled by the
labor agreements of the Histadrut. The wage agreements
include extra pay of 30 percent for the second shift and 50
percent for the third one. Nevertheless, the plant does not
have a system of norms and incentive system.
There is an awareness among the workers that they
are working in a private enterprise and therefore, their
product should be able to compete in the world market. The
employees' committee is aware of the importance of the
quality of the work and therefore, finds itself sometimes in
conflict between its good relations with the management and
its obligation to the workers. The workers appreciate the
management's understanding of the daily worker's needs. The
plant subsidized 78 percent of the cost of the worker's
meals, the workers can buy the plant's production cheaper
and on favorable terms.
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The employees emphasize the importance of the small
size of the plant which allows close and good relationships
among the workers and gives them feelings of "home" which
compensate for the lower salaries.
The plant does not face special problems in finding
workers except for some professional positions: mechanical
engineer and chemical engineer, which were not filled for a
long time. There is a high turnover among the operators
since the plant tries always to find better workers.
Nevertheless, the youth in the place are not attracted to
the plant since the chances for occupational mobility are
very slim (the production line is quite simple) and due to
the low wages and shift work. The plant has therefore
relative disadvantages while competing on the qualified
labor force with the regional or Histadrut plants. Its only
advantage is its closeness to home.
The number of women employees is small. Among the
four women, two work in production, one in services and one
is the operator. The main reason for the small number of
women is their inflexibility regarding shift work.
Contribution to the community. "Nevev Ceramics," in
hope of creating strong relationships between the plant and
the place has built a day-care center, though there are only
four women working in the plant. These relationships have
never developed. For example, to the expected relationships
Peker brings the day-care center he has built in another
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plant he owns in Kiryat-Malachi, in which a 'dialogue' has
developed between the plant and the place. The plant
arranges parties and social events and also organizes trips.
Location advantages and disadvantages. The founder
of the plant, Peker, claims that there is no relative
advantage in locating ,the plant in its current place.
Moreover, there are several disadvantages:
a. The main relative advantage - the close distance
to the source of raw material has never materialized since
the raw material is brought from all over the country. The
transportation cost of the raw material is meaningless. On
the other hand, the manpower in the place does not fulfill
expectations and since the plant is considered to be a
capital intensive one of which the quality of the labor is
of great importance, this disadvantage has a significant
effect on its operation. Actually, the founder claims that
the development of the plant has been slowed down as a
result of the distance, and the quality of the labor force.
While comparing to the quality of the labor force in the
other plants he owns in the metropolitan area, the founder
argues that the plant could have developed more rapidly and
could produce a variety of products, had it been established
in a different location.
The only reason to locate the plant in Yerucham was
the financial support in the form of subsidies and grants
which the plant could get only in the development regions.
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Today, with an export of approximately 50 percent of the
product, it could be located in any place in the country and
could get various subsidies and grants.
b. Most of the managing staff commute everyday from
Tel-Aviv, Beer-Sheva and Dimona. There is a high dependency
on commuters which is unhealthy for the plant.
c. Services - most of the auxiliary services are
supplied by suppliers who are located north of Beer-Sheva.
Only a few minor services are supplied locally. When the
plant needs the police or the firemen services, it has to
turn to the services in Dimona, since the general director
claims that he cannot rely on the local ones. The same is
true for special transportation services. Only lately, the
plant has begun to buy gas from a local station after the
owners promised to stay open twenty-four hours a day.
Most disadvantages are attributed to the small size
of the town and the low threshold for necessary services.
Future plans. The plant intends to expand
production by buying a new furnace ($3 million) and by
renovating the old one which may serve the plant for another
few years. The implication of this expansion from
manpower's point of view is an addition of no more than
twenty-five workers since an addition to the managerial and
administrative infrastructure is not needed. In the long
run, the founder thinks it will be possible to develop and
expand the ceramics industry in the region.
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Summary. "Negev Ceramics" is a plant which
apparently is based on the relative advantage of the
location, but practically could have been established in any
place in the country. Its economic strength is based on the
quality of the product and its export market.
From the point of view of the community, Yerucham,
it can be considered as a suitable industry since it gives a
decent standard of living to its workers and some
satisfaction in their work. This is a plant which fulfills
the local need for jobs for some skilled and professional
workers and for simple workers as well. This is a plant
which fulfills the needs of those who do not wish to work in
the raw material plants which demand hard working and long
commuting hours.
If there are not any radical changes in the export
markets or in the local ones, there will not be any danger
of reducing the number of employees or a danger of closing
down the plant. On the other hand, the plant does not plan
to provide jobs beyond the modest plans outlined above.
LON LABORATORIES
"Lon" is a plant which produces cosmetics products.
It was actually the first industrial plant in Yerucham
(1963). The plant was established in Yerucham since the
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company got concessions from the government to establish a
cosmetic plant whose products are based on mineral waters
from the area, under the requirement that the plant be
located south of Beer-Sheva.
The plant began to operate with six employees and by
the beginning of the 1970s it employed sixty workers. While
it had a concession from the international company of
"Fabrege" it exported 80 percent of its production. When
the right for the concession expired, the export and hence
the activity of the laboratories decreased-. Today, the
plant exports 50 percent of its product. It markets its
products directly to beauticians and beauty salons. In
Israel, its marketing difficulties stem from competition
with big commpanies like "Revlon" and "He-lena Rubenstein."
Another source for difficulties is the recent tightening in
the credit market.
The product, raw material and production. The plant
produces few products: various cosmetic treatments and
make-up. The plant has a small research and development
unit and it employes two chemists who develop new products,
the plant does not buy any know-how. Today, the majority of
the raw materials are imported from abroad, or are brought
from the central parts of the country. The plants exports
50 percent of its product.
The various auxiliary services are bought in Dimona
and Beer-Sheva. The sales center and the main office are
located in Tel-Aviv.
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The volume of production today is approximately
$700,000. In the beginning of the 1970s it was threefold.
The composition of the production expenditures is:
70 percent raw materials and packing, and 30 percent labor
force.
Employment. Today, there are approximately 30
workers. Among them, ten to eleven are in administrative
jobs: chemists, warehouse workers and maintenance people,
and twenty women working on the production lines - mainly
packing the products. Five women come from Dimona, since
the manager could not find enough women who can read the
Latin letters in Yerucham. Some of the workers have climbed
the occupational ladder in the plant. For example, one
became foreman and another manages the warehouse.
The wages in the plant are quite low since it
belongs to the food industry branch. The food and textile
branches have the lowest level of wages among all industrial
branches, but it seems that the convenient work conditions
(five work days and the close distance to home), and the
"homey" feeling the plant gives, compensate for the low
wages. The plant does not have any problems in hiring
workers when needed (mainly women).
Future plans. As was described before,, the plant
has lately encountered financial difficulties and was on the
verge of being closed down. The employees did not get their
wages for several months. Some relief may come if economic
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conditions change and it is worthwhile to increase
production for the local market.
Summary. This is another example of a plant which
was established in a specific location as a result of,
seemingly, relative advantage and government subsidies, but
post factum it was found that there was not any relative
advantage. The low rent and the previously close distance
to raw materials are offset by the transportation cost of
the final product.
The main constraint this plant has is marketing. It
could produce more but it has difficulties marketing the
product in the local as well as the export markets. In the
local market, the problems of economic policy, high interest
rates and inflation make it difficult for the small plant to
give credit to its clients, and therefore, has to limit its
production. In the export markets, it has to compete with
the many big firms, nevertheless, for exporting, the plant
gets relatively cheaper financing.
BRAND METAL
"Brand Metal" is not an industrial plant by the
common definition. This is a big mechanical locksmith
workshop, but the circumstances under which it was
established, and the problems it encounters characterizes
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other plants in the developing areas. The plant was
established two years ago by a father and two sons and got
the status of "approved enterprise." In the past, the
owners used to work in Beer-Sheva, but have decided to move
to their hometown, Yerucham, in order to supply locksmithing
services and other metal work needed by the big plants in
the region like "Dead-Sea Work" and the Arava (the southern
part of the country) plants.
Production, raw materials. The enterprise deals
with rolling iron, cutting and bending metals and mainly
renovating machines and equipment.
The competition in the area among metal workshops is
quite strong, and in order to gain work from the plants
around, the plant has to excel in its performance. The
strongest competitor is "Sodom Metal," a big and established
company (two-hundred workers) settled in Dimona.
"Brand Metal" tries actually to get work from the
same clients as well as from clients who used to sent metal
work to Tel-Aviv. Governmental ministries and especially
the Defence Ministry are obliged to prefer companies in the
development areas to others in the rest of the country when
subcontracting work.
Employment. The plant employs between twenty and
twenty-five employees. Half are skilled workers. The plant
is characterized by high turnover. Those workers who have
resigned claim that the work ethics in the place are very
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high, which means strictness concerning work hours and
breaks, as well as the long working hours (7 A.M. to 5 P.M.,
six days a week except Friday on which people work till 2
P.M.). On the other hand, they admit that the salaries paid
by the plant are, relative to the salaries paid by other
plants, quite high. Moreover, there are opportunities to
get on-the-job training, and to climb the occupational
ladder. The owners admit that quite a lot of workers were
fired because they have not fulfilled expectations,
nevertheless, those who want to learn and benefit from the
job can do it.
Half of the workers commute from Beer-Sheva, since
the plant could not find the appropriate workers either in
Yerucham or Dimona. It is therefore forced to pay travel
expenses. The plant looks for employees aided by the local
employment agency, but the latter finds it difficult to
convince the unemployed (mainly those who were recently
released from the army) to join the plant. The owners think
that another reason for the difficulties in hiring the
needed skilled workers is the preference of skilled workers
to work in the bigger and more established plants like
"Sodom Metal" which have set their name in the field and
which are able to pay better payments and to provide higher
fringe benefits. At this stage, the plant cannot compete
with them in this sense. The local labor union which
usually cooperate with the workers to organize labor unions
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in the plant in order to achieve better social benefits, is
aware of the fragile situation of the plant and at this
stage does not press in creating a worker's organization.
It perceives the plant as a good and promising one and tries
to help in its initial stages. The plant has a sufficient
amount of orders but the bottleneck of the labor force
prevents it from expanding.
Summary. The locksmithy is undoubtedly a post mark
of a new pattern of plants and services which have been
located in Yerucham for the last few years.
This is a plant which enjoys actually one advantage,
of being located close to the source of jobs for its
operation - but suffers from several disadvantages and yet,
tries to compete with any other similar plants in the
country and in the region.
,It seems that a shortage of suitable manpower
restricts the optimum operation of the plant.
Only a major change in the attitude towards work and
in the quality of manpower will encourage plants of this
type to be located in the place.
Yerucham - Other Plants and Services
Other plants and services include: "Tempo Zippoi" -
a small workshop which coats bottles with plastic coating to
prevent explosion, "Long John" - a new textile plant which
makes pants and trousers, and "Zevi Hovala" - a
transportation service company.
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The first plant was established by the "Tempo"
owners, and when they left, it moved to "Foenicia"
ownership. It employes twenty-five unskilled workers and
few skilled ones who commute from Beer-Sheva and Dimona.
The main problem it faces is the small volume of production
which means inefficiency in production. It stems from the
situation in which only part of the bottles in the country
are coated while the plan was that a law, issued by the
Ministry of Health, would force all the bottle companies to
coat their bottles, this has never matialized. As a result
the plant is dependent solely on the number of bottles
produced by "Foenicia," and the latter is dependent on the
volume of orders by "Tempo," and the demand for bottles in
the country. It follows that the plant is very sensitive to
risks regarding demand. Some argue that today the plant is
on the verge of closing down.
"Long John" was established recently, and at this
stage the plant is in a run-up stage. The decision to
locate the plant in Yerucham was highly affected by the
grants and subsidized loans given to "approved plant," which
chooses to locate in the high priority areas. Since this is
a capital intensive plant, the various incentives were
crucial in the decision to locate in the place. All of the
plant's production is planned for export. Sewing for export
demands high quality and strictness regarding timing and
keeping the schedule. In this sense "Long John" belongs to
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the "new generation" of plants like "Brand Metal" which try
to operate differently from the "old generation" of
industries. "Long John" is actually a "spin-off" from the
big textile plant of "Polgat" located in Kiryat-Gat, another
development town closer to the metropolitan area of
Tel-Aviv. The manager used to work in "Polgat" and through
his work he has found that there is a high demand for the
specific product which "Polgat" is not able to fulfill.
At this stage,, the plant takes in new employees.
Working in the plant does not demand a long training period
and special skills whereas the plant is capital intensive
and the machines are fully automated. When the plant will
operate at full it will employ fifty women. The manager
does not anticipate any problems in finding the needed
employees since the supply of women in the local labor force
exceeds the demand.
The third firm is a transportation firm, "Zevi
Hovala." It was established a year ago by eight residents
from Yerucham, who previously had worked as individuals for
twelve years. The company owns a fleet of sixteen trucks.
Their main client is "Foenicia" for whom the company serves
as the sole supplier of transportation services. The
company encounters several difficulties, among them: lack
of confidence - an attitude expressed by potential clients -
companies which are looking for transportation services.
This attitude stems from the image, Yerucham reflects on the
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firm located in the place. The owners argue that if the
main office had been located in a different place, business
could have been done more smoothly. In order to improve its
image the company keeps schedules very strictly, fulfills
every contract to its last point, and builds confidence in
its clients.
The second difficulty faced by "Zevi Hovala" is
entering the regional market which is almost monopolized by
the governmental company of "Mifably Tovala," which owns a
fleet of 359 trucks and serves all of the regional chemical
plants. The company has tried to get some contracts from
the Ministry of Defence but the Ministry has already
contracts with other companies which cannot be broken
inspite of the fact that "Zevi Hovala" submitted a cheaper
offer since it is located in the region. The expansion of
the firm depends upon getting more contracts.
Summary. The industrial history of Yerucham is
actually the stories of the seven plants outlined in the
previous paragraphs. Over the last twenty to thirty years,
some small plants (especially textile workshops) have been
established but none have survived. The new generation of
small plants and enterprises may indicate that a new era of
industrialization is about to appear, but the early stages
of development of these plants and the difficulties they
have been encountering do not make the industrial future of
the place too secure.
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5.2. THE INDUSTRY IN DIMONA
The Textile Industry
There are two textile plants located in Dimona:
"Kittan Dimona," which belongs to the conglomerate "Clall,"
and "Dimona Textile," 'a private plant which has changed
hands several times over the years.
Both plants belong to the "old generation" of
industries established in the 1950s and 1960s.' The textile,
clothing and leather branches have contributed considerably
to the goals of industrial development in its early period.
The combination of capital investment and employment of
relatively unskilled labor force, has made these branches
the most preferable ones for a rapid industrialization of
the economy and for the absorption of the mass migration all
over the country.
The weight of these branches has been progressively
decreasing during 1950-1980 with regard to output,
employment and capital. The various improvements in the
spinning and weaving machines over the years have resulted
in speeding up the processes and increasing the total
product. Nevertheless, it did not bring the branch to a
total automation and the plants in these industrial branches
have kept demanding a combination of capital investment and
'The following paragraph is based on: Ministry of
Industry and Trade, "Industry in Israel," September 1981.
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employment of masses of manpower. The textile producers
have demonstrated conservative attitudes regarding changing
and improving equipment. They have operated old and
outdated machines for a long period. A new generation of
modern textile machines which are faster and more efficient
which have been developed over the 1960s as well as
automation and control systems, are factors which set up a
pressing problem for the textile producers: to weigh the
considerable amount of new investment against the increasing
rate of production and the marketing potential of the
product.
The modern and perfected equipment act towards
strengthening the specializing in large production lines and
exploiting the advantage of scale in a "vertical" framework,
which means that every plant will manufacture from the stage
of weaving (fabrics) to the final product (the clothes).
The frequent changes in the textile market and the
constraints put by the changing requirements of the fashion
market, operate contrary to the direction of changes
dictated by the modern equipment.
It seems that these contrary forces will bring about
a revolutionary change in the textile industry. The
industry will purchase modern and improved equipment and
will go through specialization process in the course of
integrating vertically and will become "capital intensive"
industry in which the equipment is depreciated and changed
every few years.
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Although the weight of the branch has been
progressively decreasing during the period 1950-1980 with
regard to output, employment and capital, it is nevertheless
worth noting that its part in exports has grown to a record
of nearly 17 percent of the total exports in the year 1970.
From that year onwards it began steadily decreasing, partly
because of the larger growth of the metals and chemical
branches and partly because of declining demand in the world
markets following developments there.
The share of the Israeli textile and clothing
industry in world trade is small. There is room for
developing export markets, but on the other hand there is
tough competition among the big exporters - Japann, Hong
Kong, U.S.A., France, Italy, which necessitates skills and
inventiveness in developing exclusive, fashionable products
which may create its own market and therefore enables
competition in the world markets. In order to be successful
in the world market, the Israeli textile industry has to
export high quality products and to be able to produce in
large scale (in Israeli terms). It seems that the world
demand for textiles and clothing works in favor of big and
sophisticated products and in vertical operation whose
production lines are built to handle large scale, standard
production lines while retaining strictly the quality,
standards and schedules.
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KITTAN-DIMONA
"Kittan Dimona" was established by the end of the
1950s. The main purpose in establishing the plant was to
provide a supplementary source of employment (in addition to
the regional chemical plants) to the residents of Dimona and
Yerucham.
Economic considerations and profit making were not
among the most important considerations when the plant was
established. Actually, at that time there was already a
surplus of textile production but Sapir, the late Minister
of Budget, preferred surplus over unemployment and unrest in
the development towns. 2 The textile plant was considered to
be the adequate solution for the population in these towns.
It did not demand education and much training. Since there
was no incentive to operate the plant efficiently, and
governmental subsidies have been pouring whenever it was
necessary, the outcome was inferior quality of production,
low work norms and low work ethics.
This situation lasted until 1977 when two major
changes took place: on the national level, since the 1973
war, the government has begun to reduce its support for
plants, especially in developing areas which had been
subsidized for a long time and were not able to operate
without this support. This was a part of a development in
2
"Haartz," March 24, 1958.
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the Israeli economy to minimize governmental intervention in
some economic areas.
On the plant level, the conglomerate "Clall" of
which "Kittan-Dimona" is a subsidiary, has decided to follow
a policy similar to the governmental one, and to eliminate
any failed plant. It has given "Kittan" a chance to recover
and to enter the export market. Many employees have been
fired, an incentive wage system was established and inspite
of disputes and strikes, the plants has recovered. From $12
million export in 1977 the plant has reached $30 mi-llion
export in 1980.
Employment. "Kittan Dimona" like many other textile
plants has manpower problems, i.e., shortage of workers
especailly in the production lines and high turnover. In
some departments, especially in the spinning and weaving,
there were up to three turnovers of workers within a year.
Out of the 1200 workers, 300 are Arabs who come from the
West Bank and are willing to do the jobs which the Jewish
employees refuse to do..
The main reasons for the refusal to work in the
plant in general and in the specific departments in
particular are the work conditions. The quality of working
life is quite low;there is noise, dirt, it is very hot in
the summer and cold in the winter, the work itself is
physically difficult as well as the psychological effort.
On the other hand, the basic salary is very low, but the
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managers claim that with the system of incentives one can
get to a quite high salary. Nevertheless, this salary
cannot compete with salaries given in the chemical plants in
the area. The basic salary is even lower than the
unemployment payments given.
Since 1977 the company has begun a recovery plan.
Out of 1650 employees then, 250 were fired. In the spinning
and weaving departments a new system of incentive system was
developed, and there were signs for increase in output and
its quality and in production. The plant moved also to
manufacture new and more sophisticated products suitable for
export especially camping equipment (90 percent is imported
to Europe). All this was done while other textile plants
over the country, especially in development areas have been
closed down.
Contribution to the community. The two textile
companies, "Kittan Dimona" and "Dimona Textile" (see next
paragraph) employed in 1966, 1,788 workers who were then,
43.4 percent of the total employees in the place. In 1980,
1,295 of Dimona's residents were employed (16 percent out of
8,000 employees). This decline in percentage indiates the
decline in dependency of the town on the "first generation"
and labor intensive plants.
Nevertheless, the plant was for many of Dimona's
settlers the first experience of work life in contrast to
unemployment or relief work they had been engaged in until
then.
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For the last few years, the plant encountered
problems in finding workers, especially for the weaving and
spinning departments. The employment agencies in Dimona and
Yerucham find it very difficult to convince unemployed
especially among the youth who have just been released from
the army to work in the place. Women are more willing to
work in the place, especially in the sewing workshop,
although the three shifts and the low salaries discourage
from working in the place.
Among the males, heads of families the plant is
considered to be a less desirable place to work because of
the low salaries and the bleak chances for occupational
mobility. On the other hand, there has been a continuous
situation of unemployment in the town, but the unemployed
prefer to stay without work and to get sometimes
unemployment benefits rather than to take jobs in the
plants.
As was mentioned before, automation can be a partial
solution to the manpower shortage. The machines and the
whole technology are quite old and obsolete. (The rumors
are that when they were bought in the 1950s from European
countries as part of the German reparations and restitution
payments they had already been quite obsolete.) Automation
will reduce the need for workers, and on the other hand,
will improve the image of the work place.
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The manager who is aware of this solution claims
that if new machines are bought, the whole system will have
to be reorganized, an operation which cannot be implemented
-at this stage when the company fights to survive.
' DIMONA TEXTILE
"Dimona Textile" was first established as "Dimona
Textile" by private entrepreneurs in 1960. It employed then
approximately 1,800 employees. The plant included: a
spinning mill, knitting workshop and a workshop for
synthetic fabrics (Diolen-Luft) which was called "Yerucham
Textile." The origin of the name came from the initial plan
to establish the plant in Yerucham, but the owners, while
taking advantage of the incentives given to Yerucham as an
area with higher priority than Dimona, preferred to
establish the plant in Dimona which had already some
auxiliary services and better infrastructure than Yerucham.
"Yerucham Textile" has been closed down since the product
was not successful.
The rest of the plant went through several stages,
changing hands and at last went into the hands of an
official receiver which has kept operating the plant until
1979 when it was bought by a Swiss company headed by a
Sepharadic Jew (Mr. Gaon) who sees in buying and operating
the plant a help to the Sepharadic community in Dimona
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(Moroccan). Since then, a new development has taken place
under the name of "Dimona Textile."
The main product is: cotton threads and cotton with
Diolen threads, both are manufactured in the plant's
spinning workshop. Twenty percent of the raw material is
imported.
The company encounters problems in two areas:
exporting the final product, and low quality and shortage of
manpower.
"Dimona Textile" is one of the biggest spinning
mills in Israel. There are altogether seven mills which are
organized as a cartel, each one specializes in a specific
kind of product. The cartel regulates the amount of
production and the markets to which the product will be
marketed. In Israel the market is protected but in other
countries there is a "damping" of low-quality threads which
is difficult to compete with. Moreover, the price of labor
in other countries is lower which gives them a relative
advantage.
The manpower problem is a more severe one. The
plant employs today 630 employees, out of the 630, 110 are
Arabs from the West Bank, brought everyday by cabs since
they live in many scattered villages. Seventy-five workers
are brought from Beer-Sheva and from Yerucham there are only
50 workers.
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The turnover is very high especially in the spinning
mill which is totally occupied by Arab employees. In the
weaving workshop which is considered to be a more convenient
place to work, Arabs and Jews are working together. In the
sewing workshop there are only Jewish workers. Over the
years less and less people from Dimona have been working in
the place and the turnover gets stronger, i.e., the
percentage of workers employed permanently is decreasing,
and the periods in which they are employed is shorter.
The employment agencies in Dimona and Yerucham have
been requested for a long time to refer workers to the plant
but, as in the case of "Kittan-Domona" many of the
unemployed refuse to work in the place mainly because of the
hard work conditions: three shifts, noise, pollution and
the tough physical work. The salaries, on the other hand,
are quite low although with incentives it can get quite
high. The problem is that they are almost as low as
unemployment payments. Moreover, for the youngsters, there
are not many opportunities for occupational mobility. On
top of it, the plant has developed a negative image which
has been strengthened as the share of Arab workers has
increased.
The machines are obsolete. They had been bought in
the 1960s from German companies which had changed their
machines to more modern and sophisticated ones.
229
In order to overcome the problems of manpower
shortage the firms has to close down machines from time to
time and to work under its capacity which means economic
inefficiency. Another way to solve the problem is to create
a long working shift of twelve hours paying incentives and
additional hours. A different solution is shifting workers
between departments, etc.
The new Swiss owner's plan to invest in new and
modern equipment and machines which means on the one hand,
firing workers and decreasing the number of employees and on
the other hand, will improve the quality of working life in
the plant and may increase the inclination of the unemployed
to work in the plant. The owner planned as well to create a
vertical enterprise, from spinning to sewing the final
product in order to take advantage of the higher value in
such an operation.
Dimona - Other Plants and Services
An annual report by the Ministry of Commerce and
Industry lists, besides the plants listed in the previous
chapter, some other twenty plants in Dimona. The list
includes some which are actually services rather than
industrial plants like: regional bakery, printing house,
packing house, a sewing shop, etc. The number of employees
ranges from five to sixty. Outstanding in the number of
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employees is a big locksmithy - "Sodom Metal" which employs
approximately 250 workers. From interviews with the
managers of three of the twenty plants, it seems that the
circumstances in which they operate and the problems they
encounter characterize industrial plants in the development
areas, in general, and those in Dimona and Yerucham, in
particular.
The three plants are: "Sodom Metal," "Plasteco"
which manufactures Fiberglass Reinforced Polyester pipes for
industrial use and "Sakkom Dimona" which manufactures
stainless flatware.
All three managers have complaints regarding the
quality of the labor force. "Sodom Metal"'s manager claims
that there is a shortage in skilled labor force, and if he
had more trained employees he could expand and get more
projects. Moreover, he speculated that in a different
place, closer to metropolitan areas he could have gotten a
more qualified labor force which would have enabled him to
achieve a better professional achievement in the projects,
spending less time. On the same line, the manager of
"Plasteco" says that they do not expand because of lack of
skilled manpower, moreover, the number of employees has
shrunk considerably since it was established in 1972.
"Sakkom Dimona" on the same line argues that the work
climate in the place cannot be compared to the one in the
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central part of the country.' There is a lack of work ethics
and initiative. The solution to the situation which was
actually implemented by the plant was to adapt the
technology of the plant to the quality of the labor force
available. Flatware in Israel has a marketing problem since
a cheap import is coming from the Far East and "Sakkom
Dimona" finds it difficult to compete with this import even
though the quality of the Israeli product is much higher.
Thinking about switching to different products using the
existing technology, the company is constrained by the
available labor force which according to the manager's
opinion, is not capable of fulfilling the needed skilled and
professional requirements.
'The manager of "Sakkom Dimona" manages a similar plant
in Tel-Aviv, and commutes twice a week to Dimona.
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5.3. THE REGIONAL CHEMICAL INDUSTRY
The regional chemical industry consists of three
plants: "Dead-Sea Works," "Negev Posphates," and
"Periklas." All three are based on local raw material and
natural resources, they are owned by the public company of
"Israel Chemicals," and by their nature they are located a
long distance from population centers and ports, therefore,
they rely heavily on the commuting of their workers and the
transportation of the final product.
ISRAEL CHEMICALS LTD. (I.C.L.)
Israel Chemicals Ltd. (I.C.L.) is the parent and
holding company of a group of chemical enterprises engaged
in the development of Israel's main natural resources, the
Dead Sea brines and the Negev desert mineral deposits.
It is government owned and was established for the
purpose of coordinating and promoting Israel's inorganic
chemical industry.
The various companies of the group are located in
the southern part of Israel, extracting the natural minerals
and converting them into chemical products, mainly
fertilizers. I.C.L. companies provide all the required
fertilizers for the Israeli market and the great majority of
the groups' production is sold in the international market.
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Each company is an independent legal entity which is
managed by an independent managing director reporting to an
independent Board of Directors in which I.C.L. has one third
of the vote. The managing director of I.C.L. serves as the
chairman of the board of each company. The other two thirds
of each board are composed of government officials and
notable public figures.
It is the responsibility of I.C.L. to allocate
resources for new investments, coordinate operations and
maintain liasion between its daughter companies and the
government. All the companies are organized in a functional
organization and maintain a complete functional independence
including production, finance, human resources, marketing
and R&D. All three plants are categorized under "National
Projects," which means that all the decisions concerning
investment and further development are done under broader
national considerations rather than short-run narrow
economic ones.
DEAD SEA WORKS. (D.S.W.)
The Dead Sea Works Ltd. was refounded in 1952, and
production began in 1955, after the Beersheva-Sodom road was
constructed and fresh water wells were dug. (In 1931 the
first potash and bromine works were established by the
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Palestine Potash Co. Ltd. which was founded by British and
Jewish investors, on the northwest shore of the Dead Sea
close to the inflow of the Jordan River. In 1937 the
company founded another plant at the foot of Sodom on the
southwestern shore of the Sea. During the War of
Independence the northern plant was destroyed and only the
plant at Sodom remained, although it did not operate because
of a lack of road connections.)
In 1956 a new bromine plant was constructed and in
1962 large-scale expansion of the works began which was made
possible by loans from the World Bank and other foreign
banks and by the sale of shares in Israel and abroad. The
project included the creation of a hugh evaporation pan
system (to produce potash) as well as the construction of
the two modern semi-automatic potash factories.
The plant exports 97 percent of its production which
includes direct product--potash, and indirect
ones--production of fertilizers based on potash. For less
than two decades the complex has not had any profits and in
some years had even suffered losses due mainly to marketing
and prices in the world. But for the last few years the
profit has increased from 1.1 million I.L. in 1970-71
(l$=3IL) to 504.3 million I.L. in 1980 (1$=80IL). The
company has begun to invest in developmment and expansion,
and as another sign for recovery it has begun paying
royalties to the Government of Israel for permission to use
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the country's natural resources. The company has begun to
pay as well dividend to its stockholders who consist of 90
percent - the Government of Israel, and to the rest (10
percent) of private holders.
Employment history. When the factory was
reestablished in 1952, all of its workers lived in work
camps around the plant. The place has become an attraction
for many youngsters interested only in the adventure and the
high wages. They viewed the work in the place only as a
wayside station where they would stop as brief a time as
possible, and then only to enrich themselves with the high
wages they received. Many never even finished their first
week of work. The withering heat drove them swiftly away
from the Dead Sea. Others managed to stay and work until
their pockets were filled and then they also hastened to
flee. Problems of drugs and prostitution have been
flourishing in the camps. These social problems added
difficulties to the production difficulties over the first
four years, 1952-1956.
In 1956 a new management took over. The first step
taken by the new management was to liquidate the existing
work camp. New employees were chosen, family men were
preferred as responsible and mature persons, who took their
work seriously and respected it. The new management has
expended much effort in achieving healthy relationships and
in creating a feeling of identification between the worker
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and the plant, no less than in the development project.
These changes are strongly tied to the name of Maklef, who
became the general director of the plant in 1954 and saw in
the workers the most important part of the plant. The
veteran workers from Dimona see in Maklef the "father" of
the plant and of Dimona, since a strong relationship had
been created between the two in the initial stages of the
town's development. Maklef argued that one of the main
justification for the plant is to supply employment, and as
an important national project it should exist even though it
does not always make profits. He invested a lot of effort
through training and education in the workers from Dimona -
the vast majority newcomers from North Africa - to whom
employment in the D.S.W. was the first experience of work
life. Many people in Dimona today believe that in the work
camp and later through the unique relationships between
workers and management, the strong leadership of Dimona has
been shaped (Dimona has today two parliament members).
The D.S.W. is one of the biggest emploeyrs in the
southern part of the country. In the plants in Sodom and in
the offices in Beer-Sheva (which include the administration,
finance, R&D, etc.) there are approximately 1,300 employees.
The D.W.S. employs indirectly thousands of people in the
area.
The plant does not face any difficulties in hiring
new workers. For each vacancy there are up to forty
237
candidates. The salaries, fringe benefits and the social
benefits are high. The various social benefits include
various facilities in the work place as well as special
courses for advanced training and courses in other areas
like: languages and general education in the places of
residence, mainly Beer-Sheva. The company provides loans
towards payment of the tuition of the worker's children in
vocational and regular high schools and give scholarships
for higher education for worker's children who choose to
study chemistry studies.
The work conditions are: high salary which includes
high incentive bonus, an additional salary for the year (a
thirteen month salary), yearly bonus based on profits, a
work week of five days, and an earlier retirement (at the
age of fifty-eight after twenty-five years of work but not
later than the age of sixty-two).
The company pays for transportation in
air-conditioned buses. Moreover, it pays for half of the
commuting time, which amounts to 1.5 hours a day (one way)
for the Beer-Sheva workers.
The D.S.W. hires its employees from Beer-Sheva, Arad
and Dimona, and when needed from all over the country
through announcements in the newspapers. A report by
"Pilat"' states that there is a high motivation and
4
"Pilat" is a consultant company in the area of manpower.
They select employees for the D.S.W. The selection includes
conducting psychotechnic tests and personal interviews.
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identification with the plant among the workers. There is a
willingness to invest in work and to contribute. Among the
veteran workers there are feelings of pioneering and deep
rootedness of the kind pioneering farmers in Israel express.
The workers grow and develop in the same plant (there is no
mobility between the five projects in the D.S.W.), and
strengthen over the years their acquaintance with the work
which in turn has created identification and persistence.
Some other important characteristics which have contributed
to this attitude are: the quality of the working life in
the plant, the material rewards, the social context the
work-team or the specific shift gives to the workers.
Sometimes a worker spends more time with his work team than
with his family. In some groups the social life continues
beyond work, e.g., parties, family meetings, and mutual help
when needed.
There are many opportunities to climb the
occupational ladder in the plant. Most of the team leaders,
foremen, shift managers, unit heads, etc. have been promoted
from junior positions of operators or maintenance workers to
higher positions. The head of the employees' committee
claims that only those who grew up with the plant can become
heads and managers of units.
There are two trajectories for promotions. One
through professional promotion - based on seniority,- and
second through promotion based on performance - given to
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workers who have proven ability to manage and to take over
responsibility.
The turnover is very low. The plant employs between
15-20 percent temporary workers, but most of its workers
(more than 70 percent) have been working ten years and more.
The place attracts professionals and academic
workers. There are 130 (10 percent) academicians, 80 out of
them work in Sodom in production and various technical
services and 50 work in Beer-Sheva, in Research and
Development laboratories and in economic services (finance,
etc.).
The spatial distribution of the workers shows that
the employees from the lower levels of skilled work commute
from Dimona, among them: operators of machines,
technicians, shift workers, etc. The plant prefers to hire
shift-workers from closer distance: Arad and Dimona, but
for the regular work there is not any locational
preferences. Workers from higher levels commute from Arad
and Beer-Sheva, and most of the engineers and the managers
come from Beer-Sheva and its prestigious suburb, Omer (see
table 5.1).
A more profound look into the relationships between
the spatial distribution and the seniority of the workers in
the plant and based on interviews with employees may show an
interesting phenomenon. As workers proceed from the lower
level of the occupational ladder to the higher levels, they
TABLE 5.1
SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF WORKERS IN THE D.S.W.
Location
Occupation Comments
Beer-Sheva Arad Dimona
Vice General Manager 1
Top Managers 8 2
Administrators 4o 33 29 See comment A
Academicians 62 21 2
Technicians 29 16 8
Foremen 42 38 58
Professional Workers 119 77 16o 5-other places
Shift Workers 28 83 102
Students 6 1 2
Apprentices 2 l 14 -other places
Subtotal (in Sodom) 337 272 375
in Beer-Sheva 263 -38 -25
TOTAL: 600 300 4oo
Comment A: The administrators in the higher level and the more
veteran ones come from Beer-Sheva, next are from Arad
and the junior and the newest ones come from Dimona.
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move from their place to a location with high prestige, and
better social and educational facilities. People will move,
therefore, from Dimona to Arad, or Dimona to Beer-Sheva, or
from Arad to Beer-Sheve (especially to Omer). (See table
5.2.)
Future plans. The D.S.W. is considered to be a
secure place to work, but does not have major plans to
expand. Plans talk about another 150 employees in the first
stage of a new development, and another 100 in the second
stage.
NEGEV PHOSPHATES LTD. (N.P.L.)
N.P.L. was founded in 1951 for the purpose of using
the various mines in the Negev Desert. (These deposits are
part of the great North African Middle East phospate belt
which extends from Morocco in the west to Jordan in the
east.) The Israeli rock phosphate is a sedimentary deposit,
highly reactive, soft and contains exceptionally low
quantities of impurities.
The products of N.P.L. are:
1. The main product is enriched rock phosphate which is
produced and sold in three different qualities, each
differs by mining location, enriching process and
utilization, although they may sometimes be partially
interchangeable:
TABLE 5.2
WORKERS SENIORITY AND PLACE OF RESIDENCE--D.S.W.
Employment Beer-Sheva Arad Dimona
Started in:
1953 21 5
1954 3 1 2
1956 1 18
1957 2 9
1958 3
1963 1 5 3
1964 15 13 12
1965 8 4 10
1966 8 4 4
1967 8 2
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a) Washed "Zin" phosphate, mined and processed in the
Zin valley, it is suitable for the manufacturing
of phosphoric acid which is the major user of
phosphates, for superphosphates and fertilizers.
b) Direct application "Arad" Phosphate, mined and
processed in the Arad and Makhtesh Mines
c) Calcined "Oron" phosphate, mined and processed in
Oron.
2. Deflorinated phosphate which is produced in Oron
plant.
3. Purified "Arad" phosphoric acid. It is produced in
the Arad plant.
A new phosphoric acid plant ("Rotem") is under
construction in Arad.
Almost 87 percent of the phosphate consumption is
used for fertilizers and the remaining 13 percent is used
for various "industrial" usage such as detergents, food
additives and insecticides.
The majority of the products, produced in Israel,
are exported. In 1980, 88 percent of the total sales were
exported, mainly to Western Europe. The volume of
production is highly sensitive to the fluctuations in the
workd market of phosphates dominated by Morocco and the
U.S.A. The activities in the market depend on one hand upon
the grains market, and the yearly weather, and on the other
hand, on the fluctuations in prices, and differences among
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rates of local inflation and the changing rate of the
dollar. Nevertheless, N.P.L. is a company which has the
largest export (in volume) in Israel..
The product is transported from the plants to Dimona
and Arad by trains and from there to the port of Ashdod.
The structure of the production cost is:
raw material - 21 percent
energy and electronics - 23 percent
labor force - 23 percent
transportation and shipping - 18 percent
capital (spare parts) - 4 percent
capital (financing) - 14 percent
The various plants differ in the composition of
their production costs, and therefore differ in their rates
of profitability. Two of the N.P.L plants are currently
losing money ("Oron" and part of "Arad") and are on the
verge of being closed down because they lack relative
advantage in the world market regarding their products and
because both are energy and labor intensive plants which
have to bear the increasing costs of energy. The solution
for these two plants is to transfer to processes which
demand less energy and to improve the quality of the product
either by technological process or by looking for new mining
areas, with better qualified phosphates.
Emwloyment. N.P.L. employs in all of its four
plants, including its offices in Tel-Aviv, some 1,692
employees.
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The composition of the labor force by occupations is
is shown in table 5.3 (it does not include the
administrative staff).
The workers in the plants, are allocated between
workers in mining and workers in the various production
lines, processing the raw material.
The spatial distribution of the employees is shown
in table 5.4.
The work conditions in terms of wages, social
benefits and various fringe benefits are not as high as in
the "Dead Sea Works." The average salary is $8000 per year
(February 1981), in comparison to $11,000 in D.S.W. Today,
there is a tendency in the company to raise the salaries
since for the last few years they have not been increased
due to problems encountered by the company.
In terms of other work conditions, the commuting
cost and half of the time of commuting is paid. There is an
incentive bonus of 15.7 percent which is paid to all
employees, and therefore has lost its effectiveness since it
operates as a salary addition rather than incentive
instrument. There is a tendency today to introduce an
individual incentive bonus in each plant, though in some
plants it is quite technically difficult.
There are complaints about the quality of the labor
force in the plant. Managers claim that the "cream" of the
labor force in the area is attracted to the D.S.W. plants
TABLE 5.3
COMPOSITION OF THE MANPOWER - "N.P.L."
Occupation Quantity Percentage
Chemists 4o 2.7
Engineers 86 5.9
Academi ci ans 31 2.1
Techni cal Workers 129 8.8
Subtotal 286 19.6
Other Occup ations 1179 80.4
TOTAL 1465 100.0
Source: Internal document, October 1980.
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and the least capable ones come to N.P.L. They think that
with a better labor force more could be produced. There is
a chronic shortage in professionals: mechanics,
electricians, mechanical engineers, etc.
Another complaint is against the tenure laws which
do not allow firing tenured employees which do not satisfy
the requirements. The consequences of such arrangements are
low work ethics and lack of motivation to work.
The work ethics differ in the various plants. It
depends on level of technology, and on the profitability
situation. In "Oron" for example, when there were
difficulties in marketing employees were working very hard
without much compensation. In "Arad" plant there are
problems between the workers from Arad and those from
Dimona. Those from Arad have higher expectations and
therefore they are more frustrated. There is also
competition and jealousy between the workers from these two
locations which one of the previous managers thinks is a
result of the attitudes they bring from their place of
residence, especially from Arad. The same manager claims as
well, that more can be done in terms of job enrichment
especially for those who operate the machines, in order to
achieve higher productivity. More incentives should be
available, responsibilities should be shared, and more
personal evaluations should be conducted.
TABLE 5.4
SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE WORKERS - "N.P.L."
No. of Percentage
Location Workers
Dimona 776 46
Beer-Sheva 391 23
Arad 243 14
Yeruchan 174 10
Tel-Aviv and the Center 108 7
TOTAL 1,692 100
Source: Letter from the management, 2.10.81.
249
Future plans. In the short run, "Rotem" a new plant
will be operated. Another plant "Rotem 2" which will employ
200 employees is planned. In case "Oron" is closed down
because of unprofitability, another plant in the same
location will be operated with the same workers. There is
also a plan to increase the production in Zin by 50 percent.
From the point of view of employment, another
300-400 workers will be employed in the next five to eight
years.
PERIKLAS
"Periklas" was established in 1972 as an "approved
plant." It is a subsidiary of I.C.L. (70 percent) and
Austrian owners (30 percent).
The main product produced by "Periklas" is magnezium
oxide with a high grade of purity. Its main use is in the
manufacturing of fire-resistant material which is used to
build industrial furnaces, and for some special use in the
rubber, ceramics and pharmaceutical industries.
The main raw material is brine from the Dead Sea.
The structure of the production cost is:
raw material and transportation of raw material and
final product - 32 percent
energy - 45 percent
labor and transportation - 19 percent
other costs - 5 percent
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The plant exports 99 percent of its product.
Seventy percent of the product has to be sold to the
Austrian owners and the rest is marketed by the company,
which makes nice profits out of this small share.
The relative advantage of the plant is in the high
quality of its product, therefore, it actually determines
the price in its market. If the gap, from quality point of
view between the plant and other plants in the world will
get narrower, or if the demand for steel decreases the plant
may get into marketing problems.
Employment. The plant employs 180 permanent workers
and another 50-70 employees through subcontractors, who are
in charge of maintenance, sanitary services, food, guarding,
gardening, etc. Most of the permanent employees are skilled
and professionals. Eighty to eighty-five percent are in
production and maintenance jobs, and the rest are in
administration. The turnover is very low (10 percent-15
percent). The plant is known for the good relationships
among the workers and the management.
The spatial distribution of the workers is: 80 from
Arad, 20 from Beer-Sheva and 70 from Dimona. No one among
the engineers comes from Dimona. The production engineer
comes from a regional center, 90 km. south of the plant
(Merkaz Sapir), no one comes from Yerucham since the plant
"could not find any suitable worker from Yerucham." The
plant prefers to hire workers who live close to the plant.
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The wages are lower than in the D.S.W. but the good labor
relationships eventually compensate for the lack of generous
economic rewards. The workers get, as the workers in the
other raw material plants 25 percent addition to the wage,
which is called "dust addition." The wage system is based
on a system of incentive bonuses on an individual basis.
There are three shifts of work. The plant pays for
transportation and subsidizes training and extension studies
for its employees.
Sixteen women are employed, mainly in administration
and research (R&D unit).
I.C.L. - Vocational School
On the boundaries of "Periklas," a new vocational
school was inaugurated this year. The main objective of the
school is to train workers for the regional plants. The
principal target group is the employees' children. Some 150
students have begun their studies, but only a fraction
consists of employees' children.
The main areas of study are: maintenance of
machines, welding, molding, general locksmithy, etc.
The school operates with six classes: two for grade
9, two for grade 10, and one for each of the llth and 12th
grades.
The studies include theoretical and practical
aspects. Starting at the llth grade, the students work two
days in the plants, and at the 12th'grade, they divide their
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time between school and work. For their work they get
salaries.
Most of the students come from Dimona (80), the rest
come from Yerucham (11), Beer-Sheva (18), Arad (12).
The Chemical Industry - Summary
The industrial branch of mining, quarrying and
non-metalic minerals is largely influenced by the
development of demand and prices on the world market. This
is one of the most capital intensive branch groups and it
therefore has a relatively high weight with regard to
capital stock when compared to its other aspects.
Nevetheless, this weight is also declining, as there has
recently been a steadily increasing exploitation of past
investments.
The three I.C.L. plants described previously are
dominant part in this industrial branch. All three are
capital intensive, and in order to create new vacancy per
workr the capital investment needed is between half a
million to a million dollars, and all three are highly
dependent on energy cost (up to 45 percent of the production
cost). They differ in the product and hence in their
markets, profits and their employment policy including
wages, fringe benefits, etc.
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Employment in all three plants is desired by the
residents of the region, inspite of the harsh work
conditions, all three plants pay high salaries and fringe
benefits. The most desired one is the "Dead Sea Work" and
after it "Periklas" and "Negev Phosphate."
The differences in desirability stem from the
different images of the work conditions, the qualifications
of the jobs like: opportunities for occupational mobility,
interesting jobs, etc., but mainly the wages and the various
fringe benefits. The workers' committees in each plant
fight for equal conditions in all of them, but not all
plants can provide the same economic rewards. Each plant
joint the I.C.L. with its own history and product, and it is
especially difficult for N.P.L. to equate with the other
plants since it has encountered the most difficult economic
problems.
As a result of the employment policy, dictated by
the Ministry of Labor and Welfare, the three plants "belong"
to different local employment agencies and therefore the
spatial distribution of the workers is highly influenced by
this arrangement rather than by "free" movement of
employees. "Negev Phosphates" "belongs" to the regional
employment agency of Dimona and Yerucham and therefore has
the greatest share of workers from Yerucham and Dimona. The
other two plants "belong" to the employment agencies of Arad
and Beer-Sheva and get their employees from these locations.
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There are no workers from Yerucham in the "Dead Sea Works"
as well as in "Periklas" as a result of this policy and
consequently lack of commuting arrangements between Yerucham
and the plants.
Another arrangement which prevents free movement
between the plants is an agreement between the plants not to
hire ex-employees, and not to take employees from one
another.
The future of this branch will no doubt be dictated
by developments in the international markets. There are
however, promising prospects for expanding the export of
minerals, though this will depend on the extent to which
energy problems will be solved, and whether additional
processing phases will be successfully developed, rather
than exporting local natural resources in their primary
state.
From an employment point of view, a further
expansion means: 15 workers in "Periklas," 150 new jobs at
the first stage and another 100 at the second in "D.S.W."
(approximately five years) and between 300-400 new employees
for "N.P.L." (approximately five to eight years).
CHAPTER VI
THE SUITABILITY MODEL
6.1. The Theoretical Background for the Model
The objective-of this study is to explore the
meaning of "suitable industries for non-metropolitan
communities" in a dynamic context (over time). The study
strives to construct an operating definition for
"suitability" which can help in evaluating undergoing
industrialization processes as well as creating a planning
tool for designing and implementing industrialization
policies.
The notion of "suitability" consists of two basic
components:
1. The suitability of the community--its location,
- infrastructure, services, labor force, etc.--to the
industry.
2. The suitability of the industry to the community,
i.e., an industry which exploits, among other things,
the relative advantage of the community's labor force
mix. (For a detailed analysis of the notion of
suitability, see paragraph 6.2.)
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Stating the notion in this way, divides the issue of
industrialization into two separate processes taking place
concurrently, each one with its own nature and pace. On one
side the community changing over time as it develops,
perceiving the industry as another mean (besides education,
housing, welfare programs, etc.) for community development
over its stages of development. On the other side, the
industry "playing" according to different roles, has its own
dynamic development over time, and strives--at least, in
accordance with the classical location theories--to maximize
profits exploiting relative locational advantages.
The task of the government which will be discussed
later is to mediate between the two "entities", the
community and the industry, and to ease an integrated way in
which both will benefit.
A distinction should be made between "social
development" and "economic development". "Social
development" is a policy that seeks to help areas regardless
of their potentials, because they are lagging behind.
"Economic development" is a policy to stimulate actual and
potential development in the economy (Klaasen, 1967, p. 20).
Population dispersal policies may be regarded as part of the
'social development policies,' but industrialization
policies specifically, belong to the group of "economic
development" policies. Therefore, government as implementor
of national objectives has to provide conditions and to
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implement policies which will enable successful
industrialization process for the advantage of the community
in a minimum economic cost.
The following chapter will describe and discuss the
notion of "suitability" from three angles: the community,
the industry and the government. In the first two cases it
will specify the objectives of each group, the
characteristics of a "suitable" industry according to the
particular group, and will discuss the issues and conflicts
raised. The third part will discuss government's role.
6.1.1. The Community
The major factor which should be considered before
the particular characteristics of the "suitable" industries
are specified is: what are the objectives the community
wishes to achieve through industrialization. Various plants
and mixes of plants serve the objectives differently.
The objectives can be one or any combination of the
following:
1. Strengthening the economic base of the community and
increasing the standard of living.
2. Advancing the community socially, culturally and
technologically.
3. Encouraging immigration and discouraging emigration.
The last objective calls for further specification
of the objectives, namely, what are the target groups?
There can be two distinct groups:
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1. The existing community and its labor force, with the
subgroups of:
a) Males, heads of families (ages 22-45)
b) Youth, and especially those who were recently
released from the army (ages 16-25)
c) Women
d) Elderly
When objectives are targeted towards these groups,
the main objective is to prevent emigration. The
division to subgroup is crucial since different
industries "suit" different groups.
2. The future immigrants to the place. The labor force
of the desired groups of newcomers may have
different characteristics compared to the existing
ones, and therefore the notion of "suitability" may
differ from the one applied to the current
residents.
The following characteristics of industries will be
explored in order to define "suitability" from the community
point of view:
a. Factor intensity: capital versus labor
b. Technology
c. Size of a plant
d. Diversification
e. Growth and change issues
f. The plant's characteristics
g. Wages
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a. Factor intensity: capital versus labor
The issue of the factor intensity of the technology
chosen for industrialization is a highly debatable issue,
i.e., which one of the two will contribute more to the
development objectives? It is quite clear that the answer
depends on the objectives specified, and on the conditions
and alternatives available.
The basic argument for capital intensive industries
is that they increase G.N.P. per worker and therefore
accelerate the rate of development. It is based on the
premise that a cummulative increase in production and
national income stem from ever increasing productivity of
labor. This increasing productivity can only come about
through the adoption of increasingly efficient techniques
and appliances, requiring heavy application of capital. As
a result they are identified with large-scale industrial
production of "heavy" or capital goods.
Some other characteristics of capital-intensive
industries: employment of highly professional and skilled
workers, need for high quality of infrastructure and
services and in some countries, capital intensive
industries, rely on their own access to raw material (steel
mills, petrochemical plants, etc.) rather than on other
industrial plants (Kaynor and Schultz, 1973, p. 124).
The basic argument for labor-intensive industries is
that they employ or re-employ as many workers as possible
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(Klaassen, 1967, p. 15). Labor-intensive production is
assumed to be of small or medium scale of operation and to
make "light" consumer goods. There is also the view that
establishing small-scale industries is a natural first step
whereby skill, technique and markets may be developed for
subsequent large-scale operations.
Other characteristics of the labor-oriented
industries are: reliance on cheap, unskilled or
semi-skilled labor force, and low level of wages which means
smaller economic multiplier effect on the location and the
region.
In the debate between the two technologies it should
be stressed that labor-oriented industries do not
necessarily contribute most to local employment when
secondary employment created by new industries is taken into
account. A capital intensive industry might create so much
additional employment in auxiliary industries that its
contribution to total emploment is actually larger than that
of the labor-oriented industry. Nevertheless,
labor-oriented industries give an immediate contribution to
local employment while capital intensive industries, if they
contribute, do so only in the long run.
As it was discussed before, the selection of the
specific factor-intensive technology should be dependent
upon the objectives (income versus employment) and on the
available supply of capital and labor in the specific'
location.
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Owens and Shaw (1972, pp. 106-110), indicate that
countries which have experienced the highest increasing rate
of industrial product were the countries which have chosen a
technology which fits their local ratio of available capital
and labor.
While this paragraph has discussed the suitable
technology to achieve development objectives, the next one
will dwell on the suitable technology that should be used in
order to exploit the available factors of production in an
optimal way.
b. Technology
The issue of suitable technology or as it is defined
in the literature as "appropriate technology" is highly
dependent on the previous issue discussed of factor
intensity.
Many of the problems of less developed countries
(L.D.C.), such as high and rising rates of urban
unemployment, slow growth of employment in manufacturing and
high and rising capital/labor ratios, are attributed to the
failure to choose the appropriate technology (White, 1978).
In his book, "Apropriate Technologies for Developing
Countrries," Eckaus (1977) argues that the only standard of
"appropriateness" of technological decisions is in reference
to the general goal of development (which was discussed in
the previous paragraph). This approach to appropriate
technologies has been criticized on the ground that he does
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not consider the adequacy of the technology to specific
factor endowments, informal restrictions and other
institutional aspects of less developed countries.
A different perspective which examines the adequacy
of the technology to factors--not mentioned by
Eckaus--states the following issues (Anderson, 1979):
1. Can the support mechanism and organizational
arrangements which go with the technology in one
country be adopted to fit a new situation in a
different place? This issue is covered by the
literature on "Technology Transfer" which
concentrates on the difference in factor intensity
between the industrialized countries and the
developing ones which leads to technical inefficienty
(Marsden, 1970, pp. 475-502). For example: a
machine that is economic with high wage rate and low
interest rate may be uneconomic when interest rates
are higher (or at least should be, but usually the
capital is highly subsidized) and wages are lower.
2. An issue which deals with the non-material resource
requirements of any technlolgy: for example, the
question whether a technology developed with an
hierarchical organizational arrangement in mind can
be suitable for an area in which work has
traditionally been organized along collective or
cooperative lines.
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3. Issue which has gained attention only recently, but
has not been dealt with yet, like: self fulfillment,
participation, quality of access to knowledge, etc.,
which have not been included among other measures of
appropriateness in the process of applying
technologies to meet human needs.
Anderson relates two important factors in defining
suitable industries: the importance of selecting industries
which will use appropriately the local resources, and the
significance of the needs of the local level while
contemplating industrialization. Two factors which gain a
lot of attention in this study.
Anderson's approach is a part of a great body of
literature first developed by Schumacher (1973) in the
1960s, who coined and advocated the notion of "Intermediate
Technology." The essence of his theory--based on "Buddhist
economics"--argues that the economics of the free market is
not the appropriate mechanism for meeting the needs of
individuals. Therefore, the appropriate values for decision
making are the Buddhist ones of appropriateness of scale and
the maximization of individual self-fulfillment.
Consequently he advocates "Intermediate Technology" as a
mean of production in developing countries. The
intermediate technology is an advanced technology compared
to the traditional techniques common in developing
countries, but it is cheaper and simpler than the
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sophisticated, capital intensive technologies in the
advanced economies. If it costs £2 to provide a traditional
workplace, and £2000 to provide a workplace in advanced
industry, then intermediate technology is said to aim to
provide a workplace for about £200 (Dickson, 1978, p. 15).
The technology is based on the available factors of
production in most of the development countries: high
unskilled labor intensity, small size, low level of
education and scarcity of capital.
Since Schumacher proposes changing the nature of the
job tasks in order to eliminate the waste of human beings in
modern industry and to prevent alienation, this issue will
be elaborated later in the paragraph on "The plant's
characteristics" (paragraph f).
c. Size of a Plant
The optimal scale of an industrial plant differs
according to the goals to be achieved, the same way the
technologies chosen have to differ in order to achieve
various goals.
The optimal scale of the plant was studied by many
researchers (Toyne, 1974; Borts, 1968; Kipnis, 1976; and
more).
Kipnis who has studied the impact of the size of a
manufacturing plant on the amount of inputs purchased
locally, has found that ". . . medium size plants, with an
average employment of 150, seem to be the most beneficial
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for the development of the town's economic base" (ibid., p.
299). He also claims that ". . . A very large plant in a
very small town may cause a long delay in the evolution of
the local supporting service infrastructure necessary for
the attraction of new, small, and medium size industrial
activities" (ibid., p. 301). This conclusion comes from the
findings that large manufacturing establishments are
autonomous and provide the services for themselves rather
than relying on local suppliers.
The size of the plant has to be judged according to
the goal but not independently from the product and
technology chosen, since they are the major factors to
determine the efficient size of the plant.
d. Diversification
Industrial diversification is another characteristic
of industrial structures which has a significant impact on
the economic base of any community in general, and on
non-metropolitan communities in particular.
The advantage of diversified industrial mix are
(Gratton, 1979):
1. Stability of employment and protection against severe
fluctuations in economic activity. In highly
specialized areas, a high risk results from a
cyclical contraction of demand, or from the decline
of the predominant industry.
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2. A variety of employment opportunities is available
which enables all sections of the labor force to be
catered to.
3. Greater flexibility of resources. Resources can be
transferred from one use to another in response to
varying demand patterns in a region.
Diversified industrial mix increases the income
level of the population and the attractiveness of the place
to other immigrant groups.
If there does not exist a diversified industrial
mix, each of the existing plants should compensate for it by
having a variety of jobs and occupational mobility to enable
occupational advancement (see paragraph f).
e. Growth and Change Issues
When the suitability issue is explored in a dynamic
context, over time, the issues of industrial growth and
change should gain a special attention.
Technology is constantly changing over time, and the
growth rates of employment and output as well. All may have
an effect on the industrial sector and the suitability of
the labor force and the community.
Theoretically, various changes within the industry
itself and in the production process and/or in response to
external changes are likely to result in sarch for a new
location which will fit the new demand for particular factor
inputs. Generally, technical progress, for example, takes a
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form which involves increasing labor productivity, so that
the rate of growth of employment is less than the rate of
growth of output. This phenomenon--output increasing faster
than employment has been observed in many developing
countries (Stewart and Streeten, 1976). In this case, the
plant may seek a new location in which capital is cheaper
than labor. But when non-metropolitan communities are
involved the objective is that the plant will stay in the
community and changes made either in the plant
itself--adapting more labor-intensive technologies if
justified from an economic efficiency point of view--or
short-run changes in the community--for example, adding new
plant to absorb the surplus labor force.
A rapid rate of change of technology may create a
suitability problem since the community may not change at a
parallel pace. On the other hand, a slow rate of change of
technology may create a similar problem, in which the
progressing community cannot find suitable jobs in the
existing industrial sector. High rate of unemployment and
permanent shortage in workers in plants in developing towns
is a symptom of the phenomenon of laggard technologies in an
advancing communities.
The capability of a plant to induce "spin off" is
another characteristic which plants attracted to
non-metropolitan areas should have. In their study on "New
Manufacturing Firms and Regional Development," Johnson and
Cathcart (1979), claim:
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Regional policies geared to the attraction of
mobile industry--at least until recently--have not
been selective in nature and have aimed mainly at
the creation of additional jobs, without regard to
the type of job involved. Clearly these policies
have substantially increased the employment
opportunities available . . . However . . ., it
is important to note that the almost exclusive
emphasis on the number of jobs created may reduce
the possibilities for self-adoption if the
occupations, industries and functions, for
example, have low fertility in terms of
'spin-off,' i.e., the formation of new businesses
by ex-employees.
Very little is known about the variations in the
fertility rates of different occupations, industries, etc.,
but it may be plausible to suppose, for example, that
spin-off is relatively higher in managerial occupations than
in unskilled occupations.
f. The Plant's Characteristics
Since one of the main disadvantages of
non-metropolitan industrialization is a small number of
industries and lack of variety, the quality of working life
in each plant is of a crucial importance compared to the
metropolitan industries.'
The notion of "Quality of Working Life" (Q.W.L.)
refers mainly to the relationship between workers and their
work environment and includes a wide range of concerns among
them:
'This chapter is based on the following references:
Naftali Golomb; Ogur~n Stefan and Edgren Jan, 1980; Ben-Dor
et al., 1976.
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- Human engineering factors--the physical aspects of
the machines and their suitability to the workers.
- Physical condition--noise, light, ventilation, heat,
air pollution, etc.
- Hygienic condition--restaurants and dining areas,
showers, toilets, etc.
- Aesthetical condition--colors, music, openness to
surrounding landscape.
Job's characteristics:
- The physical efforts demanded by the job
- Job safety
- Shifts
- Distribution of earnings
- Job security
- Job enrichment and occupational mobility
- The opportunity to use one's capabilities to optimum
on the job--jobs with challenge, satisfaction
- Adequate participation of labor in the activities of
the enterprise, participation in decision-making
procedures, organization of work, work's system, etc.
Studies that were conducted in plants which have
reorganized their work systems to improve the quality of
working life have reported on: decreasing rate of
absenteeism, low turnover of workers, efficient production
and lower costs of production and higher satisfaction among
the employees.
270
It is worth noting that Q.W.L. indicators are used
in the "dual labor market" theory to differentiate between
the two markets, the "primary" labor market and the
"secondary" one.
Radical "dual labor market" theories have emerged in
the 1960s as a result of employment problems in central
city's ghettos in the U.S. During this time, the
definitions of labor market disadvantages have been revised.
"Unemployment" has been solved through the greater
prosperity at this time, but a new set of problems, defined
by analysts and government officials as "underemployment"
has been evoked. The concept encompassed those who were
unemployed, those who were working full time at a very low
level, those who wanted to work full time but could find
only part-time work, those who wanted to work but had
dropped ,out of the labor force, and those who seemed so
unattached to primary labor market institutions that they
were often missed by the surveys upon which employment
statistics were based. The three defining characteristics
of "underemployed" workers were their low wages, their
relatively underemployed skills and their frequently
unpredictable pattern of work. Each of these
characteristics reinforced the others, joining to form a
self-perpetuating cycle of underemployment (Gordon, 1977, p.
57).
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In the U.S. over the past fifty years, according to
the radical argument, the labor market has been dominated by
tendencies toward "labor market segmentation"--towards the
increasing compartmentalization of the labor market into
sectors featuring different kinds of labor processes. The
most important of these tendencies towards segmentation
involves the emergence of a "dual labor market."
Underlying the development of the dual labor market
lies a sharp split between two different kinds of working
conditions. One kind of working experience involves what is
called "primary labor process." Work is organized in
different ways in the two processes. The work in the
"primary" labor market (in its enterprises) is structured
internally, there are job ladders, promotional channels,
customary practices, a variety of jobs, high wages,
employment stability and job security. The work in the
"secondary" labor market is unstructured, there are no job
ladders, few opportunities for promotion, unpredictable
working relationships, primitive capital equipment, little
variety in the range of jobs available and uniformly low
wages (Piore, 1977).
The suitability of plants to the community should be
judged according to these characteristics. Moreover, it was
suggested that the existence of plants with "secondary" jobs
has reinforced the phenomenon of "dual labor market" since
they do not provide chances for the workers to advance
(Spielerman and Habib, 1976).
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g. Wages
There are two aspects to wages and earnings when
non-metropolitan industrialization is considered: one is
the individual wage of each employee and the second is the
effect on the region or a locality.
The individual wage: In a study conducted in Israel
(Bar-El, 1981), it was found that the level of wages and
salaries correlates positively with the value added per
worker. The higher the value added per worker, the higher
are the wages. It should be noted, however, that high value
added of an industry does not demand that the industry will
have high level of academic and professional workers. The
study mentioned above found as well that the correlation
between the wage level and the percentage of academicians is
rather weak. The study concludes that a plant--in order to
have high value added and to pay high salaries--should not
be constrained by the educational level of the labor force.
The region: The effect of the wage level in regional terms
is through the economic multiplier effect, i.e., generation
of income for the region above the value of its output. The
prerequisites for an efficient economic multiplier effect
are: residing of most of the employees in the region, a
well developed service system for the plants--so that they
will purchase their services locally--and strong linkages
between the plants.
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For maximization of the multiplier effect, there
should be, therefore, a socioeconomic absorption of the
plant in the region (see chapter on Government's policies).
6.1.2. The Industry
The main objective of the entrepreneur or the
industrialist, as it i-s presented in the classical theories,
is to maximize profit. In order to minimize costs and to
increase profit he will take into account the locational
factors but only in the sense that it helps him to optimize
location and to contribute to the success of the plant,
withouth considering the impact of the industry on the
location (community or region).
Theories regarding optimal location have been
developed since the end of the nineteenth century. Von
Thunen, Weber (1929) and L~sch (1954), were the first ones
to develop the theories based on distance and minimizing
transportation costs. Weber has expanded the theory to
include location of raw material, energy and market, but
basically until a few decades ago transportation cost was
the ground of the theories.
Later on, based on empirical studies, a new term of
"foot loose" industries was coined to describe those
industries which were found to be indifferent to distance
and transportation cost as a result of the nature of their
product. (For a sruvey of the development of location
theories, see chapter II.)
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The following paragraphs will discuss the main
factors considered by the entrepreneur when location
decisions are made to achieve maximum profit.2 (The majority
of the decisions taken have an impact on the input side of
the production side. On the output side the accessibility
to the markets and the connections with the consumers are
considered.)
a. Size of locality and distance
b. Availability of inputs: Raw material, Labor force,
Capital
c. Infrastructure: physical and social
d. The area's image
e. Product and technology
f. Management and entrepreneurship
g. Growth rate of industry
a. Size and distance
The size of the locality coupled with the distance
has a strong impact on the production process (see chapter
II). According to the classical theories, this impact
relates to the availability of the optimum factors-ratio to
be used in the production process to achieve maximum output
at minimum cost.
2The entrepreneur's objective is not always to achieve
maximum profit solely. The viability of the plant or its
sheer existence may be other motivations behind the
industrialist's activities, especially in cases in which the
government is highly involved.
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There are three types of "distance" which should be
considered: 1) The physical distance--the extent to which
the plant is located at a distance from the raw material
market, labor market and the market of the final product.
2) The accessible distance--roads, communication systems,
etc. (will be discussed under "infrastructures"). 3) Mental
distance--the sujective feelings regarding distance (see
under "The area's image").
b. Availability of inputs
Raw material--availability of raw material or minimizing the
transportation cost of raw materials is one of the factors
considered in all classical location theories.
Labor force--the main factors affecting the availability of
the labor force are: size, and the level of development of
the locality (Don, 1979, p. 22). It is worth noting that
labor and cost of labor will have an impact on locational
decisions only in those firms in which labor represents a
major part of the firm's total costs and displays relatively
pronounced geographical variations. The size of the
locality is not the only determinant when estimating the
available labor supply for an intending employer.
When it comes to the question of readily available
labor supply for an intending employer, it is not
the percentage of unemployment that matters, but
the numbers available within a reasonable travel
to work radius of the plant. (Davis, 1967)
Moreover, evidence suggests that new industry is not likely
to recruit exclusively or even predominantly from the
276
unemployed. But rather to recruit from the employed,
creaming off the better workers.
Another difficulty in identifying the potential
labor force, especially in the case of female labor, is that
the registered unemployment figures provide only a partial
indication of the real situation. Many married women, in
particular, do not register as unemployed.
The level of development of the locality coupled
with the size will actually determine the adjustability of
the available labor force to the requirements of the
industrial production and the availability of technical and
managerial staff. Don (1979, p. 23) states this
availability as a cost factor since it may affect the
production function through fixed items (investment in
social infrastructure) or variable items (cost of
transportation of managerial and technical staff).
Another factor to be considered when labor costs are
considered is the efficiency with which labor is utilized.
Output depends not only on the quantity of labor used in
production but also on its productivity. Consequently,
labor costs to industry are not adequately measured by the
level of wage rates but rather by the level of efficiency
wages, or wage costs per unit of output. As a result, labor
productivity tends to exhibit stronger local variations than
wage rates (Henderson, 1980, p. 161).
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Capital--Government's financial inducements upon the
relative cost advantages of different areas is the most
common instrument to encourage industrialization in
preferred areas (a detailed discussion of the inducements is
in paragraph 6.1.3 on the government role). With the
increasing substitution of capital for labor as a result of
structural and technological developments, the availability
of a large supply of labor has become less important to new
industries while the availability of capital gained more
attention.
c. Infrastructure: Physical and Social
The availability of various infrastructures:
physical, social and administrative determines to a larger
extent the degree of accessibility a place has. High degree
of accessibility may help in "shortening" and overcoming
distance and remoteness.
Under the tems "infrastructure," several issues
should be considered: In the less developed countries,
physical infrastructure means the provision of various
services such as power, water and sewage. Deficiency in the
provision of these services is a major source of handicap
for the establishment of competitive industrial plants in
rural areas (Don, 1979, p. 22).
In the developed countries, government can reduce
the capital costs of industry not only by financial
subsidies but also by the direct provision of fixed capital
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in the shape of factory buildings, industrial sites and
premises. Factory and land costs are an important factor in
the location decision if they vary markedly over space and
if their share of spatially variable costs is relatively
high. Under such circumstances areas with cheap sites and
premises will enjoy a pronounced cost advantage which will
increase their attraction for incoming industries.
Although spatial variations in factory rents and
rates exist there is no strong empirical evidence to suggest
that such costs are a major factor in the location- decision.
Cameron and Clark (1966), for example, found that factory
rents were ranked very low as an influence on the choice of
site.
Such conclusions, however, do not necessarily mean
that site and factory costs are unimportant for "foot-loose"
industry. An industrialist may decide that a location with
a site or building immediately available is satisfactory,
although not as ideal for production as the optimal one
where costs are minimized. A firm can derive important
benefits from such a decision.
Another form of the necessary infrastructure which
should be considered is the availability of services
(locksmith's workshop, hardware supply, construction
material, etc.).
Don mentions two other forms of infrastructure:
administrative and commercial infrastructure and social
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infrastructure. The first one is concerned with the
administrative capabilities of the rural, non-metropolitan
authorities, and the second is concerned with schooling,
health and socio-cultural opportunities.
Social infrastructure . . . is among the major
qualitative determinants of the population, and
has a decisive influence upon local accumulation
of human capital and the availability of skilled,
technical and managerial labor force for any
meaningful industrial initiative. (Don, 1979, p.
23)
Social infrastructure has a strong connection to the
area's image.
d. Area's Image
The image of an area can affect the location
decisions of industry since environmental factors like the
area's physical, social, cultural and economic environments,
seem to be one of the significant considerations of
"foot-loose" plants.
Behavioral theories were shown to incorporate
sub-optimal decision making since they recognize that
industiralists are essentially 'satisficers' who seek to
attain certain aspiration levels rather than 'maximizers'
seeking the optimum solution to their location problems.
The idea that personal considerations can outweigh economic
ones in location decisions is important because it
recognizes that an industrialist's perception of an area can
influence his choice of site.
The term "area's image" consists of three elements:
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1. Image of the physical environment--a dull sight of a
town or unattractive surroundings is unlikely to
prove attractive unless the economic arguments in its
favor are overwhelming. The importance of the
physical environment depends on the type of the
plant. As Klaasen (1967) has pointed out "the more
footloose an industry . . . the more the nature of
the general facilities offered by the area will be
important."
2. Image of the social and cultural environment--this
embraces features such as the quality of the cultural
life as well as indicators of a social environment
such as the demand for welfare services, social and
demographic structure, etc.
3. Image of the economic environment--excluding
availability and cost of labor which is quantifiable
and represents a distinct factor input and cost of
production, it includes characteristics such as
militancy and perceived efficiency of the workforce,
industrial relations, etc..
All three components of "image" are elusive and
difficult to measure but undoubtedly they have an impact on
the decision-making processs regarding location. These
three elements actully form the notion of "mental" distance
which cannot be overcome by relatively simple instruments
(roads, communication systems, etc.) to overcome distance.
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e. The Product and Technology
The product chosen determines the character of the
plant--including the development of the product, marketing
strategy and technology used.
In his book, Herbert (1976) indicates three ways in
which the product has an impact on the technology and hence
on the organizational structure of the plant:
1. The character and the volume of changes in the
product over time--a product with stable demand does
not need many changes regarding the production line,
outputs and the structure of the product. While when
a product needs changes the plant has to be
constructed in a way to enable it.
2. Standardization--mass production enables
specialization and training in specific tasks in the
production line. The workers' task is easy to learn
and the skill-level needed is low. The task of the
maintenance workers in a mass production process
becomes very important.
3. Level of output--size of services.
4. When the demand is steady for a long period the plant
can specialize by buying specific equipment. Level
of automation is quite high and production costs get
lower. A division of labor is possible then for few
tasks and specialization.
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One of the major criteria in product and technology
selection issues should be the availability of the needed
input (quality of labor force, raw material) as well as
taking into consideration market constraints, in such a way
that the plant will be operated close to its technological
optimum (Don, 1979, p. 30).
f. Management and Entrepreneurship
Most of the theory builders, despite many sensitive
insights and distinctions with regard to specific problems,
end up by stating that the creative (or achievement
oriented, or rational or innovative) entrepreneur with his
special talent is either present or absent in enterprises,
and similarly, business performance is uniformly lack-
luster and tradition-bound or it is innovative in all
aspects (Kilby, 1971).
In trying to explore the lack of entrepreneurial and
managerial forces, Kilby sees ". . . managerial and
technological shortcomings as enduring impediments rooted in
sociological variables on the supply side" (Kilby, 1971, p.
30)., i.e., from empirical evidence in underdeveloped
countri.es it was found that entrepreneurial performance in
roles involving exchange relationships and "political
administration" is vigorous and effective, while on the
other hand, entrepreneurs typically do not apply themselves
with equal intensity or skill to their tasks in the realms
of management control and technology..
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A different perspective is taken by McClelland who
suggests that a particular human motive, the need for
achievement, promotes entrepreneurship, which in turn is a
key to economic growth. The problem is how to increase
levels of achievement motivation in people and in the
community? Inspite of the enormous knowledge gathered in
this area there is no defined tool to promote the need for
achievement. The traditional tools may be working, e.g.,
more investment in everything from schools to roads to banks
to steel mills--but they are working slowly and it is
difficult to establish priorities among them.
While entrepreneurship may be looked upon as a given
talent, managerial abilities are skills which can be
purchased in the market place. Among them: marketing the
product and responding to competition, mamagement of human
relations within the firm, financial management, industrial
engineering (minimizing inputs with a given production
process), introduction of new production techniques and
products, etc.
Industries in development areas need good management
may be more than industries in metropolitan areas, which is
able to compensate for the various disadvantages of the
location, as well as to give special attention to the
community and labor force.
g. Growth Rate of Industry
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The growth rate of an industry is one of the main
determinants in the decision to locate. The more capital
intensive the industry and the more it requires skilled
workers, the larger the impact of a relocation and the more
reluctant an entrepreneur will be to adjust himself to
changing locational factors. On the other hand, fast
growing industries, may be found to be able to adjust
themselves to changing conditions to a greater extent than
slow growing industries for which the adjustment might often
be a too costly proposition.
In any case, one should realize that the growth rate
of an industry is not constant over time. It slows down
when it reaches maturity. The slow growth of older
industries (like textile and food processing industries)
accompanied by impaired mobility is one of the main reasons
for the existence of industrially depressed areas in many
parts of Europe and the U.S.
This means, that when locational decisions are made
they are based on factors which have operated in the past
and might change substantially in the future. Therefore,
when non-metropolitan industries are considered the nature
of growth of the industry as well as its ability to adjust
to changes in the community should be taken into account.
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Issues and Conflicts
a. The individual and the community in the industrializaton
process.
In almost every underdeveloped community, the
phenomenon of outmigration--usually by the socially and
economically stronger, and more capable residents--is a
common phenomenon.
In a community, undergoing industrialization, the
problem is that an individual who is climbing the
occupational ladder in his plant and improves his
socioeconomic status tends to leave the community either to
reside in a more developed community in the region
(retaining his old job) or to move to a more developed
region, with better jobs.
From the point of view of the individual, this is a
successful industrialization policy, from the point of view
of the community, it means that the specific technology--the
specific plant was not suitable for the community.
This means that "unsuitability" may stem from a
"laggard" technology which implies that local people do not
want to work in the plant, may look for different jobs in
the region when available, or may leave the place. The
"unsuitability" can also stem from a technology which is too
advanced for the community and therefore does not employ
local people, but hires workers from the whole region, or
other regions.
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There are high and low boundaries of technology
which should be examined carefully by policy makers.
Politicians tend to request "high technology" plants for
their places in order to prevent outmigration and to
encourage immigration to the place. The results may be
found to be counterproductive, since the high-technology
plant (or any other te'chnology which does not suit the local
labor force) may be physically located in the place but does
not exploit the local labor force. Another issue to be
considered is the various jobs demands like high work
ethics, accuracy in performance, keeping the schedule which
characterize these industries and which the local labor
force is not qualified yet with these characteristics.
b. The Successful Plant--"Green Field Facory"
"Green field factory" is a term which was coined by
a group of experts. It is defined as a socioeconomic urban
enclave, situated physically outside the urban territory.
Such an enterprise seeks usually rural environments in order
to exploit specific resources located in the area,
nevertheless, it may be operated with such technology and
labor force mix, which may result in reducing the social and
economic effects of the "green field factory" upon the
region (Don, 1979, p. 33).
This is a description of a successful plant from the
industrialist's point of view, but an unsuitable one from
the community's point of view since it does not exploit and
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serve the locality. This may stem from the unsuitable
technology, i.e., the technology chosen is too advanced for
the local labor force, and the plant has to look for workers
in other localities and outside the region.
The effect of the economic multiplier is very small
as well, since the workers do not spend their salaries in
the place.
c. Regional versus Local Plants
The issue of the effectiveness of regional versus
local plants for local development (rather than regional or
national development) has been raised previously.
Regional plants enjoy economies to scale: larger
population which enables intensified industrialization,
bigger plants and sometimes higher level of technology when
more skilled and professional manpower is available. The
cost of infrastructure is lower since the physical
infrastructure serves more plants, externalities from
concentration of plants, etc. But, they may not give
solution to specific local groups like: women, or elderly.
Moreover, in a region which has communities in various
stages of development the problem is: how to assure that
the workers from the less developed communities will not
occupy only the lower levels of the job ladder without many
chances to climb up.
A distinction should be made between a regional
plant which was planned to serve the whole region, and a
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local plant which was planned to serve primarily the place
it was located in. Some local plants turned out to be
regional ones in terms of the spatial distribution of their
workers. This may happen as a result of unsuitable
technology, i.e., the local people are either over-qualified
or under-qualified for the specific technology and the
needed labor force has to be "imported" from outside the
locality.
All of the issues raised so far, point to the
problem of unequal pace of development of industries and
communities, and the difficulties which rise in the
industrializaton process.
A partial solution lies in social and economic
community development. A well developed community attracts
new residents and has a low rate of emigration. The problem
is that community development is a long-range process. It
takes years of enormous effort and investment of resources
in order to rise the educational and welfare levels of the
community's residents. On the other hand, the industry acts
on relatively short range with the ability to adapt easily
by changing technology, limiting growth, moving or closing
down.
In order to achieve a successful industrialization
process there should be a mediation and coordination between
the two: the community and the industry. Governments are
considered to be the most capable agency to undertake this
task.
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6.1.3. The Role of the Government
The lack of coordination between the community and
the industry which stems mainly from the differences in the
pace and direction of development, can be useful only by big
public bodies like the government.
The reason why the government is so intimately
involved in the process is that the government alone has the
power to interface with the play of forces in the market and
to alter comparative costs in the home market by supporting
and sustaining new industrial plants through their birth
pangs and early years.
The government has to create a situation in which a
"suitable" industry for the community will be a "successful"
one for the industrialist, while at the same time achieving
the stated national goal of development.
There may be several national goals:
1. Maximization of employment
2. Maximization of the value added. Which means
maximizing total new income created by the plant for
the benefit of all factors of production.
3. Increasing export and the production of import
substitution.
4. Maximization of profit for the producers of the
principal inputs used.
Some of the objectives may be supplemented to each
other, but basically they differ in the structure of the
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required factors of production and in the target group they
are aiming at.
The first objective is targeted towards the
unemployed while the second objective can be achieved only
by high price skilled labor which is usually in shortage in
development areas, therefore it may attract newcomers to the
region but will not solve the problem of the local
unemployed workers. The same may be true for the third
objective. Industries based on export were found to be less
effective for development purposes, since the objective of
improving the balance of payments may interfere with
planning for development as a result of economic and
political pressure in the short-run. The fourth objective
may as well overlook the interests of the community to be
industrialized (Bar-El, 1980, p. 19).
Government's policies are usually taking the form of
subsidizing one or several factors of production: financial
incentives, labor subsidies and infrastructure provision.
In some other cases the raw material or the final product is
subsidized.
The most common instrument used by the government to
disperse industrial plants is to utilize financial
incentives. The success of the policy depends upon the
impact of the subsidies on average total costs in the
preferred areas. If financial incentives are set at too low
level they will extend the spacial profit margins
insufficiently to incorporate the desired area.
291
The advantages and disadvantages of capital
intensive industries were discussed in previous paragraphs
as well as labor intensive ones. Except for the criticism
concenring the factor intensity, planners criticize the
directions to which subsidies are given, "Instead of
building better schools and using public amenities to
attract firms, many communities have extended direct
financial involvements" (Hansen, 1980, p. 166).
The issue of subsidizing industries versus
subsidizing infrastructure like schools and welfare
amenities has a time dimension since the first one deals
with the short run and the second with the long run.
Another criticism against the way governments
encourage industries attacks the negligence of the time and
growth considertions: ". . . In fact, the policies of many
Western countries are static, being based upon the existing
situation and paying little or no attention to developments
overtime." (Klaasen, 1967, p. 19).
On the same issue of the different paces of
development of the community and the industry, and based on
the "filtering down" theory of location (Thompson, 1969, p.
8), Hansen suggests:
The economic development of the smaller, less
developed urban area would seem to require that it
receive each successive industry a little earlier
in its life cycle, to acquire the industry at a
point in time when it still has both substantial
job forming potential and high-skill work. Only
by upgrading the labor force on the job and
generating the higher incomes (fiscal capacity)
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needed to finance better schools can the area hope
to break out of its underdevelopment trap.
(Hansen, 1980)
Infrastructure provision is another common
instrument used by the government (see paragraph 6.1.2.c.).
Labor subsidies consist mainly of training and vocational
education on one hand, as well as partial exemptions from
taxes according to the region and its priority among
national goals. In some cases housing and various social
services are provided for the needed labor force.
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6.2. The Suitability Model - The Theoretical Framework
The theoretical model, intends primarily to display
the various factors taking place in the process of
industrialization of the development towns. It
describes--using a "sign diagraph"--the interactions among
the various factors, and the interdependencies between them.
It is not a quantitative model, although some
numbers and quantities can be applied to the variables. It
is rather a heuristic model which describes the qualitative
characteristics and relations of the system's components.
The model is centered around the notion of
"suitability" between the community and the industry. It is
hypothesized that the signs of crisis in the community in
the development towns (see chapters IV and V for the
description of the crisis), i.e., increasing rate of
emigration from the towns, and in the employment area: the
paradox of high rate of unemployment on one hand, and a
shortage of needed workers on the other hand, stems from a
development of "unsuitability" between the industrial plants
and the community over the years.
The model was therefore built in order to throw
light upon two major issues: a. The suitability of the
community--its location, infrastructure, services, labor
force, etc.--to the industry, in the sense that there are
advantages for the industry to locate in the community so
that it can exist and oper'ate efficiently. b. The
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"suitability" of the industry to the community, i.e., an
industry which exploits, among other things, the relative
advantage of the community's labor force mix. This type of
"suitability" means that the industry (or the mix of plants
in the community) will use the various qualifications of the
labor force in terms of quality and quantity--the different
groups of the labor force. It means also an industry which
fulfills the communities' objectives in terms of economic
and social progress.
Both notions of "suitability" takes into account the
dynamic factor. Since the characteristics of the labor
force are changing over time, the mix of plants should
either be modified or the plants themselves should adapt to
the changing nature of the labor force in the remote areas.
Each sector (the community and the industry) has its
own unique pace and direction of behavior. It is therefore
the task of a public body--or government to mediate between
the two. It should facilitate an integrated way in which
both will benefit and achieve their goals.
The underlying assumption which this study holds is
that the only way to assure the implementation and the
success of the objective to disperse the population, is by
securing the welfare of the local residents. The objective
of population dispersal can be justified from various
angles, e.g., political, economic, ideological, etc. But,
in any case, the target is to secure the well-being of the
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individual in all the spheres of his life.' "Suitability" as
one of the prerequisites for securing the well-being and
welfare of the community and its individuals was put
therefore in a central place in the model.
The following graph presents the main components of
the framework and their mutual relationship. The main
concepts of the model are:
1. "Actors" and their "Behavior"
There are three major actors in the model
(represented by rectangular boxes):
a. The government
b. The industry
c. The community
Each actor has its own behavior and policies (square
boxes):
a. Governmental policies
b. The behavior and the policy of the employer
(manager and/or entrepreneur)
c. The behavior of the community in the development
town, represented by the employees in the industrial
plants.
2. "States" and "Outcomes"
'For a more detailed analysis of the objective of
population dispersal and its justification, see chapter I.
LEGEND
symbol meaning
FIGURE 6.1& THE THEORETICAL MODEL government
(a simplified version) actor
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There are various "states" and "outcomes" resulting
from the activities of the actors in the system (represented
by oval boxes).
a. On the industrial side: "The economic performance
of the plant"
b. On the community side: "The social performance of
the community--the island phenomenon"
c. As an outcome of the whole system--"Suitability"
and hence, "wages and salaries" and "quality of working
life" (Q.W.L.)
3. "Contexts"
There are two "contexts" having the role of a
"reference group" in the model:
a. The economic context--describes the economic
situation in the country, the economic development,
industrial climate, etc.
b. The social context--represents the socioeconomic
status of the people in the whole country, standard of
living, as well as demographic, social and educational
level. It includes also social norms and modes of life
of the various ethnic groups.
The following "sign diagraph" is a more detailed
model. It shows the interactions between the various
factors, using arrows (when applicable) to indicate the
direction of the impact. Whenever the relationship is
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mutual the arrow points to both directions. Whenever the
arrow is dotted it means that expectations influence the
relationship as well.
The small graphs indicate the nature of the
relationships.* This nature can take the following forms:
7
1. - a "positive" relationship: when x increases, y
increases
2. - a "negative" relationship: when x increases, y
decreases
3. - a "maximum" relationship: a relationship which is
first positive and later turns negative
4. - a "minimum" relationship: a relationship which is
first negative and later turns positive
The detailed graph is heavily based on the previous
part (chapter 6.1: "The Theoretical Background for the
Model").
I . GOVERNMENT
Government's behavior is demonstrated through
policies. Population dispersal policy is the critical
policy in the suggested model. The national objective of
dispersing the population--from the central parts of the
country to the non-metropolitan areas--is the origin of
socioeconomic-political policies implemented to achieve the
'Whenever the small graph is missing, it means that the
nature of relationship is ambicuous (consult the individual
exIanation).
FIGURE 6.2- TME THEORETICAL MODEL I governmentdispersal policies
soc I-economic distance
differences (physical * mental
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goal. Establishing the development towns, providing them
with sources of employment, implementing welfare and social
policies, all are measures, taken by the government in order
to achieve and maintain the dispersal.
There are, therefore, four areas of policies which
stem from the goal of population dispersal:
1. Industrialization policies
2. Infrastructure policies
3. Welfare and social policies
4. Employment policies
1. "Industrialization Policies." Industrialization
policies include a wide range of policy tools and
instruments to encourage industrialization in remote areas.
The instruments prescribed in general
industrialization policies can be financial or non-financial
in character. Financial instruments comprise low interest
loans for newly locating industries, guarantees of interest
payments, grants, tax-shelters, and subsidies in land and
building costs. The non-financial instruments can be more
general in nature and they are described under
"Infrastructure policies," since they affect both the
community and the industrial plants.
The government demonstrates its rank of priorities
among national objectives and development regions by
applying variable rates of grants and subsidies according to
the government's preferences.
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Industrialization policies to encourage industrial
plants in the development regions have an impact on the
economic performance of the plants directly and indirectly.
a. There is a direct impact on plants owned and operated by
the government. They include mainly "national projects"
like the "Dead Sea Works" or "N.F.L." In these cases the
government takes active part in actually managing the
plants.
b. There is an indirect effect through the "Entrepreneur's
policy" on the "economic performance" of the privately owned
plants, or those plants which are operated and managed as
private enterprises. By implementing varioius programs,
changing and creating biased price systems, the government
influences the entrepreneur's decision process regarding the
location of the industrial plant and the way it will be
operated.
The nature of the impact of the two types of
governmental policies on the economic performance of the
plant is one of the key issues examined by this study. It
is not clear to what extent the support, given by the
government, i.e., grants, subsidies, etc., has a positive
impact on the performance of the plant. Although this
support is offered in order to compensate for the
disadvantages to location, its quality and especially its
timing is of crucial importance to the degree of succes, and
this research studies the issue. Therefore, there is no
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indication on the graph as to the nature of this
relationship.
2. "Infrastructure Policies". "Infrastructure
policies" are a very important part of the governmental
efforts to encourage industrialization. Klaasen (1967)
categorizes them under "non-financial" instruments, as tools
which are more general in nature compared to the financial
instruments:
They include road, railway and communication's
improvements as well as the development of
residential schools, playgrounds, and shopping
facilities, etc. Broadly, they seek to improve
the economic, social and cultural "climate" of the
area to heighten the general attractiveness as an
area for new activities. (Ibid., p. 17)
Some other areas of activity should be added to the
"infrastructure policies." Among them: energy policies,
provision of electricity, power stations, transportation
systems and especially networks of trains.
One instrument that deserves special attention in
the present context is the "industrial estate." Governments
can reduce the capital costs for the industry not only by
financial subsidies but also by the direct provision of
fixed capital in the form of factory buildings. Factory and
land costs may play an important role in the location
decision if they vary markedly over space and if their share
of spatially variable costs is relatively high. Under such
circumstances, areas with cheap sites and premises will
enjoy a pronounced cost advantage which will increase their
attraction for incoming plants.
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These various policies affect the community and the
industrial and economic activities in the area in various
ways. It is impossible to evaluate the direct impact of
each "infrastructure policy" on the different factors, as
well as making distinctions between short and long range
impacts.
In the suggested model, infrastructure policies have
an impact on the various components of the system. First,
the policies have an impact on the "physical" and "mental"
distances as a part of the "island phenomenon." As this
study suggests,' there are three kinds of "distance." They
are: a. The physical distance--the distance itself. b. The
accessible distance--the various means to overcome distance.
They include: roads and railroads on one hand and
communication systems (like telephone) on the other hand.
The rate of public transportation can be also included under
this category. c. The mental distance which is the result
of the physical and the accessible distance, coupled with
socioeconomic differences.
Infrastructure policies have, therefore, an impact
on three components of the model. First, they have an
impact on the physical distance (part of the "island
phenomenon"). The relationship between the policies and the
"distance" is of a negative shape since increase in the
'See chapter 6.1, "The Theoretical Background for the
Model" on the various meanings of "Distance."
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resources invested in infrastructure "decreases" physical
and accessible distances. Second, the policies have an
impact on the infrastructure of the community ("positive
relationship") and finally, they affect the "economic
performance of the plant in the community" (positive
relationship).
3. "Welfare and Social Policies." The government
affects the community through various programs and subsidies
given to welfare and social services. These include a wide
variety of education programs from childhood to old age,
social programs aimed at poor and needy families, welfare
programs to the whole community, etc. (This variable does
not include welfare payments to individuals.) The main
objective is to improve the well-being of the community,
which will insure the continued existence of the town.
The nature of the relatioship between the welfare
and social policies and the community socioeconomic
characteristics is not unequivocal. It is not clear whether
more programs and subsidies to change the socioeconomic
characteristics of the community actually improve (positive
relationship) the situation. Thus, there is no indication
as to the nature of the relationship between the two. In
the analysis this issue will be discussed according to the
data.
4. "Employment Policies." The fourth type of policy
which stems from the general goal of "population dispersal"
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is employment policies which have direct effect on the labor
force, its quality and quantity. The overall policy is in
charge of training, vocational education and of matching
between employees and sources of employment.
These policies have an impact on the administrative
and social infrastructure of the community. The first one
is concerned with the administrative capabilities of the
non-metropolitan authorities, and the second is concerned
with schooling, health and socio-cultural opportunities.
Employment policies have also an impact on the
spatial distribution of the workers, since they set
regulations and rules regarding hiring procedures. This in
turn affects the quantity and quality of the labor force in
the industrial plants, and indirectly the "economic
performance in the community."
II. INDUSTRY
The "industry" is the second "actor" in the
suggested model. The industrial sector consists of: a. The
"actor," which is the employer. b. The "behavior" and the
policies implemented by the employer (manager and/or
entrepreneur). c. The "outcome"--the "economic performance
of the plant in the community," and "suitability." The
industrial sector as a whole is affected by the "economic
context of the country," which is an indicator of the
economic situation--the economic development and the
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industrial climate. It has an effect on the entrepreneur's
decision process, as well as on the probability of the
plant's success. In a more detailed way, the components
are:
1. "The entrepreneur's policy." This is a variable
which describes the entrepreneur's behavior and includes the
main factors considered by the entrepreneur when location
decisions are taken to achieve some degree of economic
viability (rather than maximum profit--an issue which is
discussed in chapter 6.1). It includes: size of the
locality, distance and its implications, availability of
inputs (raw material, labor force, capital, etc.), the
physical and social infrastructures, the area's image,
product and technology as well as decisions taken concerning
management, growth rates, financing, etc. (all factors were
specified previously in chapter 6.1). The entrepreneur
policy has an impact, primarily on the probability of the
plant to exist and be viable. The entrepreneur is heavily
influenced by the reality created by the governmental
policies to encourage industrialization and by the
industrial climate in the country. The industrialist
responds to the biased price system created by the
government to encourage industrialization in a specific
region or a preferred sector.
As was discussed before, it is not clear what is the
nature of the relationships between' the governmental
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industrialization policies and the decisions of the
entrepreneur.
2. The "economic performance of the plant in the
community." This is a variable which is defined in the
model as an "outcome." The extent to which a plant achieves
economic viability depends upon
a. "The entrepreneur's policy and decisions." In
addition to the entrepreneur's decision process, the
economic viability is affected also by the expectations of
the entrepreneur (dotted arrow) as was discussed in chapter
6.1.
b. "Industrialization policies." A direct impact
on the plants owned and operated by the government. It is
not clear what is the nature of this relationship. This is
part of what the study tries to find.
c. "Infrastructure policies"--have a positive
impact on the economic performance of the plant since they
help to alleviate the distance and communication problems.
d. "The community socioeconomic characteristics."
The community has an impact on the economic performance of
the plant in two ways. The first one is through the impact
of the physical, social and administrative infrastructures
which are determined by the socioeconomic characteristics of
the community, i.e., it is assumed that a community
characterized by higher income, higher level of education,
smaller families, etc., will have better infrastructures,
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and these in turn will affect positively, the economic
performance of the plant. The second, more direct impact is
through the "labor force mix," which is a segment of the
community. It is assumed that the relationship between the
labor-force mix and the probability of the plant to perform
successfully, takes the form of "maximum relationship,"
i.e., as the quality of the labor force improves, it has a
positive imapct on the economic success of the plant. When
the quality of the labor force begins to be overqualified
for the existing plant and its technology, some workers may
move to more technologically advanced plants (staying in the
community and commuting) or may immigrate altogether. It
has then a negative impact on the economic success of the
plant. The overall effect of the labor-force mix is
therefore positive at first and negative later (when
measured overtime) and the sign is therefore of a "maximum"
shape.
It should be added also that the relationship
between these two components is reciprocal, although
indirect (through "suitability"). The degree of economic
performance of the plant has undoubtedly an effect on the
quality of the labor force, but the effect depends on the
degree of suitability of the plant to the community. A
plant which is economically successful does not always have
a positive impact on the labor force since the "Quality of
the working life" in the plant can be low and.everything is
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compensated for by material and financial rewards. (This
issue will be discussed under "suitability.")
e. "Distance"--the distance in its physical sense
has an impact on the probability of the plant to perform
successfully. Thie impact is usually of a "negative
relationship" since as distance grows, there are more
disadvantages to location and the probability to succeed
decreases. Nevertheless, if the plant enjoys a high rate of
governmental protection in the market due to its physical
remoteness it may eliminate the negative effect of distance.
f. "The economic context of the country." The
stage of economic development in the country, and the
industrial climate have an impact on the economic
performance of the industrial plant. The relationship
between the economic performance of the plant in the
community and the economic context .of the country, can be
depicted as "minimum relationship" in which, the
relationship is negative at the beginning and then, turn to
the positive.
In this study, it is suggested that at the initial
stages of industrial development there is a rough
competition among all "infant" plants. All compete for a
limited amount of governmental (loans and grants) and
national resources (venture capital, managerial and
professional work force, etc.). There is, therefore, a
"negative" relationship. As the probability of the plants
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in the country to succeed increases, the probability of the
plant in the community to succeed decreases. This is a
"substitution" effect among the two types of plants. The
"negative relationship" continues up to a "take-off" stage
in the economic development of the country. When it
"takes-off," governmental assistance to other plants
decreases, and more resources may be left for the "infant"
and existing plants in the developing areas. Moreover, the
progress and the success of the other industrial plants in
the country indicates a healthy economic situation, which
benefits all. The relationship turns to be therefore
positive.
Embodied also in the "minimum relationship" shape of
the graph, the situation in which changes in the national
priorities affect differently the various industrial
sectors, i.e., when "population dispersal objective" gets
top priority, more resources are channelled to development
areas, and their industrial economic success is more
secured. At that point, less resources are transferred to
other industrial plants in the country, and their economic
success is more doubtful.
In the suggested model, the "economic performance of
the plant in the community" has an impact mainly on the
outcome--"suitability." The relationship between the two is
reciprocal since the degree of "suitability" has an impact
on the economic performance of the plant as well. It is
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assumed that as the plant performs more successfully from an
economic point of view, it is more suitable since more wages
and salaries are paid, nevertheless, this assumption should
be analyzed carefully: First, high salaries and wages do
not always mean high and improved Q.W.L. Employees may
enjoy the material rewards but will not benefit from
interesting jobs and chances to advance--which is the second
requirement from "suitable" industy. Second, the workers
who will gain economic power from their work in the plant,
will find out that they can afford living in communities
with higher standards of living and may decide to emigrate
to different communities. This may happen, when, on the one
hand, the plant constributes economically and increases the
economic power of the community while, on the other hand,
governmental policies to improve the social and educational
level of the community are lagging behind.
There is another factor which should be considered
when the "economic performance of the plant" and its impact
on suitability is discussed. It is believed, that if the
plant is very successful economically, it may decide to move
to a different location--closer to the central part of the
country since it does not need anymore governmental
assistance due to its location in the development area, and
it can benefit from the locational advantages in the central
parts of the country. The emigration of the plant is
"unsuitable" to the community.
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As was suggested, the relationship between the two
components is reciprocal. "Suitability"--in its second
meaning, i.e., the "suitability of the community to the
plant"--affects the "economic performance of the plant in
the community." It is assumed that when the community is
more suitable to the plant, e.g., its labor force,
infrastructure, etc., the probability of the plant to
succeed is higher. (See discussion on the issue of
"suitability" in the last part of this chapter.)
III. THE COMMUNITY
On the side of the community there are also four
components:
1. The actor--the socioeconomic characteristics of the
community in the development town, but mainly the
labor force mix (the employees) which is a segment of
the community.
2. The behavior of the community and the labor
force--there are two types of behavior: emigration
and immigration by the community, and the
job-behavior by the labor force.
3. "Outcomes"--the main outcome is the "social
performance of the community" of which the "island
phenomenon" is an important dimension.
4. "Context"--the social context of the country.
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In the following pages, the above subjects will be
discussed:
1. The "socioeconomic characteristics of the
community"--the community in the development town is
characterized by two structures, which altogether give some
indicator to the "community socioeconomic characteristics."
The two structures are:
a. "The social structure of the community"--this
includes the social and demographic characteristics of the
community. The social structure includes also the various
social services existing in the community like: schools,
day-cares, kindergartens, etc., as well as amenities like:
theatres, cultural centers, swimming pools, etc. All are
institutions and facilities which give some indication of
the standard of living in the town. There are two main
factors influencing specifically the social structure:
"governmental policies" and the "quality of working life" in
the industrial plants.
- "Governmental policies"--three kinds of policies have an
effect on the different segments of the population and on
the social services provided by the community. Social and
welfare policies may influence the education level, skills
and occupations of the community and hence the qualify of
its labor force. Employment policies will influence
directly the quality and quantity of the labor force, and to
some extent the rates of employment and unemployment. The
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community, both its social and economic structures, is
influenced also by "infrastructure policies."
- "Quality of Working Life" (Q.W.L.) in the industrial
plants--In the suggested model, Q.W.L. has a significant
impact on the quality and quantity of the labor force, and
hence on the well being of the community. (This issue will
be discussed under "Q.W.L.")
b. "The economic structure of the community"--This
includes the economic characteristics of the residents of
the place. The economic structure is affected mainly by the
wages and salaries paid by the industrial firms which are
determined by the economic success of the plant. The wages
and the salaries contribute to the economic power of the
community, which determines the volume and the quality of
the various economic services, i.e., stores, commercial
services, banks, etc.
The two structures specified above describe the
"community socioeconomic characteristics" and gives some
indication to its "well-being."
Labor-force mix--the "labor-force mix" is the
segment of the community which participates in the labor
force. In itself there are several segments: males-heads
of families (ages 21-60), ex-soldier, youth, women, elderly,
etc. As such, they have the "community socioeconomic
characteristics" in addition to the specific characteristics
as a segment of the labor force.
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The "community socioeconomic characteristics" and
the "labor-force mix" have an impact on the "economic
performance of the plant," as the community well-being
improves, indicated by the changes in socioeconomic
characteristics, this means a better environment for the
plants and higher probability to succeed. The same is true
for the impace of the "labor force mix" on the economic
success of the plant in the community. The extent to which
the local labor force fulfills the plant's specific needs
(in terms of quality and quantity) for the employees,
expresses the rate of suitability of the community (its
labor-force mix) to the industry. (See, under
"Suitability.")
There are reciprocal relationships between the
"actor" the community and the "outcome" the "island
phenomenon" as well as between the community and the
"behavior"--"migration and job behavior."
3. "Outcome"--the "island phenomenon." The "island
phenomenon" is defined as a situation in which the community
in the development town has characteristics of developing
societies in the midst of a country with characteristics of
well-developed societies. The phenomenon from socioeconomic
point of view, is measured by objective measures:
differences in social, educational and economic structures
between the development towns and the rest of the country
(see chapter IV) and by "subjective" measures--the feelings
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of seclusion and remoteness--by the residents of this
community.
The "Island Phenomenon" in the model consists,
therefore, of two components:
a. The "Distance"--both in its physical and mental senses.
The "distance" physically--the sites of the development
towns and therefore the plants (locally or regionally) are
determined by the government. "Population Dispersal
Policies" are the main policies responsible for the
decisions concerning location, though some other policies
affect the location indirectly.
The distance in its physical sense is a significant
factor in determining the economic success of the plant. As
the plant is located in a more remote place, far from raw
material and market centers, its probability to succeed
diminishes. Government assistance to non-metropolitan
industrial plants is based mainly on the assumption that the
assistance has to compensate for locational disadvantages.
The relationship has therefore the shape of "negative
relationship."
The "distance" in its mental sense is felt as a
result of isolation and seclusion which may stem from the
physical distance, but also from a lack of adequate
communication channels, low rate of public and private
transportation, bad roads, etc.
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The distance in its physical and mental sense has an
impact on the community's well-being in a negative way.
b. "Socioeconomic differences"--between the community in
the development town and the other communities in the
country. The "social context of the country" creates
therefore a mental distance which goes beyond the physical
distance and its perception.
The "island phenomenon" has a strong impact on the
community and especially on its labor force. For example,
the differences between the socioeconomic structures of the
community and the other communities, coupled with the
exposure of the local workers to employment opportunities in
the metropolitan areas, create employment expectations which
can neither be fulfilled by the existing local industrial
plants nor by the quality of the existing labor force.
The "island phenomenon" has an impact on the two
types of behavior: on "migration" and on "job behavior."
It might discourage emigration and encourage immigration, or
may have an impact on the willingness to look for different
jobs in more advanced plants. These responses are
indicators for the desire to shorten the distances in all
their three meanings.
2. "Behavior"--The behavior of the community and
the labor force. The socioeconomic structure of the
community, coupled with the "state" of the "island
phenomenon," may induce two types of behavior, in order to
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eliminate the feelings of seclusion and remoteness, those of
being part of the "island phenomenon" and not belonging to
the center in its physical, social, cultural, political and
economic meanings. In the community it may induce
emigration, moving from the development town to a community
which is either closer to the metropolitan center
(overcoming the physical distance) or has a better standard
of living and is "closer" to the social, political and
economic centers of the country. Among those who
participate in the labor force, it may induce willingness to
change jobs either in the community or outside it.
a. "Migration."--This variable is influenced mainly by the
social and economic characteristics of the community, but
has obviously an impact on these variables as well.
When the impact on migration is considered, it is
important to distinguish between the effects of the "social
structure" versus the effects of the "economic structure."
It is assumed that when the social well-being
improves over time (higher level of education, more social
services, etc.), the emigration decreases and the
immigration increases. The same is assumed to be true for
the economic well-being, when the standard of living
rises--as a result of better employment opportunities,
better wages, etc.--there will be less emigration and more
immigration, but up to a point in which the better
employment opportunities and the economic power of the
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workers will outpace the parallel social welfare of the
community. At this point, the resident of the community may
feel that moving to another community which has a better
social welfare may improve his standard of living, and since
he can afford it economically, he may leave. This is the
case described under "Issues and Conflicts" as: "The
individual and the community in the industrialization
process" (see chapter 6.1). Another cause for emigration
might be when the technology in the plant is not suitable
anymore to the labor force in the community. For example, a
labor-intensive plant which is characterized by poor quality
of working life (Q.W.L.) and which pays low salaries, may
encourage emigration to a better community with better
chances for employment, since the existing plants do not
provide quality of working life and chances to advance in
the future. The same may be true when the technology is too
advanced for the capabilities of the local people. The
plant will be physically located in the community, but many
of the workers may commute from other communities
characterized by higher standard of living. This is the
case of "successful plant--green field industry" (see
chapter 6.1).
It should be added that a worker may migrate to a
different--"better"--community, without actually changing
the nature of his job. He may decide to emigrate to a
community with higher quality of life (educa'tion, welfare)
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in order to improve his and his family's future perspective
(if he can afford it economically), but still do the same
type of job (or sometimes even less qualified one). For
example, it is quite a well know phenomenon among immigrants
from their own countries to other countries, who are willing
to take jobs they would have refused to take in their own
country, only for the sake of staying in a country which
seems to promise a better future.
b. "Job behavior." Another type of behavior--which stems
from the desire to eliminate the "island phenomenon" or at
least to reduce the distance, when the economic conditions
of the worker do not permit for emigration,--is changing the
work place. This can take two forms: 1. If there are in
the community plants which offer better Q.W.L. and chances
to advance within the plant (existence of a ladder of
occupations) these promised future perspectives help in
eliminating the feelings of the "island phenomenon" and in
some way reducing the mental distance. 2. If there are not
in the community plants which offer better conditions, the
employee may seek jobs in nearby communities and commute
everyday to work. In the long run, it may lead to an
emigration of the employee and his family from the
community.
The two types of behavior have reciprocal relations
with the community well-being and its labor-force mix. The
effect of emigration, is a decrease in the size of the
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community and hence deterioration of the community's
well-being. The same is true for the labor-force mix. When
employees leave, and usually, they are the better ones,
there is a shortage of workers.
4. "Context"--"The Social Context of the Country"
The social context of the country describes the
socioeconomic structure of the country, the various ethnic
groups, the socioeconomic gaps, norms and cultural
background. In the model, this variable has the role of a
"reference group" rather than a central role which may be
implied by the size of the "rest of the country."
This variable is used in order to understand the
"island phenomenon" since the latter is a "relative
concept," i.e., the feelings of isolation and the existence
of the "mental distance" are the result--among other
things--of the relative differences between the community
and the rest of the country.
IV. SUITABILITY
"Suitability" is an outcome. It defines the extent
to which the plant is suitable to the community. As such,
it combines two factors which defines "suitability" (based
on the definition of "suitability"--at the beginning of this
chapter).
a. The suitability of the community--its location,
infrastructure, services, and especially the labor-force mix
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to the industry, in the sense that there are advantages for
the industry to locate in the community so that it can exist
and perform successfully.
The extent to which the local labor force fulfills
the plant's specific needs (in terms of quality and
quantity) for employees, expresses the degree of suitability
of the community (the labor force) to the industry. If the
labor force is suitable, it will contribute to the
probability of the plant to be economically viable.
Following this line, it should be noted, that if the
plant does not find the adequate labor force in the local
community, it might hire the necessary employees from other
communities in order to increase the probability to succeed.
From the point of view of the plant, it has therefore the
"suitable" labor force, but it creates, from the point of
view of the community "unsuitability" sinceyit does not
exploit the local labor force. This will be expressed then,
by the notion of "suitability" of the industry to the
community (as it is described in the following paragraph b).
b. The "suitability" of the industry to the community, i.e.,
an industry which exploits, among other things, the relative
advantage of the community's labor-force mix. This type of
"suitability" means that the industry (or the mix of plants
in the community) will use the various characteristics of
the local labor force in terms of quality and quantity. It
means also an industry which fulfills the communities'
objectives in terms of economic and social progress.
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The "suitability" has two outcomes. It is assumed
that when and if the plant is suitable for the community,
there are two consequences which have an effect back, on the
community:
1. "Income level" (wages and salaries)--It is hypothesized
that a plant which is economically successful, pays adequate
salaries and wages, and therefore contribute to the income
level of the community. In the model, it is suggested that
if the plant is successful, its material rewards will affect
the economic structure of the community.
2. "The quality of working life" (Q.W.L.)--This variable
contains a wide range of variables which refer mainly to the
relationship between the workers and their work environment.
It includes a wide range of concerns; among them: human
engineering factors, physical conditions, hygienic and
aesthetical aspects, job safety, shifts, job enrichment,
occupational mobility, etc. (For details, see chapter 6.1.)
It excludes the wages and salaries which are mainly the
outcome of the degree of the economic success.
There are mutual relationships between the "Q.W.L."
and the "income level," although their nature is not clear.
As the "Q.W.L." increases, workers work more efficiently
and the probability of the plant to succeed and hence paying
higher salaries increase. On the other hand, it can be
assumed that the "economic performance of the plant" has a
positive impact on the "Q.W.L." It means that as the
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economic success increases, the "Q.W.L." improves. In cases
in which there is not an actual improvement in the "Q.W.L."
higher salaries and wages may compensate for the work
conditions.
The nature of the mutual relationships should be
explored. The "Q.W.L." has a significant impact on the
well-being of the community, and hence on the labor force,
its quality and quantity. For example, if the employment in
the plant becomes attractive, there will be more people
willing to work, especially among groups which tend to be
less employed--the youth or the women (in case the specific
type of jobs is suitable for them). The "Q.W.L." has
therefore also an indirect effect on the well-being of the
whole community.
Both, the "income level" and the "Q.W.L." have an
impact on the "community behavior" and on the "suitability,"
and it is important to notice the different effects of both.
If it is assumed that income level has an impact on the
economic structure of the community, it means that when the
plant becomes successful from an economic point of view, and
hence the salaries and the wages may go up, above a specific
level, if the social welfare of the community will not be
simultaneously improved, some people may emigrate, since the
individual economic standard of living will be higher than
the social welfare of the community. The process may be
stabilized in a lower level of the community's welfare (as a
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result of emigration of the economically and socially strong
members of the community). This will therefore have also an
impact on the "outcomes," the "island phenomenon" and on
"suitability."
On the other hand, if it is assumed the "Q.W.L." has
an impact on the social structure of the community, it means
that when the plant changes and advances technologically, it
has a positive impact on the labor force and hence on the
well-being of the community. If it is a stagnant, "old
generation" type of plant, it may have a negative impact on
the labor force, and hence on the community which may result
in looking for different jobs in other communities (in case
the standard of living in the current community is adequate
for the worker and he prefers to stay) or in emigration
altogether. This is another case of "unsuitability."
The relation between the social-welfare structure of
the community and the economic structure and the economic
strength of the individuals should be considered by the
government when subsidizing plants and communities. For a
given level of governmental subsidies, and dependent on the
initial socioeconomic level of the population, subsidies to
the plant should be given up to a point in which emigration
is considered by the residents. Then, subsidies should be
given to the community. To sum-up, a balance should be kept
between subsidizing the industry and the community.
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How the Model Is Used in the Suggested Study
The model gives a comprehensive picture of the
factors taking part in the determination of the quality of
the economic-industrial base of the development town. It is
a static model which describes the situation in a specific
period and gives indication to the rate of suitability
between the community and the industry at that time.
Nevertheless, when it used several times for various
periods, it gives the description of the dynamic processes.
For example, some variables, like the "island phenomenon" or
the "community socioeconomic characterisics" indicate the
result of a continuous development, and as such express
outcomes of several years of development.
For the study purposes, the model will be applied to
three periods: 1) the intitial stage of industrialization,
1955-1967; 2) the effects of the "Six Days War," 1967-1974;
3) the current period, 1974-1980.
By examining the situation continuously over the
three indicated periods, the notion of "suitability" and
hence its effects on the community, the labor-force mix and
the industry, will get a dynamic meaning. It will help to
understand and explain the history and the development of
the "island phenomenon" and its crucial role in determining
the strength of the economic-industrial base of the
development towns.
CHAPTER VII
ANALYSIS AND GENERALIZATION OF THE CASE-STUDIES
In this study an attempt is made to understand the
roots and the causes for the state of "crisis" in the
development towns as revealed by the increasing rate of
emigration and the aggravating employment situation.
A model is constructed to describe the development
of the situation (chapter VI). The model depicts the
interrelationships and interactions among the three major
components participating in the situation: the community
(in the development town), the industry and the government.
Since it is hypothesized that the current situation
is an outcome of a dynamic process which has evolved over
the years, the relevant period (1955-1980) is analyzed.
In order to examine the accuracy and the
implications of the model, this chapter analyzes the data by
correlating the key events in the preiod 1955-1980 with the
model.
The correlation between the key events in the period
and the model is done by dividing the whole period into
three subperiods. The model is then applied three times, to
each subperiod. The overall analysis of the three
subperiods highlights the dynamic variables in the system.
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The dynamic variables in the analysis of the
situation were found to be of crucial importance in
understanding the causes and the results of the situation.
It was found that the dynamic effects on the community, on
the industrial plants and on the interactions between them
produce factors which are negative for the long run for the
community and for the industry. These factors undermine
mainly the "suitability" (in its two meanings--see chapter
VI)--between the community and the industry--which is one of
the necessary conditions for successful industrialization.
A second group of important variables are those
which describe the multiple levels of distance, which affect
the decision process and hence the behavior of the community
and the industry. The multiple levels of distance (as
described in chapter VI--"The suitability model") include:
the physical distance, the accessible distance (roads,
communication systems, etc.) and the mental distance which
takes into consideration the cultural variables,
socioeconomic differences and the subjective feelings of
isolation and seclusion. The various "degrees" of distance
have an effect on one hand, on the behavior of the
community, and on the other hand, should be taken into
account when different policies to remedy the situation are
designed.
The analysis of the key events and the developments
in the country, the communities and their industrial bases
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show that the origin of the problems of "unsuitability"
between the communities and their industrial bases are
rooted in the initial stages of the country's development,
in the policies and the developments that had been taking
place in the period 1948-1967. The existence of the problem
and the extent to which they were severe, have not been
realized throughout the second period (1967-1974) due to an
overall economic prosperity in the country, but they have
continued to exist and developed. Only during the third
period (1974-1980), when the economic resources have begun
to be limited, the "unsuitability" and its implications
became particularly evident.
This chapter is based on the following data:
a. Description of the chronological development of
the communities in the development towns in general,
and in Yerucham and Dimona in particular in the period
1955-1980 (for a detailed analysis, see chapter III).
b. The industrial trajectories--the history of the
industrial plants in the communities (detailed analysis
in chapter V).
c. The main economic and political events since the
establishment of the state. Highlights of governmental
policies: espoused policies and policies in use.
The three subperiods analyzed are:
1. 1955-1967: The initial stages of industrialization.
2. 1967-1974: The effects of the "Six Day War."
3. 1974-1980: The effects of the "Yom Kippur War" and the
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Likud Government.
Before analyzing the data, a general background for
the years 1948-1955--the period in which Yerucham and Dimona
were established is given.
7.1. 1948-1955: The Initial Stages of Statehood
General Background. The striking phenomenon at this
period, and especially between the years 1948-1951, were the
massive waves of immigrants from Europe, Iraq, Yemen and
Libya. Net immigration has reached 666,000, corresponding
to an annual rate of an increase of the population of 24
percent. Three major decisions were taken by the newly
formed Israeli government: 1) Dispersal of the population
from the central parts of the country to the sparsely
populated areas of the Gallil and the Negev. 2) Massive
formation of capital to absorb the waves of immigrants. 3)
Lessening the country's dependence on imports of essential
foods, and producing domestically, at least 50 percent of
all food requirements. Agriculture was developed to permit
both the settlement of less populated areas and the saving
of essential inputs. Another tool for investment policy was
the granting of the status of "approved enterprise" under
"the law for encouragement of capital investment" to
industrial plants.
At this stage, agriculture was the main source of
employment for the residents of the development towns. The
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process of migration absorption was accompanied by high
rates of unemployment--between 7 percent to 11 percent.
Relief work programs were implemented, which have employed
part of the unemployed.
At the beginning of this period, Yerucham was
established (1951) and towards the end, Dimona (1955). By
1955, the number of residents in Yerucham was 500, and in
Dimona it was 311.
The initial stages of social, political, economic
and industrial developments, set the scene for future
developments. A phenomenon--the "Island Phenomenon" which
has been a crucial factor in further developments, has
emerged at this stage. The location of the development
towns in remote areas, coupled with the socioeconomic
differences between the immigrants who have been sent to
these places and those who have populated the metropolitan
regions (see chapters I and 4.1), all have contributed
initially to creating "nuclei" groups of population,
different from other groups.
In the more specific case of Dimona and Yerucham,
both have been established some 30-40 km. from Beer-Sheva,
which itself was a new and undeveloped town, some 110 km.
from the metropolital area. Dimona was better located (on
the road from Beer-Sheva to the Dead Sea), but both were
quite inaccessible due to the low rate of motorization,
infrequent public transportation and lack of other
communication means, like telephones.
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Because of historical developments (see chapter I,
"The history of population dispersal policy"), most of the
immigrants in both towns have immigrated from Asian and
African countries, in contrast to those who have immigrated
from American and European countries and have settled in the
central parts of the country. Since those who have
immigrated from Asian-African countries are also
characterized by big families, lower level of education and
less skilled labor force, these have created, from the
start, socioeconomic differences between the residents of
the development towns and the residents of the metropolitan
areas.
The situation in the area of employment has not
contributed as well to bridge the gaps. Most of Yerucham's
labor force was employed in relief work, although two big
chemical plants had already been operating in the region
since 1951. The two were: "Dead Sea Works" which was
reopened in 1951, and "Negev Phosphates" which was
established in 1952. In contrast to Yerucham, a great share
of the settlers of Dimona have already been employed by the
"Dead Sea Works" prior to their settling in Dimona (see
chapter III). This gave Dimona a head-start regarding its
socioeconomic viability, over Yerucham.
Based on the model, and on the historical
development, it can be seen that the dispersal policies were
concentrated mainly in welfare-social policies and in
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infrastructure. Industrialization was in an inceptive
stage. There were not any local plants, and the issue of
"suitability" between the community and the industry did not
exist. Nevertheless, the basis for the "island phenomenon"
has been created at this period, basically by the pattern of
population dispersal policies.
7.2. 1955-1967: The Initial Stage of Industrialization
From the perspective of the development towns, this
period can be divided into two subperiods:
1955-1960: The years of urbanization of the development towns.
1961-1965: The years of industrialization of the development
towns.
The last two years in this subperiod, 1965-1967, were years
of recession and beginning of a period in which the
dispersal of the population froze.
Government policies. This period, which is known
also as the "Sapir Era" (after the late Minister of the
Treasury), was charactrized by vigorous policies to further
develop the existing settlements. The investments in the
various branches of the economy have been accelerated and
grew by 50 percent compared to the first half of the 1950s.
The reparation agreement with Germany enabled development of
new industrial branches and investment in transportation and
electrical infrastructure by import of machines and capital.
Most of the roads were paved in the development areas, some
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30 percent of the roads were paved in the southern part and
some 20 percent in the north. The objective of this program
was to provide a network of roads between the development
towns and the national network of roads (Zilberberg, 1973).
Investments in agriculture decreased (from 30
percent at the beginning of the decade to 26 percent).
Heavy subsidies and loans were part of the accelerated
government directed industrialization policies. In 1959, a
geographical criteria was applied to "the law for
encouragement of capital investment in industry," and
development areas were preferred in terms of getting a
larger share of the investments in loans. Nevertheless, in
practice most of the investments were done in the central
part of the country(some 70 percent of the industrial built
area).
In the second subperiod (1961-1965), the economic
tide has continued, and the rate of growth of the Israeli
economy has accelerated. This high rate stems mainly from
growth in the industry (annual rate of 14 percent).
Industrialization policies were accompanied by dispersal
policies. Some 45 percent of the investments were made in
development areas; 25 percent in the southern parts and 17
percent in the north, the percentages were similar to the
share of each region in population growth. This was a
considerable change in the geographical distribution of
investments in industry. Compared to the previous period,
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the southern region enjoyed a greater share of the
investments. But, it should be noted that except for the
development of raw material and chemical plants in the
south, which demanded a great share of investment in
capital, the other industrial plants (the local ones--those
which planned to serve the near locality) got less capital
investments relative to the share of the population they had
to employ. Nevertheless, this was the period in which the
industrial infrastructure was established for future needs.
As the model shows, at that period (1955-1967) and
especially between the years 1958-1964, the government has
implemented extensive dispersal policies, particularly
through industrialization. Among the various development
regions, the southern region has clearly gotten preferential
treatment compared to other development regions.
The share of the development areas in the
industrialization process was relatively small at the
beginning (1955-1960), but it has increased in the following
period.
The industry. The government's extensive policies
to industrialize the development areas has begun showing
results around 1957-1958 when two textile plants were
established in Dimona: "Kitan Dimona (established in 1958)
and "Sivi Dimona" (established in 1959). At this stage, as
the model indicates, government dispersal policies had an
impact on the industrial sector. The positive impact was on
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both the public sector (effects on the "economic performance
of the plant in the community," as defined by the model),
and the private sector--a positive impact on the decisions
of the industrialists to locate in the development areas.
The economic incentives coupled with some ideological
considerations helped in attracting new plants to the
region. Over the decade (1955-1965) some thirty-five new
plants (including the two big textile plants in Dimona and a
cosmetic laboratory "Lon" in Yerucham) were established (see
tables 3.6-3.7 in chapter III). New investments and
expansions were done in the "Dead Sea Works" and in "Negev
Phosphates."
The community. On the community side, these were
the years in which welfare and social policies have helped
in the absorption process. Nevertheless, as welfare
indicators show the initial socioeconomic differences
between the central parts of the country and the development
areas has not been narrowed down. In 1961, the average size
of a household in Dimona was 4.6 persons per household, in
Yerucham, it was 4.8, while the average for the whole
country was. 3.8. The population in the development towns
continued to be characterized by big families, high natural
growth and by lower education level, compared to the
national average. In addition, programs to improve the
standard of living in the development areas were lagging
behind similar programs in the central parts of the country.
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For example, between the years 1961-1966, 25 percent of the
additional population was sent to the south, but only 16
percent of the additional housing units (and only 13 percent
of the built area) were built in the south. Although, there
was an increase of 30 percent in the size of an average
apartment (compared to the previous period 1955-1967), there
was still a gap between an average size of an apartment in
the south (60 square meters) and in the central parts of the
country (82 square meters).
It is believed that other welfare and educational
programs have suffered from deficiencies stemming mainly
from the remoteness of the development towns. For example,
shortage of social and community workers, less competent
teaching staff, less resources directed to various programs,
etc. The physical and social distance from political and
decision-making centers are blamed for the less equal
resource-allocation relative to the metropolitan centers, or
to settlements, politically closer to the decision-making
centers (like the Kibbutzim). All of these have contributed
to the process of broadening the socioeconomic gap.
For this matter, a distinction should be made
between Yerucham and Dimona. While Yerucham lacked strong
local political leadership, Dimona had a leadership which
grew up in the "Dead Sea Works" and was cultivated by the
plant's management. This leadership has helped in getting
more resources to the town.
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The employment situation was good, relative to the
rest of the country. The high rate of employment was due to
the economic tide. Unlike several development towns like
Beit-Sheaan and Kiryat Gat of which their employment relied
on agriculture in the rural surroundings, in Dimona and to a
lesser extent in Yerucham (which still had a high share of
employed by relief works), employement was based on
industry. In 1961, while the share of the employed in
industry in the whole country was 25.4 percent, the share in
Yerucham was 25.7 percent and in Dimona it was almost
double--48 percent. This was due to the employment of a
great share of Dimona's labor force in the chemical plants
and in the two new textile plants.
The "labor-force mix" as part of the community--as
the model indicates--consisted mainly of male, heads of
families who were employed in the raw material plants and in
the textile plants. The last ones were planned mainly to
employ females who were unemployed at that time.
Unemployment rate has decreased from 7.5 percent at
the beginning of the period to 4.5 percent at the end.
While in the period 1955-1960 most of the unemployed were
concentrated in the central parts of the country, in the
period 1960-1965 there were some unemployment nuclei in the
north and to a lesser extent in the south. Some relief work
programs were implemented.
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The improved economic situation, coupled with
positive effects of the various government policies--i.e.,
"infrastructure policies," "welfare-social policies," and
"employment policies"--all had effects on the well-being of
the community (which can be expressed by changes in the
"community's socioeconomic characteristics") and especially
on the community's behavior.
The nature of the "island phenomenon" as defined in
the model has not changed much. It should be noted that
since the whole country was in a process of absorbing the
immigration from abroad, the differences in the standard of
living between the development towns and the rest of the
country were smaller than in later years. The "island
phenomenon" had more physical meaning rather than a mental
one, since the towns were located in remote areas and the
various ways to reduce distance and to increase
accessibility were lacking, i.e., low motorization rate,
infrequent public transportation, shortage in telephones,
etc. Moreover, the lack of exposure to the life in the
central parts of the country because of the distance and the
absence of radio, television, etc., helped in preventing
strong feelings of isolation and seclusion among the
residents of the development towns. As a result,
expectations--which play a crucial role in satisfaction from
work and quality of life--were relatively low.
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From the community behavior, and especially from the
low emigration rate (since there was not a variety of
industrial plants, "job behavior," i.e., changing jobs, was
not very common), one may conclude that the residents of the
communities were quite satisfied with employment and quality
of life. Nevertheless, it is known that some strong
(socially and economically) segments of the communities have
emigrated at that stage. Those who were employed in the big
regional plants have moved to Beer-Sheva or Arad and
retained their jobs. Those who were not satisfied with the
jobs in the textile plants have preferred to move to the
central parts of the country. Many have ended up working in
similar plants and being employed in similar jobs in the
metropolitan areas, but at least, from their point of view,
they had the feeling that they improved their's and their
children's future life, by living closer to the center of
the country.
Nevertheless, as a result of the governmental
policies, Yerucham and Dimona have experienced population
growth. In both towns there was emigration, mainly to the
central parts of the country, but the constant immigration
of newcomers sustained, on the average, quite a high rate of
growth. (See tables 3.1-3.2 in chapter III.) This was also
due to the population dispersal policies at that time which
has given priority to the south over other regions.
Two-thirds of the additional population was sent to the
south.
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Suitability. The socioeconomic characteristics of
the community in both towns, and hence the qualities of the
labor-force mix were suitable to the labor force needed by
the regional as well as the local plants. The low skilled
labor force was suitable for the types of jobs available in
the plants even though there was a shortage in skilled and
professional workers. This problem was solved by commuting.
Professional and high-skilled workers have commuted from
Beer-Sheva and Arad (after 1963), and some--especially in
managerial jobs--have commuted from Tel-Aviv.
The second type of "suitability"--this of the plant
to the community--existed as well at this time. The
existing plants as a source for employment were suitable to
the community, and the residents, some of whom have been
employed for many years in relief work, were satisfied with
the permanent industrial jobs.
As the model suggests, when the plant is suitable it
has positive impacts on the community by affecting the
income level and through the quality of working life
(Q.W.L.) in the plant which may, among other things, improve
the educational and occupational level of the labor force.
The effect on the income level was immediate, the
salaries of those who were employed in the plants were
higher than the payments of the relief work. The effects of
the "Q.W.L." on the work at the plant and on the employees
were felt in later years (will be discussed later).
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Towards the end of the period, and between the years
1966-1972, there was a freezing in the population dispersal.
The main reasons were: a. The years 1966-1967 were years of
recession, there was a sharp decrease in the economic
activities and high unemployment. The immigration to the
country almost stopped, so that the main tool for dis
the population was absent. Investments in industry a
housing went down, and the first to suffer were the
development areas which have been heavily dependent o
governmental support. b. "Population dispersal" as
national goal has lost its high priority among other
national goals (this issue will be discussed later).
Inspite of the recession, two new plants were
persing
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established in Yerucham. "Tempo," a glass manufacturing
owned by a private entrepreneur was established in 1966.
"Foenicia," owned by the conglomerate "Koor," which belongs
to the Labor-Union, manufacturing hollow glass as well, was
established in 1967. The first plant employed 300 workers
while the second only 50. Both were almost the sole places
of work for Yerucham residents. Only part of the unemployed
could find jobs in these plants, since not all of the
relief-work employees were suitable for industrial jobs.
The negative impact of the recession was the closing
down of several, recently established small plants and
workshops. In Dimona, six plants closed down and in
Yerucham, three. In exsiting plants, workers were fired.
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The textile plants in Dimona, as well as the regional
chemical plants, which were heavily supported by the
government, have survived the recession. As a result, the
unemployment rate in Dimona and Yerucham did not go up
significantly unlike the rest of the country. Some other
factors which have probably contributed to the low
unemployment rate were: lower level of education which
increases the willingness to participate in relief-work
programs, and the already higher percentage (relative to
other communities) of participants in relief-work programs
(Don and Bar-El, 1972).
7.3. 1968-1974: The Effects of the "Six Day War"
General Background. The period 1968-1974, had a
crucial impact on the industrialization process in the
development towns in general, and in Dimona and Yerucham, in
particular. Inspite of the recession towards the end of the
previous period (1965-1967), the outcome of the vigorous
industrialization policies implemented between the years
1960-1965, came into effect at this period. The accelerated
rate of economic development, which has characterized the
period after the "Six Day War" and on, has undoubtedly
contributed to the process. The net domestic product grew
at an annual average rate of 10 percent, and the rate was
especially high in the construction and industiral branches.
This growth was partially due to the external factors, i.e.,
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the military situation and the investments made for military
purposes, the increase in capital import and the renewal of
immigration from abroad. Essentially, it was the
continutation of the growth process which has started in the
1960s.
The annual growth rate of investments (in real
terms) between the years 1966-1972 was larger by 38 percent
compared to the annual volume in the previous period.
Government policies. The most distinct feature of
government policies at this stage is the beginning of a
tendency to rely more on the private sector. In the area of
housing construction, part of the demand for housing--for
newcomers, young couples and others--was transferred from
the public sector to the private construction companies. By
doing so, the government has decreased its control on one of
its most important tools to disperse construction and
population to development areas. Since most of the private
construction was done in the central parts of the country,
the overall effect was a decrease in the share of the
south--in terms of quantity of apartments--from 16 percent
to 12 percent and in terms of apartment size, from 13
percent to 10 percent. The decrease in the share of the
development areas in the country's development, could be
seen also in the pattern of population dispersal. Over this
period, there was not any change in the dispersion. As in
the case of construction, the south experienced a decrease
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in its share in additional population compared to the
increase in the previous period. The share of the Jerusalem
region in construction and addition of population has
increased. The share of the northern part in construction
has not changed but in absorbing new immigrants it has
decreased.
Investments in other branches of the economy over
all the country have increased as well. The annual rate of
investments for the whole period (including the recession
one) has increased by 40 percent compared to the annual rate
in the previous period.
The geographical distribution of investments in
industry shows that the shares of the southern region and
the northern region have decreased. While formally, the
government efforts to industrialize the development towns
have continued, since the beginning of the 1960s, the
overall effects of the intensified economic activities in
the central parts of the country have caused the decrease in
the share of the development towns, relative to their share
in the previous period.
The distribution of loans for industrial purposes by
regions, shows that in the period 1965-1972, the share of
the development regions has increased, but the increase was
mainly in Jerusalem, while the shares of the south and north
regions have not changed. The overall trend in this period
was a decrease in the share of the south and the north
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regions. Moreover, there was an increase in the amount of
loans and subsidies given to industrial plants in the
central parts of the country due to their ability to export
or to substitute import. Exporting plants were entitled to
become "approved enterprises" and defence-related plants
were entitled to become "recognized plants" (plants which
produce import substitutes for military purposes) even
though they were located in the central part of the country.
Inspite of the fact that the amount of loans and subsidies
was smaller than in the development regions, it was found
out that plants preferred to locate in the central parts.
Moreover, consistent with the government trend to encourage
export, the last two years were characterized by
increasingly strict demand--from plants in the developing
regions--to export some percentage of their 'product.1 These
changes in the policy were disadvantageous for the
developing areas from the point of view of their relative
share in industrial investments although the total
investment continued to be large.
In sum, it can be said that from the second half of
1967 and on-- after the "Six Day War"--the economy has
started taking off again. The rate of development has
accelerated, investments increased, and there was full
'The original law (passed in 1962) made the "approved
enterprise" status available only to plants which export
some percentage of their production. (The amount varied
according to location), but this condition was not enforced
until 1968.
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employment coupled with a new wave of immigration, but at
that stage, when resources for population dispersal were
available, the priority--given to the objective of
population dispersion since 1948 and even earlier--was not
observed, and other national objectives got higher priority.
This was due to several causes: a) new pressing needs such
as improving the balance of payments and increasing export,
b) geopolitical changes and especially the high priority
given to the objective of settling the West Bank and
Jerusalem, c) changes in the nature of immigration
(immigrants who came from developed countries, with higher
socioeconomic characteristics) which could not be used any
more as a tool for population dispersal. (This issue will
be discussed later.)
The industry. The extensive industrialization
policies implemented in the previous period (1960-1965) had
an effect on the industrial structure of Yerucham and Dimona
in the years which followed. Although the espoused policy
has not changed, government policies in use reflected the
change in the order of priorities among national objectives.
As the model suggests these policies had an effect on the
industrialist's decision process. Industrialists preferred
to locate their plants in the central parts of the country,
and to benefit from the better location and some of the
government subsidies rather than to locate in the
development areas. Only a few have decided to establish
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their plants in Yerucham and Dimona. The entrepreneurs
claim that the decision to locate in the development towns
were done under ideological (the importance attributed to
pioneering) or personal (their close relationship with the
late Minister of the Treasury, Sapir) pressures, rathr than
strict economic considerations. Relative advantages of the
location like the availability of raw material were marginal
to the decision. Moreover, the locational
disadvantages--which stem mainly from the physical distance
(as the model suggests, as distance grows the probability of
the plant to succeed decreases)--outnumbered the possible
advantages. Among the new plants were: "Sodom Metal"--a
big metal workshop, serving mainly the chemical plants, and
"Negev Ceramics"--ceramics tiles manufacturer, which had to
close half of its production line, close to its
establishment, because of a wrong selection of a product.
Among the existing plants there was a high turnover of
privately owned, small plants and workshops, belonging to
the light industry branches like: sewing workshops,
mechanical locksmith's workshop, carpentry shop, etc. These
plants could be defined as plants which "maximize subsidies"
(Finger, 1971), rather than maximizing profit or any other
objective which can be an indicator for economic success.
These kinds of plants try to achieve immediate profits using
the available subsidies and loans designated for "approved
enterprise." After a few years (sometimes as few as one to
349
two years) of exploiting the available funds, the plants
closed down. The main reasons for closing down the plants
can be categorized under "employer's policy" which stems
from the industrialist's decision process. The "economic
performance of the plant" was affected by a) wrong selection
of the product, because a proper market research was not
done; b) incompetent management--finding a good manager was
one of the big problems faced by the plants. At that time a
manager among the local people could not be found, and those
who were willing to commute to the development towns, from
Beer-Sheva and as far as from Tel-Aviv, were usually
unexperienced managers who looked at the work in the remote
place as a "spring board" for a better job in the
metropolitan area. c) The technology--the technology
selected was either inadequate from the start, or became
obsolete quite soon. The final product had a low quality.
The entrepreneurs, who had quite low expectations from the
plants (either because they were pressed to establish the
plant, or simply wanted only to use the available
governmental subsidies) did not want or did not have
resurces to invest in upgrading the technology. d) The
labor-force mix--as the model suggests, the quality and
quantity of the labor force has an impact on the "economic
performance of the plant." At that period, the labor force
available was suitable to the plant's needs, except for the
professional and skilled labor force which had to be brought
from neighboring towns.
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With these kinds of problems, the plants could not
compete with other plants in the local and especially the
export markets--as the new circumstances have demanded--and
had to close down.
In contrast to the small plants and workshops which
had to close down, the big plants (textile and glass) which
faced a similar problem, did not close down. These plants
operated with obsolete technologies, and hardly exported,
but they employed a great share of the labor force in the
towns, and as such got a strong financial support- from the
government to ensure their existence and to prevent massive
unemployment. (This issue will be elaborated on later.)
The regional chemical plants have enjoyed a stage of
expansion and growth. A new chemical regional plant was
established--"Periklas" (1973).
The plants, and especially the new, more advanced
ones, found some difficulty in finding the needed labor
force for their jobs. Many of the managers, engineers,
technicians and other professionals commuted from other
towns in the region and especially from Arad and Beer-Sheva.
The community. The accelerated economic development
and the prosperity which characterized the period, had an
effect also on the socioeconomic situation in the
development towns. The standard of living increased, and
the socioeconomic situation of the residents of the towns
has been improved. Several welfare indicators suggest that
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the socioeconomic characteristics of the communities have
changed.
a. In the area of housing, there was an increase of
20 percent in the size of an average apartment in the
country. The trend which has started in the previous period
of narrowing the gap between the regions, has continued.
The size of an average apartment in the south was 78 square
meters (80 percent of the size of an average apartment in
Tel-Aviv and the central parts of the country) compared to
60 square meters previously (73 percent of the size of an
average apartment in the center). Part of the gap was due
to the relatively limited involvement of the private sector
in construction in the development towns, and the smaller
apartments (by 10 percent) built in the south by the public
sector, inspite of the average size of a family in the south
which continued to be bigger compared to the size of a
family in the metropolitan areas.
In the specific case of Yerucham and Dimona, the
average size of a family, in 1972 was 5.1 in Yerucham and
4.5 in Dimona, while the national average was 3.6. As a
result the housing density was as follows: In Yerucham,
only half of the population lived in decent housing
conditions (1.5 persons per room). In Dimona, 56.4 percent
lived in decent housing conditions, while the national
average was around 70 percent. (For comparison, in Arad,
almost 90 percent of the population have lived in decent
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housing conditions in 1972). Compared to the year 1961,2
the situation in Yerucham and especially in Dimona has
improved, but it has improved to a larger extent in the
metropolitan areas. Consequently, the welfare gap between
the development towns and the metropolitan areas has
broadened.
b. Another indication for the relaltively lower
level of welfare is the "dependency ratio" 3 which continued
to be high in both towns. In Yerucham, it was 1.31 and in
Dimona 1.14, while the national average was 0.92.
c. The rate of motorization is another appropriate
indicator for comparing the welfare situation in the towns
to the whole country. In 1973, the rate of motor vehicles
per 1000 was 18.3 in Yerucham, 22.8 in Dimona and 88.0 in
the whole country.
d. Education level in Yerucham and Dimona was lower
compared to the rest of the country. Some 21 percent of the
population of Dimona and 33 percent of Yerucham's population
had minimal education (0-4 years of schooling), while the
national average was 13.6. Only 3.6 percent in Yerucham and
9.2 percent in Dimona had high education compared to the
national average of 14.5 percent.
2The housing density in 1961 was: 1.8 persons per room
in Dimona, 2.03 persons in Yerucham, and the national
average was 1.4 persons per room.
3
"Dependency ratio" is the number of children in the ages
0-19, plus the number of adults in the ages 65+, divided by
the number of people in the working age 20-64.
353
The same socioeconomic features have characterized
the labor-force mix which is a segment of the population,
and had an effect on the "economic performance of the
plant."
The labor force at that period consisted mainly of
males, heads of families who were initially employed in the
chemical plants, and later in the newly established local
ones. The females were not active seekers of jobs, and the
tendency to go to work was not strong because of the big
families they had and traditional constraints, but the
supply of jobs--when the textile and glass plants were
established--has created demand, and when suitable jobs were
available for females, the needed labor force was found.
As the welfare situation was improved, the
employment was improved as well. Except for the high rate
of unemployment at the recession period (and as was
mentioned before, the development areas suffered relatively
less than the central regions), the rate of employment was
high from 1968 and on, and the peak was in the years
1972-74.
In the structure of employment there was a decrease
in the share of employment in agriculture and an increase in
the share of employment in industry. Dimona and Yerucham
were heavily based on industry; 65.3 percent of the employed
in Dimona had jobs in industry, 42.8 in Yerucham while the
national average was 26 percent. It is therefore clear,
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that the extensive industrialization in the 1960s which was
implemented by capital investments had an effect also on the
employment. Nevertheless, the growth in employment was
somewhat restricted due to the tendency to establish capital
intensive plants which stems from the way the subsidies were
given--mainly to capital and less to employment.
The quality of the labor force has improved due to
vocational-education programs available, but mainly due to
the on-the-job training. Work at the plant itself was for
many employees their first acquaintance with work life, work
ethics, keeping schedules, etc. It is important while
discussing employment to distinguish between the chemical
plants, and especially the "Dead Sea Works" and the local
p'lants. Because of their characteristics' (capital
intensive, existing of job ladder, challenging jobs, etc.)
coupled with the national importance attributed to the
plants ("national project"), a special climate has been
created in the plant, which enabled and encouraged
occupational mobility on one hand and workers leadership on
the other hand. This leadership, in the case of the "Dead
Sea Works" was transferred later to the town Dimona and had
an impact on the community life. The local plants (textile
and glass) lacked these characteristics, and their impact on
the community was mainly through income, by increasing the
economic power of the community and hence the standard of
4 For more details, see chapter V.
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living in the town. (See under "Suitability.")
The social performance of the community. The
"island phenomenon": Inspite of the improvement in the
socioeconomic condition in both towns--and to a greater
extent in Dimona--the gap between the welfare condition in
Yerucham and Dimona, and the metropolitan area remained
broad. In some areas, it narrowed down, especially in
housing. But due to the rapid progress in the central parts
of the country, the socioeconomic gap broadened.
On the "distance" part of the phenomenon, there is
no doubt, that the physical distance has been "decreased" by
increasing various levels of "accessibility." The rate of
private transportation has increased, and public
transportation has been upgraded. The number of households
with a telephone has increased.
The decrease in the physical and accessible
distances has exposed the population in the development
towns to the way of life in the metropolitan areas. This
exposure was strengthened by the introduction of a national
television system to the country, after the "Six Day War."
All of these, coupled with the real socioeconomic
gap, have emphasized the dissimilarities between the
development towns and the metropolitan. Moreover, the
mental distance, the feelings of "isolation" and "seclusion"
have been strengthened. The main causes were: a) The
increased attention given to the new territories (Sinai, the
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West Bank and the Gaza Strip) in terms of material and human
resources which replaced the attention given to the
development towns in the previous period. b) Changes in the
policy to settle new immigrants. Due to changes in the
socioeconomic characteristics of the immigrants (mainly from
Europe and America), who were sent to the central parts of
the country, rather than to development areas as in previous
periods. The residents of the development towns felt that
they were discriminated against when they were settled by
the various public bodies.
As the model suggests both the socioeconomic
differences and the various levels of distance create the
"island phenomenon." Based on the evidence brought, it can
be said that the "island phenomenon" has been reinforced.
There was a difference in the extent to which the phenomenon
existed in Dimona and Yerucham. Dimona has enjoyed several
advantages which in some sense "shortened" for its residents
the "distance." The first advantage was the concentration
of extended families ("Hamulot") from similar origins, i.e.,
North African countries (the majority came from Morocco).
This gave people feelings of "belongingness." Moreover, the
existence of a network of informal institutions taking care
of various economic and welfare aspects, partially
compensated for the alienation and detachment feelings
towards the center. In Yerucham, wherein people from
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various origins were put together,' these kinds of informal
networks have not been developed in the town. The feelings
of isolation and alienation were therefore stronger in
Yerucham.
The second advantage of Dimona was its strong
leadership, which has been developed and cultivated in the
"Dead Sea Works" and was transferred to the town. The mayor
of Dimona, which is a "Dead Sea Works" employee on leave, is
also a Parliament member, and there is another Parliament
member from the town. Yerucham, on the contrary has
suffered from frequent changes of its local leadership, and
at the time of the study, the municipality had an outside
council. The strong dependency on outside institutions has
reinforced the "island phenomenon" in Yerucham.
The third and the most obvious advantage Dimona has
is the better location of the town, compared to this of
Yerucham. Except for the proximity of Dimona to Beer-Sheva,
Dimona is located on the main road from Beer-Sheva to Sodom
and the "Dead Sea Works," while Yerucham is located on a
by-road, some 10 km. from Dimona and the main road.
Suitability. As the model points, there are two
kinds of "suitability." The "suitability of the community
to the plants," and the "suitability of the plants to the
5This was part of the ideology of "Mizug Galuyoth"
("Melting Pot"). Due to the failure of this policy, later
on, immigrants were settled by groups according to their
country of origin (see chapter I).
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community." At that period (1967-1974) the existing labor
force was still suitable for the needs of the industries.
The main problem, faced by the local plants was the lack of
technicians, skilled workers and managers. This skilled
labor force, was found in the neighboring communities--Arad,
Beer-Sheva--and some commuted even from Tel-Aviv (especially
managers). It was disadvantageous for the plant that the
manager lived out of the towns, on the other hand, inspite
of some efforts made by the communities (especially by
providing housing), the places were not attractive enough
for the managers' families.
The new plants that were established in that period,
took as a "given" the quality of the existing labor force.
The types of plants that were attracted to these places
needed therefore low skilled labor force which was in
abundance in the towns. From the beginning the plants
planned to hire the skilled and professional employees from
other communities in the region, sometimes without even
checking if the necessary labor force can be found locally.
The regional chemical plants, which were not
committed in any way to hire workers from a specific
locality, usually hired the "cream" of the labor force from
the whole region. The employees commuted every day using
the transportation system provided by the plants.
In addition to the free transportation, the
employees were paid for half of the time spent commuting.
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In sum, it can be said that at that stage the
community (its labor force) was suitable for the plants and
has contributed--to various degrees--to the successful
performance of the plants. Those plants which had to close
down did so because of reasons other than the quality and
quantity of the labor force. The main reasons were: wrong
selection of product, management that "maximized" subsidies,
and the growing competition in the export markets
(espeiclaly in the area of textile) to which they were
exposed due to changes in the governmental policies.
To what extent were the existing plants suitable to
the community and what was their contribution?
The very low unemployment rate at that period, and
especially between the years 1972-1974, may indicate a high
degree of suitability, but it apparently masked a beginning
of a process in which suitability began to deteriorate. A
slight increase in the negative migration balance is an
indicator for the initial stages of the situation of
"unsuitability."
It was argued already that work in an industrial
plant (compared to relief work) introduced to the labor
force the concepts of work ethics, discipline and skills,
but when the years passed, and the technology has not been
modified, and actually became obsolete, it did not
contribute anymore to the technological advancement of its
workers, in addition it caused inefficient production and
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losses. The work began to be monotonous and boring. Rough
competition with development countries, which have an
abundance of cheap labor force, forced the
industry--especially the textile branch--to pay low salary
in order to be able to compete. The plants became less
attractive. Skilled and successful workers found out that
they cannot advance in the plant and preferred to move to
another plant or to leave the community altogether since
there were not many employment alternatives. The less
capable have stayed in the plant.
The regional chemical plants continued to be
suitable since they kept offering challenges to their
employees, advancement in the job ladder and good salaries.
An analysis of the "labor-force mix" by segments
shows that the existing industrial structure was partially
suitable. The males, heads of families could find jobs in
the regional plants, and some--those who did not want or
could not work in harsh physical conditions--could find some
jobs in the plants, located close to the towns. But the
number of available jobs were limited, and paid low
salaries. Females found jobs mainly in the textile plants.
At that stage, there was not yet an employment problem for
young unmarried women, they did not tend to seek work before
getting married. The main difficulty was faced by
ex-soldiers, who came back to town after their service in
the army with some technological skills acquired either in
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vocational education school before going into military
service, or during their service. Without much choice they
took jobs in the existing textile and glass plants, only few
found suitable jobs in the regional plants, since the number
of vacant jobs was limited.
The salaries and wages paid by the local plants were
not high, and in the textile plants and various sewing
workshops they were quite low, but compared to the
relief-work payments, they were high. The salaries paid by
the chemical plants were one of the highest in the country.
(The effects of the Q.W.L. in the plants, and
especially in the chemical plants on the social and
educational level of the employees was discussed under
"Suitability.")
Community Behavior. The model suggests that the
community behavior is the result of four factors: The
community socioeconomic characteristics, the labor-force
mix, the "island phenomenon" and expectations which also
affect all the other three. The analysis of the period
1967-1974 shows that migration and job behavior was actually
the result of these factors, coupled with indirect effects
of government policies and the degree of "suitability."
The data shows that within the period 1967-1974
inspite of the improvement in the socioeconomic
characteristics of the community and the low rate of
unemployment, there was the beginning of a negative
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migration. In 1973, the rate of negative migration was
-22.4 per 1000 in Yerucham and -37.0 per 1000 in Dimona.
It is suggested that this was a reaction to several
processes that have been taking place: a) The changes in
national priorities and the lesser importance attributed to
population dispersal. Population dispersal froze in that
period. b) The improvement in the socioeconomic
characteristics of the communities coupled with stronger
"island phenomenon" feelings. c) The deterioration of the
"suitability" between the industry and the communities.
There were two types of reaction to the situation in
order to eliminate the "island phenomenon" and to decrease
the mental distance. One was to immigrate to the central
parts of the country. Although not many have changed the
type of job done in the new place, the changing of the
residence, and the living in the metropolitan area itself
reduced to some extent the "isolation" feelings. Data on
the direction of emigration from Dimona and Yerucham is not
available, but the concentration of many of the
ex-development towns' residents in the slums and the
low-level housing projects in the big cities may indicate
that this has been the process. (The issue of to what
extent the people actually improved their situation will be
discussed in chapter VIII.)
A second type of reaction was of those who have
succeeded in their jobs, became economically stronger and
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preferred to move to better communities. They usually
followed two patterns of behavior:
a. If the employees wanted to retain their jobs in the
plant--this was especially true for the workers of the
chemical plants--they moved to better communities like
Beer-Sheva and Arad. The developed transportation system
provided by the regional plants encouraged this move.
Moreover, in some cases i.t was more convenient to live in
these communities since there was a direct transportation
from these communities to the regional plants. In the case
of Yerucham for example, there was not a direct
transportation arrangement. The result was that none of the
town's residents worked in-the "Dead Sea Works." Historical
data on the spatial distribution of the "Dead Sea Works"
employees and the year in which they have begun to work in
the plant, indicate that over the years, as the workers
climbed up the job ladder, they moved from Dimona and
Yerucham to Beer-Sheva and Arad.
b. Employees that did not want to retain their jobs, moved
from the community and the region altogether, in most cases
to the central parts of the country, where they could find
jobs more suitable to their capabilities.
7.4. 1974-1980: The Effects of the "Yom-Kippur War" and
the Likud Government
The phenomena and the processes that had started in
the previous period, have been strengthened and reinforced
in the period 1975-1980.
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The worldwide recession coupled with the adverse
effects of the 1973 war made the years 1974-1976 difficult
for the Israeli economy. After growing by some 5 percent in
1974, the GNP increased by some 1 percent in both 1975 and
1976, which is in stark contrast to the pre-1973 growth
rates.
Investment fell and stagnant production was
accompanied by rapid inflation as the consumer price index
rose by 46 percent in 1974 and 24 percent in 1975, both of
which combined to increase labor unrest. A serious economic
problem facing Israel has been a large and persistent
deficit in the current account of the balance of payments.
The deficit swelled appreciably in 1973 and 1974 as a result
of the Yom Kippur War and the increase in fuel prices in the
world's markets.
The only relieving feature in the period was that
unemployment remained low in 1975, totaling 3 percent of the
labor force at the end of the year, but the unemployment
rate began to rise in 1976.
Government Policies. A quickening in the movement
away from governmental-interventionist policies, followed
the 1977 election defeat of the Labor coalition which had
governed Israel since the founding of the state. The new
government coalition favored a more laissez-faire economic
policy. The first important step in this direction was the
October 1977 policy package, which included the adoption of
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a floating exchange rate and the removal of many distortions
in the domestic price system. These were significant
actions, although they represented an acceleration of
previous trends rather than a fundamental change of policy.
The Israeli government policy moved towards integration into
the world economy, and an active promotion of exports has
been carried on since the late 1960s and has continued in
the 1970s.
The serious economic problem facing Israel has been
the large deficit. The basic cause for the large deficits
was the need to import machinery and goods to increase the
pace of industrialization and raise the standard of living,
coupled with a lack of competitive exportable products.
While the large deficits were undesirable in themselves, it
is clear that they permitted the Israeli economy to enjoy
high rates of growth.
The government has tried to reduce the balance of
payments deficit through different policies. Starting in
1975, there was a series of "creeping devaluations" of the
Israeli currency. As was mentioned before, these
devaluations ended in October 1977, when the Israeli pound
was allowed to float. This policy made imports more
expensive, but also made Israeli exports more competitive on
the world markets. Second, the government tried to reduce
the growth rate of the demand for imports by curbing the
expansion of the Israeli economy. Third, the government
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adopted various policies to directly and indirectly
encourage exports.
These policies have been successful in reducing the
deficit: by 1977 the ratio of total exports to imports rose
to 0.66, its highest level since 1966. However, the price
that had to be paid for this improvement was a slowdown in
the growth rate accompanied by a high inflation rate.
The government has used three policy instruments to
influence the nature and level of economic activity: 1) The
Development Budget--which was used to channel government
funds to the private sector, and to finance the creation of
social overhead capital. A large percentage of the
Development Budget has historically been devoted to
residential construction, and has remained important in the
years 1975-1980. In the 1977-1978 budget, of the amount
allocated for development capital, 24 percent has been
earmarked for industry and crafts, 17 percent for
agriculture, 12 percent for oil pipelines and drilling, with
the rest distributed among water projects, transport and
communications, tourism, etc.
2) The Law for the Encouragement of
Investment--which has been implemented with amendments since
the 1950s. The law was designed to stimulate direct foreign
investment to development areas. The law encouraged
investment by providing direct grants, subsidized loans and
reducing taxes and duties, according to the location of the
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plant and the percentage of the production which was
exported. These incentives were available at the investment
stage and were not linked to future performance.
In the period 1974-1980, due to the high rate of
inflation and budgetary constraints, the terms on which the
loans were given under the law were changed. An amendment
to the "Law for the Encouragement of Capital Investment,"
passed in August 1978, brought the rate of interest on
development loans into comensurability with the rate of
inflation. However, an element of implicit but smaller
subsidy remained. The lengthening of the repayment period
from five to ten or twelve years counteracts to some degree
the effect of the increase in interest rates. Another
change was that plants that intended to export a high
percentage of their production were guaranteed similar loan
terms as plants in the development areas.
The tax concession included: tax relief, lower tax
rates, accelerated rate of depreciation, tax credits and
deferral of payments. The Treasury estimated that out of
the total incentives given to industrial plants in
development zones, more than half came through tax
concessions. But it has been pointed out that the law did
not take into account the fact that the generous support for
investment in capital goods under the existing law had
resulted in much superfluous investment and underutilization
of the equipment bought and structures erected in the
development areas.
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3) Tariffs and quotas have been used to protect
domestic agriculture and industry from foreign competition.
At the same time, till the introduction of the New Economic
Policy in 1977, exports were encouraged by a variety of
subsidies. Under the New Economic Policy, the Israel
currency was devalued by 40 percent, and allowed to float.
This action put all the export industries on an equal
footing, in effect it benefited the technology intensive
industries in which the country probably had a competitive
advantage.
The overall impact of the New Economic Policy on the
industrializatiion of the development areas was quite
negative. As will be shown later, the new policies
implemented coupled with the industrial climate in the
country, i.e., the increasing tendency to export, diminished
the effectiveness of the-massive support system which
previously has favored the development areas.
The Industry. The overall economic policy and the
industralization policies in particular , had the expected
effects on the industry. It was found (Pomfret and Toren,
1980) that factories which manufacture for export are price
responsive and have therefore been favorably influenced by
government policies which increased the financial incentive
to export. ~The share of the industrial exports in Israeli's
total exports (goods and services) grew from 42.2 percent in
1970 to 49.3 percent in 1977 (Ministry of Industry and
Trade, 1981, p. 9).
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The impact of the policies and the overall new
economic circumstances on the "economic performance of the
plants in the community" and on the industrial structure had
various effects on the plants in the towns and region,
depending upon their type. The overall effect was of
weakening the industrial base, there was a high rate of
turnover among small plants and workshops, and the rate of
unemployment has increased.
The plants in the region were categorized into three
groups in order to better understand the impact of the
policies in the period 1974-1960:'
1. The "first generation" plants.
2. The regional chemical plants.
3. The "new generation" plants.
1. The "First Generation" Plants. The group of the
"first generation" plants includes: the textile plants;
"Kittan Dimona" and "Dimona Textile" ("Sivi Dimona"); and
the glass plants, "Tempo" and "Foenicia."
The textile, leather and clothing branch has
contributed much to the goals of industrial development in
its early period, but its weight has been progressively
decreasing during the whole period with regard to output,
'The "economic performance" of each category of plants
will be discussed considering the impact of governmental
policies, the entrepreneurs (and/or the managers) policies
and behavior, and the effect of the economic context of the
country. The impact of the community and its labor force
will be mentioned, but will be discussed in detail under the
paragraph "Community."
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employment and capital. In the year 1970, its part in
exports has grown to a record of nearly 17 percent of the
total exports, but from that year onwards it began steadily
decreasing, partly because of the larger growth of .the
metals and chemical branches and partly because of declining
demand in the world markets following developments there.
This was one of the br'anch groups where internal changes in
the competition of products and technologies were of
particular importance. The development of this group of
branches was characterized by a transition to production of
goods of ever higher quality and design such as clothing of
leather or fur, fashion goods, knitted and synthetic goods
produced by modern techniques. These characteristics were
applicable to most of the plants in this branch, especially
in the central parts of the country and plants like "Polgat"
in Kiryat Gat. But many of the plants in- the development
areas, including the two big textile plants in Dimona, have
basically continued to operate with the same obsolete
technologies and inefficient production processes, they have
been equipped with since the late 1950s. Both plants, which
have been established mainly in order to provide jobs, have
operated as plants which "maximize subsidies." (This type
of plant tries to exploit all subsidies available without
trying to be efficient and productive by upgrading the
technologies and the labor force as expected from a plant
that maximizes profit. When subsidies are not available
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anymore, and the plant is on the verge of closing down, it
usually gets more support from the government to prevent
massive unemployment, since this plant usually employs a
great share of the town's labor force.)
In 1975, both plants have begun facing problems.
The main reasons were: a) changes in the government
policies. Ending the period of massive support to plants in
the development areas. b) In the case of "Kitan Dimona,"
"Cllal," the "parent" company has decided to stop supporting
inefficient an unprofitable plants. In the case of "Dimona
Textile," it has changed hands since its establishment each
new owner has tried to get more subsidies, and the plant
itself operated inefficiently and accumulated losses. In
1975 the plant was transferred to official receivership and
in 1979, a Swiss company, headed by one of the richest
Sepharadic Jews--Gabon bought the plant.
Both plants have suffered from low work ethics,
hidden unemployment, and low quality of the final product.
In "Kitan Dimona," the first step taken was to fire workers
(some 236 out of 1638 employees in 1977) inspite of worker's
unrest, demonstrations and strikes. The efficiency of the
labor force increased, the productivity increased, and the
plant was able to begin exporting. In "Dimona Textile,"
some 500 workers were fired (between the years 1972 and
1975), and the new owners planned to change technologies,
and to increase the value added of the production by
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Moreover,
products.
to produce final products besides spinning and
Nevertheless, both have problems of marketing in
markets as well as in the export markets. Textile
competitive, and it is very difficult for Israeli
to compete with countries like Taiwan and China
very low salaries to the textile employees.
the local market is dumped with cheap imported
The textile plants became the symbol of the "first
generation" plants, however, the development of the glass
factories in Yerucham followed a path similar to that of the
textile factories.
"Foenicia" and "Tempo," both were established to
supply jobs for the local residents of the towns. Both have
enjoyed massive government support over the years, and both
have begun encountering problems around 1975, due to the
decrease in demand for bottles. In the following years the
plants have encountered more difficulties: Export markets
were closed down, the machines and the equipment became
obsolete (especially in "Tempo"), and the owners were
unwilling to renew them due to the unprofitability of the
plant. (For more details, see chapter V.) In 1979, the
private owner of "Tempo," who had another big plant near
Tel-Aviv had decided to close down its plant and "Koor"--a
company which belongs to the Labor Union and is identified
with the M~arach (the Labor party--the opposition party) had
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decided to buy the plant and to merge it with its plant
"Foenicia." The process, similar to the case of the textile
plants, was of gradually firing employees and changing
somewhat the production lines in order to operate more
efficiently. Nevertheless, the plant has continued to lose,
and only the support provided by "Koor" prevented massive
discharge of workers and closing down of the plant.
The "oldest" plant is "Lon" which is a small
cosmetic laboratory, which was established in Yerucham in
1963. From seventy workers in 1974 it decreased the number
of workers to thirty-five in 1980. As most other plants it
has encountered problems in marketing, in the local as well
as in the export markets.
There is one exceptional case among the "first
generation" plants, which has succeeded in its economic
performance. The plant was the last to be established among
these plants. This is "Negev Ceramics" (1972). The plant
was located by a private entrepreneur in Yerucham because of
the availability of the raw materials the plant needed for
manufacturing tiles. The plant was not planned at the
beginning to export, but after it began manufacturing, it
was found that there is an export market for the plant's
products. Since then it began exporting over 50 percent of
its production. Due to the successful operation of the
plant, the plant has recently renovated one of its furnaces,
and bought another new one for an additional production
line.
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There are several factors in common to all the
"first generation" plants which may help in revealing the
main causes for the weak economic performance of the plants,
they are: a) All plants were located in the towns because
of either personal connections between the owners and the
late Minister of the Treasury--P. Sapir, who actually
pressed them to locate their plants in the development
towns, or because the firms were "maximizing subsidies," or
both. Since the owners have invested a very low share of
the total investment from their own capital, provided the
massive subsidies available from the government, the owners
were not motivated by econnomic considerations, and did not
have enough incentives to operate the plant efficiently. b)
the relative advantage of the location (for those plants
which were based on the raw material in the region) was
found to be negligible. The distance from the markets and
the sea and air ports, were found to play a more important
role than the proximity to the physical location of the raw
material. Moreover, distance--in its physical and mental
senses from the central parts of the country--had a strong
negative effect on the quality and quantity of the labor
force. (This issue will be elaborated later, under "The
Community.") Distance was also the main cause for the
persistent shortage of skilled and professional labor force,
which was another factor in weakening the economic viability
of the plants. Moreover, most of the managers have commuted
from outside communities, as far as Beer-Sheva and Tel-Aviv.
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The presence of the manager near the plant found to be
important for the proper operation of the plant, and this
lacking in most cases in development towns. c) Due to the
circumstances in which the plants were established, and to
the massive governmental (or another public body) support,
the plants did not upgrade their technologies, and have
operated for many years with obsolete technologies and
inefficient production process (except for "Negev
Ceramics"). This was one of the main causes for losses, and
had counterproductive effects on the labor force. (See the
discussion on "The Labor-Force.") d) All of the plants have
encountered difficulties when governmental industrialization
policies and the overall economic circumstances have
changed. e) There are some similarities in the way the
plants have tried to overcome the difficulties. The first
step was to increase productivity by firing workers and
changing somehwat the technology. This was done in order to
increase the competitiveness of the plant so it can export.
Two plants ("Textile Dimona" and "Foenicia") have actually
continued to survive being supported as in the previous
period--due to political or semi-political considerations.
To sum up, it can be said that the economic
performance of the "first generation" plants was affected at
this period (1974-1980) mainly by the sharp changes in the
governmental policies and the economic situation. They have
triggered negative processes which have been developed in
the plants for a decade or more.
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2. The Chemical-Regional Plants. These plants have
enjoyed the status of "national project" since their
establishment and as such, have benefited from governmental
support beyond strict economic considerations. The three
plants, "Dead Sea Works" (1952), "Negev Ceramics" (1951),
and "Periklas" (1972) have been affected more by the demand
for their products, and the prices in the world markets,
rather than the economic and industrial situation in the
country, as was the case with other industries.
All three are managed by "Israel Chemicals Ltd."
(I.C.L.), which is the parent and holding company of a group
of chemical enterprises engaged in the development of
Israel's main natural resources. I.C.L. is government
owned.
Each plant is an independent legal entity, and each
has joined the I.C.L. with its own history and type of
product. The "Dead Sea Works" had heavy losses for many
years, and only for the last few years has begun to be
profitable. It has started paying royalties to the
government and dividends to its stockholders. "Negev
Phosphates" is less profitable. The plant is highly
sensitive to the fluctuations in the world market of
phosphates dominated by Morocco and the U.S.A. The
activities in the market depend upon the grain market, the
yearly weather, on the one hand and on the fluctuations in
prices, differences among rates of local inflation and the
377
changing rate of the dollar on the other hand. At the time
of the study, two of the N.P.L. projects are losing money
due to lack of relative advantage in the world markets.
"Periklas" produces a high quality product and has created
its own market. It has been profitable almost from the
beginning.
"Negev Phosphates" and "Dead Sea Wroks" (until a few
years ago) can be categorized as "maximizing subsidies"
which probably had an effect on the ways they have been
operated. But the relative advantage of their products in
the world markets, and being "national projects" have acted
against processes which characterize the "first generation"
plants, which means, that they have enjoyed better
management over the years, modern and upgraded technologies,
and they have hired the "cream" of the labor force in the
region. (This issue will be discussed later.)
Under the category of "regional plants" the
defence-related plant located in the region can be
considered but its operation, objectives and goals are
independent of any economic considerations and
circumstances, and it is impossible to evaluate its
"economic performance."
3. The "New Generation" Plants. Except for
"Friction"--a modern and advanced plant that was established
in 1975 and closed down after a few years--no major plant
(in terms of quantity) has been established in Dimona or
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Yerucham. Over the period 1974-1980, some forty new plants
and workshops have been establi-shed and a similar number
were closed down. The high turnover of small plants and
workshops has continued. Small textile and sewing plants
have encountered problems in marketing in the local markets,
due to competition with cheap imports.
Among the newly established plants, those which have
survived longer, or have good chances to survive, are either
service suppliers (like "Sodom Metal" or "Brand Metal" which
are locksmith's workshops), or modern, technologically
advanced plants which can operate efficiently. In any case,
they had to be able to compete with similar plants in the
central parts of the country, since they basically did not
enjoy anymore much favorable treatment.
"Brand Metal" and "Long John" (sewing workshop) are
newly established plants and services which try to be
competitive by keeping high work ethics, keeping schedules,
producing high quality products. These plants and other,
older ones have to overcome several difficulties, among the
severe ones: finding the necessary, qualified labor force,
overcoming the disadvantages of the physical and mental
distances (image), etc. Under the economic circumstances in
the period 1974-1980, and the governmental policies, the
probability of these kinds of services and plants to perform
successfully was low.
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In sum: the "economic performance performance of
the plant in the community" was heavily affected at that
period by changes in the government industrial and economic
policies. The ability of the plants to survive depended
upon the circumstances in which they were established and
the ways they have been operated since their initial stages.
The quality of the labor force was affected and affected as
well the "economic performance of the plants" as will be
discussed next.
The Community. The various socioeconomic indicators
show that in the period 1974-1980, the well-being of the
communities in Dimona and Yerucham has improved (chapter
III). The median years of schooling in Yerucham , for
example, increased fiom 4.2 years in 1967 to 7.5 in 1977.
(The increase in the whole country was from 8.3 to 10.0.)
In both towns, the share of big families has continued to be
large, but the "dependency ratio" decreased somewhat,
relative to an increase n the whole country. In 1978, the
"dependency ratio" was 1.13 in Dimona (1.14 in 1967) and
1.23 (1.31 in 1967) in Yerucham. The density of housing has
improved as well, in 1972 55.4 percent of the families lived
in density of less than 1.5 persons per room. In 1980, it
increased to 58.1 percent while in the whole country it has
decreased from 79 percent to 77 percednt in 1977. Another
indicator of welfare is the rate of motorization which has
increased as well. In Dimona, in 1973 there were 28.8 motor
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vehicles per 1000 population and in 1978 it was 43.5
(increase of 51 percent). In Yerucham it increased from
18.3 in 1973 to 24.8 in 1978 (an increase of 35 percent)
while in the whole country the increase was from 88.0 to
115.5 between the years 1973 and 1978 (an increase of 31
percent).
These are only a few indicators which show that the
socioeconomic situation in the development towns of Yerucham
and Dimona has improved. Inspite of the fact that these
indicators show also that the gap between the towns and the
whole country has been narrowed down--since some'indicators
show greater improvement in the towns relative to the
improvement in the whole country. The feelings of
isolation, seclusion and being different--the feelings of
the "Island Phenomenon" became stronger (see chapter 4.3).
As the model suggests, the "Island Phenomenon"
consists of two parts: a) socioeconomic differences and b)
distance (physical and mental). From the socioeconomic
point of view, in the period 1975-1980, there was still a
concentration of immigrants who came from Asian and African
countries in both towns. In Dimona, in 1977, 43.2 of the
residents came from Asian and African countries, compared to
21.1 percent in the whole country. In Yerucham, the share
of those who came from Asian and African countries was 47
percent in 1977.7 These ethnic differences implied also
7These percentages do not include those who were born in
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socioeconomic differences between the towns and the rest of
the country, and especially the metropolitan areas (see
chapter 5.1). There is no doubt that in some slums and a
few development towns, closer to the big cities, the
objective socioeconomic indicators of the communities showed
an inferior welfare condition of these communities, but the
distance in its physical and mental senses played a major
role in creating feelings of isolation and seclusion.
Moreover, at that period, the issue of the ethnic gap
between the Ashkanaizim (those who have immigrated from
Europe and America) and the Sepharadim (those who have
immigrated from Africa and Asia), became one of the most
controversial issues in the Israeli society when
socioeconomic gaps, equality of opportunities and the
historical circumstances of their development were
discussed. These added to the subjective feelings of being
different, underprivileged and neglected.
As was stated before, the distance in it physical
and mental senses played a major role in creating the
"island phenomenon." The accessibility of both towns to
Beer-Sheva and to the central parts of the country has been
improved as the increase in the rates of motorization shows,
but this was not enough. People continue to be dependent on
Israel to parents from Asian and African countries. The
share of those who have immigrated from Asian and African
countries and their children was 80 percent to 90 percent of
the population while in the whole country the share was 46
percent.
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public transportation which was not very frequent,8 and
stopped operating quite early (from Beer-Sheva to the towns
around 9:30 p.m. and from the towns to Beer-Sheva around
10:30 p.m.) These actually cut those who did not have a
private car from any social and cultural events in
Beer-Sheva. Moreover, the rate of private telephones was
low and there were only few public telephones, most of the
time out of order.
The physical and inaccessible distances coupled with
the socioeconomic differences laid down the ground for
feelings of mental distance, isolation and seclusion, i.e.,
the "island phenomenon." Residents in Yerucham and to a
lesser extent in Dimona felt remote from the metropolitan
areas and from centers of decision making. The central
parts of the country symbolized for them a place with better
perspectives for the future and more chances to advance.
Those who were more exposed to the life in the metropolitan
areas--mainly ex-soldiers and the young couples--have
developed greater expectations regarding their life,
occupation, soecioeconomic status, etc. These, in turn were
in sharp contrast to the reality in the development towns,
and sometimes to their own capabilities. Nevertheless,
expectations played a major role in the community behavior,
aThe minimum time of waiting was fifteen minutes for the
buses traveling between Beer-Sheva and Dimona, and the
maximum time of waiting was twenty minutes. In the case of
Yerucham, it was thirty minutes and sixty respectively.
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as will be shown later.
The labor force, its qualities and quantity--as an
integral part of the community--was affected by the same
factors as the community, in addition to industrial and
employment factors. The various segments of the labor
force, were affected differently. The labor force mix can
be divided into four sectors: a) The males, heads of
families, who were mainly employed in the regional chemical
plants and in the local plants. The unemployment rate among
them was quite low. Menagers and those who are in charge of
personnel--especially in the local plants--had complaints
regarding the quality of this segment of the labor force.
The common complaint of the managers was that the quality of
the work of an employee in their plants were inferior to
similar work done by employees in the central parts of the
country. The work ethics of the employees were low, and as
evidence, they brought the situation in which they had to
hire another 30 percent of the needed workers to compensate
for the low quality.
The low quality of the labor force stems mainly from
the general atmosphere of dependency and helplessness and
from the quality of working life in the heavily subsidized
plants. Both sources encouraged low work ethics, low
motivation for progress on the job and excellence. This in
turn had an effect on the economic performance of the plant.
The price of labor became higher, and some plants like
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"Foenicia" and the textile plants found that they could not
be competitive in the markets. b) The segment of the
younger generation, ex-soldiers and youngsters (ages 22-29).
This segment, at the time of the study, was the most
problematic segment. The rate of unemployment among this
segment was very high, the number of job vacancies available
for this group was very limited, and most of them were
either in the textile plants or in small workshops. The
work in the textile plants was rejected by many of the
unemployed due to the low salaries, harsh work conditions
and the increasing rate of Arab labor force in the plants.
But they also rejected jobs available in the small plants
and workshops, belonging to the new generation even though
these plants were characterized by high work ethics and
improved quality of working life. The main complaints
against the work in these plants were that they demanded
much in terms of keeping schedules, accuracy and high
quality of the final product. The opportunities to be
trained on the job, to progress and to acquire new skills
were overlooked by the young unemployed. Another factor
which contributed to the unwillingness to go to work were
the unemployment benefits which were paid to the discharged
soldiers. They were quite high and almost comparable to the
wages paid in the textile plants. Moreover, among the
youngsters in this segment, very high
expectations--concerning their future life--prevailed.
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These expectations have further contributed to their
rejection of available jobs. They stem from the atmosphere
in the towns which has been developed over the years, the
way these young people were educated and from the exposure
to the life in the central parts of the country. It should
be noted, that in the previous period (1967-1974), the
education system in Yerucham and especially in Dimona has
been expanded and developed, and the whole system has been
geared mainly towards "white collar" skills and professions.
Expectations have been developed consequently. At that
time, only a small fraction have graduated, and they have
been successfully absorbed by the then existing industrial
and service systems. In the next period 1974-1980, masses
of graduates--from the enlarged education system--after
serving in the army, were looking for jobs but their search
for suitable jobs could not be satisfied by the laggard
industrial system.
An important phenomenon which has surfaced was the
low quality of the human capital of the graduates in the
development towns, i.e., a graduate of a high school in
Dimona or Yerucham had less skills compared to a similar
graduate of a high school in the central parts of the
country. The same was true for other skills and profesions
such as a typist or machinist. The results of the high
expectations and low capabilities were disappointment and
frustration. c) The women--this segment has begun to be
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active in the labor force, when available jobs were offered,
especially when the two big textile plants were established
in Dimona, and the glass factory was established in
Yerucham. Nevertheless, this kind of work satisfied this
segment until the third period, but since then two problems
have emerged. First, the salaries and wages payed by these
plants were very low and second, the work in these places
could not solve the employment problem of the young females,
ex-soldiers. They faced the same problems as the young
males, graduates of high schools. Less attention was given
to this segment as it was considered to be secondary to the
main labor force.
d. Arab labor force. Arab labor force from the
West Bank and the Gaza Strip was introduced to the Israeli
labor market since 1967. At the beginning, Arabs were
employed mainly in agriculture, and later on have been
replacing Jewish workers in difficult and low-paid jobs
refused by the Jewish workers. In Dimona, there were some
350 workers who commuted everyday from the West Bank by taxi
cabs since they were spread over many small towns and
villages. The price of transportation was high. The Arab
workers occupied the jobs in the lower level of the job
ladder in the textile plants. Only a few, with some skills
have been able to climb up the ladder and to be employed in
better jobs. The availability of such cheap labor force has
further discouraged the owners of the plants from upgrading
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the machinery in their plants. Moreover, the involvement of
Arab labor force in specific jobs has further increased the
bad image these jobs had, and the refusal of Jewish workers
to take the jobs.
In sum, the main characteristics of the labor-force
mix in the priod 1974-1980 were: a) Increasing rate of
unemployment espeially among the young genration, due to the
laggard industrial base, its bad image and its impact on the
quality of the labor force over the years. All of these had
a negative impact on the economic performance of the plants.
b) There was a decrease in the number of local residents
working in their towns, and increase in the numbrs of
employes who commuted everyday to the towns. On one hand it
can mean a progress in the job ladder for the local people,
but it also means that highly skilled professional and
managerial workers were in shortage in the towns, besides
shortage in cheap labor force. Both kinds of labor force
were brought from outside.
c) The regional chemical plants took the "cream" of the
labor force, and the local plants had to hire workers from
the less capable segments.
Suitability. The suitability of the community to
the industry and vice versa was discussed already throughout
this chapter. The main points to be emphasized are: in the
period 1974-1980, the community in both towns was less
suitable to the plats (the local ones) and had a negative
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impact on the economic performance of the plants. The
quality of the labor force was inferior, and there was a
shortage of managerial, professional and skilled workers.
Many of the needed labor force had to commute everyday from
neighboring communities. The various amendments to the laws
and regulations which previously have encouraged investments
in development areas, coupled with the changes in the
ecoomic situation and policies in Israel, have lowered the
suitability of the communities in the remote development
towns to industrial plants.
The suitability of the communities to the regional
chemical plants has not changed. The main advantage these
plants had was the regional labor market and in some cases
the whole country was actually their labor market, which
enabled them to hire the best qualified workers.
The suitability of the industry to the community was
the most severe problem at that stage. As was discussed
before, the plants in the towns and region should be divided
into four subgroups, since each group differed in its
suitability: a) The "first generation" plants were the
least suitable ones. They paid lower salaries, the quality
of working life in the plant was inferior, it did not
conribute to the development and progress of their
employees, on the contrary, they had counterproductive
effects on the quality of the existing and future labor
force. b) The "new generation" plants were found to be
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quite suitable to the existing and future labor force. They
paid good salaries and the Q.W.L. in the plants contributed
to the human capital of the employees. The main
disadvantage they had was their small size and hence their
inability to replace the big "old generation" plants, in
terms of number of employees. c) The regional chemical
plants were found to suit very well the communities. There
were differences among the three plants analyzed in this
study, in terms of their contribution to the communities.
For example, "D.S.W." paid the highest salaries among the
three, and "N.P.L." had a lower "Q.W.L." compared to the
others, but generally they were suitable plants. d) The
defence-related plant, although physically located near the
two towns, did not contribute as expected to the towns.
This is a type of a "green field industry" (see chapter
6.1). It was planned that the plant will employ a great
share of the town's labor force, but due to the slow
development of the communities, they have not been
successful in attracting the needed labor force and most of
the employees commuted from communities with a higher
standard of living. The jobs in the lower stage of the job
ladder were done only by workers from the two development
towns.
Community Behavior. As the model points out, the
community behavior is the product of several factors. The
most important ones are: The social performance of the
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community (the "island phenomenon"), the community's
socioeconomic characteristics, and the economic performance
of the plants (indirectly, through "suitability"). It sems
that all factors had contributed to both types of "community
behavior." a) Job behavior--the period 1974-1980, and
especially the last few years were characterized by high
turnover of employees in the local, failing plants. Workers
who were not satisfied with the work in the plants, quit
their jobs, and began to look for different, better jobs.
Since there were not many alternative jobs in the local
plants, and the regional ones hardly hired new employees,
many of the town's residents went to seek jobs in the
neighboring communities. The unemployed ex-soldiers
preferred to take unemployment benefits, they were entitled
to, rather than to take the undesired jobs. But the most
common reaction to the employment situation was emigration.
b) Migration--Between the years 1973-1978, Dimona has still
enjoyed an increase in its population. There was an
increase of 3.8 percent (1000 residents) from 1973 to 1978.
But the balance of internal migration was negative. For the
years 1973-1978, the average rate of emigration per year was
-31.9 per 1000 residents. The situation was worse in
Yerucham. There was a decrease of 3.2 percent of its
population between the years 1973 and 1978. The balance of
internal migration was negative, and the average per year
was -22.4. In 1977 it was -39.4 per 1000 residents. The
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increasing rate of emigration was clear evidence of the
deterioration of the well-being of the community and the
employment situation.
CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENTATIONS
This study has concentrated mainly on the interface
between society and planning. More specifically, it
examined the impact of one aspect of population dispersal
policy (the planning and implementation of industrialization
policies) on the community in the development town.
Many of the studies, dealing with population
dispersal, overlook the policy factors and their effects,
and concentrate on the "natural" processes of migration
(quantities of emigrants and immigrants--see chapter II).
This study highlights the impact of governmental policies on
the communities undergoing industrialization (as part of the
population dispersal policy) and their consequences.
The main justification for highlighting governmental
activities is the underlying assumption that the whole
process of "population dispersal" is an "artificial"
process, which acts against the nature of human
beings--i.e., people tend to concentrate together because
they feel better when they are in the center in its various
meanings (physical, social, political, economic, etc.)--and
only a strong governmental or public body, with vast
resources and influence is able to carry on such an
endeavor.
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In order to carry it successfully, the government
has to assure that the welfare of each individual in the
community will exceed his welfare in the metropolitan area
(plus transfer costs).. Since it is the government target to
settle people in remote areas in order to achieve national
goals, and since it acts against the natural processes,
these make each sphere of life crucial for the residents in
the remote areas. Each sphere of life, i.e., welfare,
employment, culture, politics, can serve as a factor which
mentally "shorten" the distance to the center, and helps the
individual to feel that being physically removed from the
center, does not mean that he is not part of the whole
community in the country in other ways. (This issue is
discussed later in this chapter.)
Based on the assumption that the government has to
assure the welfare of each individual in order to implement
the population dispersal objective successfully, the study
has suggested examining the implementation of the
industrialization and employment policies and to evaluate
their contribution to eliminate the feelings of isolation
and seclusion, or in the language of the study, the "island
phenomenon." It was assumed that in remote areas the
interdepencies between the community and the industry, or
the welfare of the individual and his employment, are
stronger and clearer compared to the same relationships in
the metropolitan areas. Moreover, they are an important
factor in the success of the population dispersal policy.
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Two crucial issues which are part of the general
subject of the evaluation of the industrialization policy
have been raised: 1) Based on the existence of the "island
phenomenon," and the weak industrial base in the development
towns at the time of the study--what were the main
historical causes of evolution of the situation? 2) What
were the effects of the weak industrial base on the
communities?
These two issues are part of the broader issue of
"suitability" between the community in the non-metropolitan
areas and its industrial bases. By using the various
criteria of suitability to evaluate the extent to which the
industrial bases of the towns were suitable to the
communities' characteristics and objectives and vice versa,
the two issues of the "island phenomenon" and its effects
have emerged.
The rest of this chapter will concentrate on two
major subjects:
1. The historical explanation of the development of the
"island phenomenon" and its effects--using the
criteria of "suitability."
2. Policy implications to prevent and remedy the
situation, and suggested solutions.
The last paragraph will be devoted to
conclusions and suggestions for further research of
issues which were not looked at, so far, in the
literature.
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8.1. Historical Explanation of the Development of the
Situation
For the last few years, Yerucham and to a lesser
extent Dimona as well as several other development towns in
Israel, have begun facing increasingly difficult
circumstances. The main evidence for the state of crisis
was the increasing rate of emigration especially among the
young adults and the discharged soldiers. Politicians,
bureaucrats and public figures on the local and national
level, as well as residents of the communities, pointed to
the employment area as the main source for dissatisfaction
and hence emigration. In this area a paradoxical phenomenon
has surfaced: an increasing rate of unemployment on one
hand, and a severe shortage of needed workers in the
industrial plants on the other hand, especially in plants
belonging to the industrial plants of the "first generation"
(established during the late 1950s and the early 1960s).
These plants-filled the job vacancies with employees from
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The plants also faced
operational and financial problems stemming from competition
in the local and especially the export markets.'
The main finding, analyzed and discussed by this
study was the cause for weakness of the economic base of the
development towns, and the creation of the "island
phenomenon."
'For a more detailed description of the situation, see
chapters IV and V.
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The crucial cause found to be the deterioration of
the "suitability" between the existing local plants and the
town's labor-force mix. "Suitability" defines the extent to
which the plants in the community are suitable to the
community.
The notion of "suitability" consists of two main
characteristics: a) The suitability of the community to the
industry, in the sense that there are advantages for the
plant to locate in the community, so that it can exist and
operate efficiently. b) The suitability of the industrial
plant to the community, i.e., a plant which employs the
various segments of the community's labor force and fulfills
the community's objectives in terms of economic and social
progress. As can be seen, this definition of "suitability"
is based on criteria which are different from the more
"common"criteria based on economic "success" and "failure."
The criteria suggested for "suitability" of plants in remote
areas should be defined, as going considerably beyond the
routine micro-economic profit on invested capital
calculations.
The definition of "suitability" was based on there
principles: 1) "suitable for whom?" The well-being of the
community and its individuals was given top priority rather
than the government or the industry. Different plants would
be located if the government needs were given top priority
(i.e., export plants or more capital intensive plants) and
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another group of plants would be established if the location
were based on industrial considerations solely. 2)
"Suitable how?"--there are various objectives which can be
reached through industrialization. This study emphasized
the community's well-being rather than increasing export for
example. 3) "Suitable when?"--this question introducts one
of the important features of "suitability"--the notion of
time. There is a dynamic factor embodied in the definition.
"Suitability" is changing over time due to changes in the
industry, changes in the community and especially its labor
force, and changes in government objectives and policies.
Based on these criteria, an analysis of the
trajectories of the plants in the communities and the region
was conducted to account for the situation.
It was found that at the time of the study, there
was still some degree of "suitability." By using the
criteria of suitability constructed, the analysis shows that
the regional chemical plants were suitable for some parts of
the labor force (males, heads of families), but the number
of vacant, available jobs was extremely limited, and
therefore these plants could not serve the new segment of
the labor force, the young, ex-soldiers. Only 26 percent of
the residents of Yerucham and 27 percent of the residents of
Dimona were employed in the chemical plants which offered
well-paid jobs, with opportunities for progress. There was
some degree of suitability between the existing local plants
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and some other segments of the labor force--women,
elderly--but these plants could not serve as a sound
economic base for the major parts of the labor force:
males, heads of families and the discharged soldiers.
The low rate of suitability was found to be one of
the major factors in the increasing rate of emigration, and
hence further hurting the well-being of the communities and
reinforcing the "island phenomenon."
The analysis of the trajectories of the plants in
the communities and the region, coupled with the historical
development of the communities and government policies over
the years shows that historically, the situation of
"unsuitability" has evolved as a result of unequal
development of the industrial sector and the communities in
the development towns, while the government, which was
heavily involved in the initial stages of development has
gradually abandoned (intentionally or otherwise) its
involvement--this was not expressed in the espoused policy
but can be found in the policy in use. As a result nobody
has encouraged coordination between the development of the
towns and the different pace and direction of development of
the industry.
To be more specific, the roots of the problems which
surfaced in later years can be traced back to the initial
stages of the establishment of the development towns, and
the beginning of the process of industrialization,
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i.e., in the initial years, the "island phenomenon" was
created, and was reinforced over the years by the
"unsuitability."
The "island phenomenon" was defined as a situation
in which the community in a development town has
characteristics of developing societies in the midst of a
country with characteristics of well-developed societies,
i.e., the developing communities are lagging behind the
country. The phenomenon consists of two factors: the first
is the "distance" in its physical and mental sense, and the
second is the socioeconomic differences between the
community in the development town and other communities in
the country.2
In the first years of statehoods, and at the initial
stages of the town's development, the decision taken and the
policies implemented, have actually created the towns as
"islands." These "islands" consisted of new immigrants,
mainly from African and Asian countries who were settled in
remote areas. They were different in their socioeconomic
characteristics from the veterans in the metropolitan areas,
and although the declared policies were meant to help them
enter the main stream ("Mizug Galiot"), the policies in use,
and the ways they were handled, reinforced their isolation
and the continuous existence of the "island phenomenon."
2The policies on how to eliminate the phenomenon which
has a strong impact on the community, its labor force and
their behavior will be disussed in section 8.2.
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Every sphere of life was controlled and managed by
outsiders--those who belonged to the various centers:
economic, political, social, etc.
It was widely accepted prior to 1973 that
political power in the country was wielded by the
limited group of Western, especially East
European, pioneers who had come to Israel as
youngsters during the Second and Third Aliyot.
Despite rapid expansion of the population from
vastly divergent backgrounds, the hold of these
pioneers on the nation's political institutions
remained uncompromised. Although encouraged from
the st'art to develop local governmental services
in the growing number of Mashovei Olim (immigrant
villages) and development towns, political power
quickly came to be concentrated in the country's
national institutions, the party, the government
ministries, the Knesset. Local government was at
its ebb in the early 1950s with established towns
and Kibbutzim failing to absorb their share of the
immigrants and the new towns proving so
inexperienced that outsiders were sent in to
manage their affairs until they could learn to
fend for themselves. The turning point came late
in the 1950s when talented local leadership began
to emerge, gaining a growing role in local
affairs. (Greenberg, 1979)
This situation has created a strong dependency of
the whole community on the various government departments
and the different public bodies like the Jewish Agency.
Moreover, employees were dependent on their outside
employers who commuted everyday from neighboring communities
and as far away as Tel-Aviv.
In the case of the remote development towns, this
reliance on outside agencies was even greater due to the
problem of accessibility. The rate of private cars was very
low and the residents were highly dependent on infrequent
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public transportation--another outside public body. The
weakness of the communication systems further aggravated the
situation.
The consequences were that everything was organized
for the settlers, and whenever something was not supplied as
demanded by the residents they claimed: "We should get it,
we deserve it." This has eliminated any attempt for
self-reliance, and weakened the settlers' determination to
achieve anything by themselves, and their self-confidence.
In this atmosphere, new industrial plants were
brought--rather than have chosen to locate themselves--to
the region. A wide system of subsidies and grants was
formulated to encourage entrepreneurs to locate their plants
in the towns and region, but they played apparently only a
minor role in pursuing the industrialists to move to the
remote places compared to ideological and especially
personal pressures which were put on them. These initial
circumstances in which the plants were brought to the towns,
did not promise much economic success, but at this stage,
they have promised at least decent salaries and suitable
work conditions for the new residents who otherwise would
have been employed by relief work or have been unemployed
altogether.
From a strict economic point of view, the cost of
the policy was very high: ". . . Location subsidies per
additional employee in the textile industry between 1958 and
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1965 exceeded location subsidies per additional employee in
all other industries" (Toren, 1979). But no study or
analysis was conducted to evaluate the extent to which these
plants (the local ones) rather than plants belonging to
other branches were suitable for the community. It seems
that the characteristics of the industries (textile and
glass) brought were suitable for the unskilled capabilities
of the local people. The rate of growth and the positive
balance of migration (especially in Dimona) between the
years 1957-1963 may give some indication of the successful
beginning of the industrialization process. Nevertheless,
the jobs in these plants and the way they were managed did
not allow for more independence. The jobs were routine and
boring, and there were not any job ladders to allow progress
and advancement on the job. They were managed by outsiders,
since no one from the community had any managerial or high
skilled position. These plants were also perceived as
belonging to the "outside" world.
The first period was followed by a period of
recession in the whole country. Some of the development
towns--and among them Dimona and Yerucham were not affected
as badly as other locations due to the continuously massive
support by the government and the relatively high percentage
of residents employed by relief work.
The second period (1966-1974) was a period of
prosperity and a high rate of economic growth in the whole
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country. These were the result of three main events: The
"Six Day War," the consequences of the recession
period--surplus of unemployed labor force which entered the
job market, and a very high economic growth rate
(approximately 10 percent) without any price increase. The
situation in this short and episodical period has actually
masked, to some extent, the processes and developments that
have been taking place in the development towns. At that
period, the towns grew, the education system expanded, and
the rate of participation in the educational system
increased although the rate of dropouts was still rather
high. A realistic evaluation of the events and achievements
could not be conducted under these circumstances. Although,
at that stage there was a flourishing of studies and books
evaluating the historical developments of the towns and
their performances, no real criteria could be applied at
that time. The young generation was still in school, plants
have just been established and operated with heavy
subsidies, and everybody in the country have benefited from
the period of prosperity and growth.
The real test could be done later on in the third,
more "normal," period (1974-1980), and in this period, the
real results could be evaluated. At that stage, the
problems rooted in the first period have surfaced.
'See chapter II, "Literature Review."
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The period 1974-1980 was characterized by several
changes in governmental policies which had direct and
indirect effects on the towns: a) Population dispersal and
the development towns lost their high national priority.
Other objectives like settling the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip got higher preference. This process has begun to take
place in 1977 when the Labor party was replaced by the Likud
(National) party as the ruling party in the Israeli
government. Although, in the declared policy, the changes
in the priorities cannot be found, in the policy in use,
especially in the allocation of resources these changes had
their effects. b) Since the beginning of the 1970s the
economic policy has begun moving towards a "free market"
economy, and less government intervention. Moreover, the
"Yom Kippur War" has worsened the balance of payments
problems. Both processes have increased the dependency on
export. As a result, exporting industries were encouraged.
In the development areas there were hardly any exporting
plants, the plants there, were not intended and were not
capable to export but mainly to provide employment. One of
the most important relative advantage these plants had, was
being located in the development areas, and hence being
entitled to various grants and subsidies. This advantage
lost its importance in face of the high benefits granted to
exporting industries regardless of their location. Without
the continuous support, the plants, which previously' did not
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operate efficiently--because of this massive support--could
not compete and had to close down. Those who survived were
those which either were continuously supported by public
bodies (like the Histadrut) or those which operated
efficiently (the "new generation of plants," privately
owned).
There were several consequences to the crisis in the
industrial base of the development towns:
a. The most severe and immediate one was an increasing rate
of emigration from the towns, especially among the young
couples and ex-soldiers.
b. Increasing rate of unemployment, especially among the
young generation due to their unwillingness to take boring
and unchallenging jobs in the old plants. The high
expectations they have developed over their "high school"
priod, and their service in the army, have contributed to
this refusal.
c. Due to the atmosphere in which the young adults have
grown up in, and the quality of the education system, they
have graduated with less skills and capabilities. An
employee with twelve years of vocational schooling in Dimona
or Yerucham is not as capable as a similar employee in the
central parts of the country. Moreover, the atmosphere of
dependency has added to the unwillingness to work hard and
to progress and advance while working. The refusal of
ex-soldiers to take available jobs in the successful plants
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belonging to the "new generation" of plants stems from
unwillingness to undertake jobs demanding "high work ethics"
even though these jobs are rewarding in terms of material
benefits and future opportunities.
d. On the industrial side: In its short-sighted policies
to secure employment for the short-run, the government has
helped the survival of inefficient plants which should have
either changed technologically, or closed down
altogether--as happened to some of the heavily supported
plants. The continuous survival of these plants had a
counterproductive effect on the community in the long run,
in particular on the bored and unmotivated work force. This
created a negative image of the community for incoming
industries and discouraged the young generation from
entering the local labor force.
The overall effects of these developments in the
social, welfare and employment spheres was of reinforcing
the "island phenomenon." The gap between the development
towns and the metropolitan areas has widened in terms of
socioeconomic standard of living, and the cultural and
political integration of the communities with the whole
country has slowed down.
An historical analysis of the process that have
taken place since the establishment of the towns and their
industrial base shows clearly that the roots of the problems
were laid a long time ago, in the first period.
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Three "actors" have participated in the process:
the community, the industry, and the government. As was
explained previously, each has its own direction and pace of
development.' The various processes taking place in the
community are the longest and the most difficult to change
(like education, welfare, etc.) compared to processes in
the industrial area. Since the main problems the
communities faced were in the areas of education, welfare
and in related areas, it is therefore complicated and almost
impossible to improve the situation immediately, in the
short run. Therefore, this study, has concentrated on
problems which are located in the interface between the
community and the industry. The latter is easier to
manipulate and change by government policies." The second
part of this chapter will be, therefore, devoted to
conclusions regarding policy implications and suggested
solutions.
8.2. Policy Implications and Sugested Solutions
The previous chapter--on the historical explanation
of the development of the weak economic base of the
development town and its effects-- pointed at the government
4See chapter 6.1--"The Theoretical Background for the
Model."
This actually occurred in these analyzed case-studies,
when changes in policies and political circumstances had
strong effects on the community, but unfortunately, from the
community's point of view, they were counterproductive.
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policies as the crucial factor in the success or failure of
industrialization policies in remote areas. This section
will dwell on the policy implications from this study, and
will suggest some directions for improving the policies.
The following subjects will be discussed:
8.2.1. Population dispersal policies
8.2.2. Industrialization of development and remote
areas
Throughout this chapter, special attention will be given to
the problems stemming from "distance."
8.2.1. Population Dispersal Policies
There have been always a wide range of
justifications which support the goal of population
dispersal, among them: political, geographical, economic,
security and environmental goals. Whenever one of them
diminished in importance, there was another one to replace
it in priority. The outcome of the existence of an umbrella
of justifications was the validity continuously given to the
goal. The changes in justifications have only dictated the
policy tools and instruments used, and the priority given to
the various regions.
So long as the goal is valid, the instruments and
the policy tools used to implement the objective may vary.
They can range from incentives to encourage development of
preferred areas like directing new immigrants, provision of
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public housing, industrialization and employment and
personal incentives to restrictive measures to curb the
growth in the central parts of the country.
However, regardless of the type of justification,
the policy instruments used to achieve the goal of
population dispersal have to secure the welfare of each
individual in the community.
When extreme modes of policy tools are ignored
like--forcing people to settle in remote areas as it exists
in some totalitarian countries, or directing immigrants
without much choice to preferred areas, as has happened in
the initial stages of the Israeli statehood--this study
supports strongly the view that the only way to assure the
implemention of the objective, i.e., that people will
voluntarily reside and stay in the development areas will be
when the individual's welfare will exceed his welfare in the
metropolitan areas and the transfer costs to these places.
Dispersion of population is inherently contradictory
to welfare. Human beings tend to concentrate and strive to
be in the center (physical, social, political, cultural,
etc.). Any policy which removes them from the center should
compensate them for the loss in their personal welfare.
This assumption stands at the core of this study.
Population dispersal policies have to overcome the
various types of distance in order to eliminate the feelings
of isolation and seclusion which are part of the welfare of
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each individual. Failing to do so, as the study suggests,
may resulte in a wide range of reactions by the residents
from changing jobs to emigration from the town.
The study recognizes (and the model presents) three
types of "distance:"
a. Physical distance
b. Accessible distance
c. Mental distance
The three were put in some order of rank, according
to the difficulty of implementing policies to overcome the
specific type of "distance." There exists a "basket" of
tools and policy instruments to overcome these distances:
a. Physical distance--this is the most "simple" distance.
The physical distance is determined by the actual decision
to locate the town in a specific place. There are two ways
to overcome the physical distance: one, is to relocate the
town, if desired by the government and if feasible, closer
to the center--the metropolitan area, and the second, is to
increase accessibility by various means (see next
paragraph).
b. Accessible distance--The term "accessible distance"
defines all the means which help to "decrease" the physical
distance. These include on one hand, roads, railways,
airports--the infrastructure needed for transportation and
the communication system's infrastructure, especially the
telephone networks. On the other hand, these include the
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frequency of public transportation, rate of private cars per
person, and the actual use of telephones. The "accessible
distance" found to be a crucial factor in decreasing
distance and strengthening the perception of being closer to
the center. It should be noted that while the
infrastructure part of the "accessible" distance is highly
dependent on the rank of national priority given to the
place, and hence government policies which dictate the
amount of resources invested in infrastructure. The second
part--the means themselves are correlated with the
socioeconomic standard of living of the residents of the
towns. As the standard of living rises and the economic
condition of the residents is upgraded the rates of private
cars, telephones, radio and television sets in the community
increase and accessibility improves. The distinction
between the "public" and the "private" parts of the
accessibility notion is found to be important from another
angle as well; the "private" part indicates the degree of
independence the residents of the towns have. When the
rates of public transportation and communication systems are
increased it enables people to feel less dependent and
unconfined to public and government bodies to decide for
them where to find jobs or how often they can reach the
physical center. On the other hand, as "public"
accessibility increases, it strengthens the dependence on
governmental and public agencies, the feelings of isolation
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and seclusion deepen and the "island phenomenon" is
reinforced.
In the context of this study, accessibility is one
of the crucial factors when industrialization is considered.
Low rate of accessibility has its effects on the plants and
on employment. Difficulties in proper operation of the
plants stems from distance from the center of marketing, raw
material market, pool of skilled and managerial labor force,
etc. Better roads and communication systems will
undoubtedly improve the situation for some types of plants.
But there are plants which belong to industrial branches
like electronics, computers and others in the research and
development stage which have to be located in the center
itself, and any distance may interfere with the proper and
successful operation of the plants. At this stage of the
country's development, and especially the development of the
Negev region, none of this kind of plant can be located in
the region.
In both cases--the community and the industry--the
government can increase accessibility by improving roads and
railways, and in extreme cases build airports. It should
also improve communication's infrastructure. Telephone
should be perceived as an essential necessity for each one
in the remote areas.
c. Mental distance--The less tangible distance is the
mental distance. This type of distance is found to have a
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strong impact on the viability of the community and on the
succes of the plants. It is derived from the rate of
accessibility as it is described by the "accessible
distance," but some other factors contribute to the creation
of it. Among the other factors the most important one is
the subjective feeling of being remote and secluded. This
feeling does not have to be a product of a physical
distance, but rather a consequence of being removed from
social, political or cultural centers.
Development towns have been removed since their
establishment from social, political and cultural centers,
and the only relationship has been their dependence on these
centers. Only for the last few years the situation has been
changing slowly, especially in the political sphere. Nuclei
of local political groups have been developed. There are
more mayors of towns among the local residents, and more
representatives of the towns in the various political
institutions in the national level, including the Knesset,
the Israel parliament.
In addition to social and political remoteness, the
socioeconomic differences between the towns and the
metropolitan areas have intensified the feelings of
isolation and seclusion and contributed to the creation of
the "island phenomenon." The actual existence of the mental
distance and the "island phenomenon" can be observed also
among residents of development towns closer (physically) to
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the metropolitan areas. The proximity solely does not
compensate for the remoteness felt in other spheres.
The importance of "belonging" to social, political
or cultural networks, rather than the proximity itself can
explain why some other forms of settlements, like a Kibbutz,
located in a remote area can exist and function successfully
inspite of its physical remoteness. In the case of the
Kibbutz, being part of a national network of Kibbutzim, and
feeling part of the cultural and social network diminishes
the effects of the distance, in addition to the lack of
socioeconomic differences between the residents of the
Kibbutz and the metropolitan area. Moreover, the higher
socioeconomic status and educational level of the Kibbutz's
settlers enable them to participate in various country-wide
social and cultural networks which further eliminate the
impacts of "distance."
The common reaction, by the residents to the state
of "island phenomenon," is a search for a way to decrease
the various types of distance. The easiest way is to
decrease the physical distance, and some choose, therefore,
to emigrate to the metropolitan areas. Those who cannot
afford it try to change jobs. (This issue will be discussed
in paragraph 8.2.2.) Does emigration help in improving the
situation? Does the attempt to reduce physical distance
solely elimate the "island phenomenon"? Emigration to slums
and run-down neighborhoods close to the big cities may help
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in improving at least the feelings of isolation by being
closer to the center, although it may imply lower quality of
cultural and educational systems and worse housing
conditions. Moreover, the physical proximity to the
metropolitan areas itself may increase jealousy and social
pressure (the same way as the exposure to the life in the
metropolitan area through the service in the army or the
television affect the residents of the development towns).
In the scope of this study it is impossible to compare the
quality of life in the slums of the metropolitan areas and
the development towns, but it is clear that living in the
metropolitan areas gives more hopes regarding future chances
and opportunities due to the physical proximity to the
center, even though these hopes may be'Ofound to be elusive.
The development towns were created as "islands" due
to historical developments and circumstances, but this
situation has been reinforced partially because of
inadequate governmental policies regarding distance
Adequate governmental policies should distinguish
among the various types of distances as they affect the
communities of the remote areas.
Except for improving accessibility to decrease the
"physical" distance, "mental" distance can be decreased by
strengthening local nuclei of political, social and cultural
powers through cultural and educational activities, and by
encouraging connections to country-wide networks and
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organizatons.'
8.2.2. Industrialization of Development Towns and Remote
Areas
Securing the personal welfare of each individual was
found to be one of the most important factors in the success
of dispersal policies. Adequate employment--employment
which provides decent salaries and job satisfaction--is an
integral part of this welfare. Since the two towns in these
case studies, Yerucham and Dimona, are quite isolated from
any rural hinterland, the major source of employment they
could rely on was industry. Due to the remoteness of the
towns, and the materialistic and mental benefits adequate
jobs can provide, the importance of the suitability of the
industry to the community cannot be underestimated.
Industrialization policies are easier to implement
compared to welfare or'education policies. Moreover, their
impact can be felt in the short run. Successful
industrialization policies will benefit the employees as
well as the whole town, and actually the whole economy.
This chapter will analyze and discuss the policy
implications of this study pertinent to industrialization
and employment in remote areas. The main issues will be:
a. Technological change and quality of working life.
6There is no doubt that extensive welfare and educational
activities should be continued to further helping in
integrating the comunities in the development towns with the
rest of the country, but this issue is beyond the scope of
this study.
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b. Industrialization policies for remote areas.
- The timing of the industrial support
- Regional plants and local plants
- Employment policies
- Entrepreneurship and management
Industrializatrion policies in remote areas encounter
the same difficulty, population dispersal policies, in
general, -encounter--overcoming the natural tendency of most
of the industrial plants to concentrate in the central parts
of the country. Excluding cases of industries with
locational requirements--mainly the industries which are
based on quarries and chemical raw materials--most of the
plants prefer to benefit from the advantages the center
provides in terms of qualified labor force, proximity to
technical, financial and managerial services, etc. Various
industrialization programs are formulated to help plants,
located in remote areas, to overcome distance and to
compensate for locational disadvantage.
Without any policies aimed at changing industrial
location, in national perspective, industries filter down
through the system of locations, from places of greater to
lesser industiral sophistication.
Most often the highest skills are needed in the
difficult, early stage of mastering a new process,
and skill requirements decline steadily as the
production process is rationalized and routinized
with experience. As the industry slides down the
learning curve, the high wage rates of the more
industrially sophisticated innovating areas become
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superfluous. The aging industry seeks out
industrial backwaters where the cheaper labor is
now up to the lesser demands of the simplified
process. (Thompson, 1969, p. 8)
And it is of course small towns and rural areas that
constitute the lowest rung of the filtering process.
This was the case of most of the industrial plants
(textile and glass) which were attracted to the development
towns, due to massive governmental subsidies and the
abundance of low skilled, low paid labor force. Over the
years, the quality of the labor force has improved, and it
was not a cheap labor force anymore. According to the
theories, at that moment, the plant had to either move to a
location with cheaper labor force (as happened in a few
cases in which plants moved to Arab neighborhoods), to find
cheaper labor force in the region (as happened to the big
textile plants, hiring workers from the West Bank), or to
close down altogether. Since the latter option was rejected
by the government due to the threat of massive unemployment,
the plants continued to operate inefficiently. The main
problem faced, therefore, by the implementers of the
industrialization policies is: how to change gradually the
nature of the industrial structure in order to make it
suitable to the changing needs of the community and its
changing character (the dynamic factor) and to prevent
emigration of both residents and plants to the central parts
of the country?
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This question emphasizes the importance of the
adequate modification of the industrial structure either on
the micro-level--the level of a single plant (as was done by
several successful plants like "Negev Ceramics," or recently
by the textile plants), or on the macro-level--the level of
the whole industrial structure of the community and the
region, or on both levels.
Modifications on the micro level pertinent to
changes in technology, while those in the macro level
pertinent to modifications in the types of plants, i.e.,
prolonged coexistence and cohabitation of modern, advanced
industry and of "first generation" industries. The second
type of changes do not exclude simultaneously changes of the
first type in the "first generation" plants.
Those two types of changes relate also to the
different segments of the labor force. While the first type
is relevant more to the older segments of the labor force
(males, heads of families, older women), the second one is
relevant to the next generation--the discharged soldiers,
young women, and in order to attract new groups of
population to the development town.
When analyzing the issue of "suitable industry," one
should distinguish between the various target groups for
whom the industrial base is intended. Different industrial
bases will be planned for the existing labor force, compared
to the one planned to attract new groups of residents. From
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this study it is quite clear that industrial development
should be done gradually to meet the changing needs of the
existing segments of the labor force, and to prevent
unemployment. Leaping development, i.e., development of
advancedand high technology, will not serve the existing
segments of the labor force, and may provide employment to
residents of other neighboring communities (the "green field
plant"). Moreover, it is not clear if this industrial base
will attract new residents.
The advancement of the existing residents rather
than the attraction of new groups was preferred by many of
the politicians, administrators, and the residents of the
two towns.
The two types of modifications, i.e., technological
change and comprehensive industrial change, imply two
differenct kinds of policy recommendations:
a. Technological change and quality of working life
(Q.W.L.).
The selection of technology and the process of
adjusting it to the local labor force is found to be of
great importance throughout this study. The type of
technology and its suitability has a stronger impact on
non-metropolitan industries, compared to its impact on
metropolitan ones, since it was found that adequate
employment is perceived as a means to advance and almost as
a life style.
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The notion of "appropriate technology" fits very
well the type of technologies which should be adopted. The
"appropriate technology" method attempts to recognize the
potential of a particular community and tries to help it to
develop in a gradual way. This development is based on
local resources and progressively builds up the skills of
the community. One of its aims is to improve the quality of
life of the people (see chapter 6.1).
Few of the plants in these two case studies is found
to have "appropriate technologies," among them the regional
chemical plants, and some of the "new generation" ones. The
rest should go through major changes in order to suit the
needs of the existing labor force, and to conbtribute to the
employees' Q.W.L.
It is more difficult to implement new technologies
in existing plants rather than to build new plants with
appropriate technologies, but as one of the managers of the
"old generation" type of plant claims:
In an existing plant, if there is a reasonable
chance that the industry can be made competitive,
the plant has to go through technological change.
Machines and robots have to replace the manual
jobs done by employees today. The plant has to be
adjusted to the existing labor force, by
introducing more automation and control to
compensate for the low quality of the labor force.
The automation will also improve the negative
image of the plants belonging to the "first
generation." The plant's owner should subsidize a
change rather than losses.
7 The manager of "Foenicia" in an interview.
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Experts in the area of human engineering, industrial
psychology and organizational behavior should be more
involved in the reorganization of the plants in order to
diversify the range of jobs and to secure opportunities for
advancement in the plant (job ladders).
In the case of new industrial plants they should be
selected carefully according to the suitability of the
technologies to the capabilities of the local residents.
They should have diversified jobs in each plant and
opportunities for upward mobility.
Among the characteristics of the "appropriate
technology" there are two important characteristics which
relate to each other: the optimal size of a plant for
remote areas, and the appropriate capital/labor ratio. Both
are highly dependent on the objectives of
industrialization.'
A clear indication for the optimal size of a plant
was not found in this study. In contrast to studies' which
suggested optimal size to achieve the goal--mainly,
increasing the number of the employed, this study found that
size is important only to the extent that it determines or
'For a discussion on the objectives of industrialization
and the characteristics of the plants, see chapter 6.1.
'See Berler (1970), Kipnis (1976), Spiegel (1966).
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has an impact on the quality of working life in the plant
(Q.W.L.). It was found that there are very small plants and
services (like "Brand Metal") as well as big plants (like
the "Dead Sea Works") which have high Q.W.L. It is the
technology which determines the Q.W.L. rathr than the size
itself. Size should be considered to some extent when the
issue of regional versus local plants is discussed (see next
paragraph). Size is important in the first stages of
industrialization when a critical mass of plants should be
established to create a viable industrial infrastructure
which will attract residents to the localities, rather than
the other way around (establishing first the place, and
providing employment later on). But, as was found the
technology and the Q.W.L. in the plants for the long range
are more important for a successful industrialization
process.
In theory the appropriate capital/labor ratio in the
plants in remote areas depends also upon the objectives of
the industrialization policies, and mainly upon the policies
implemented to encourage the process. The availability of
the supply of capital and labor in the specific location is
a factor which should not be underestimated in its
importance. The ratio of capital to labor determines the
technology chosen, the size of the plant and other
characteristics.
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In the case studies of Yerucham and Dimona, no clear
indication was found to indicate the appropriate
capital/labor ratio. Some capital intensive plants were
found to be very suitable, like the "Dead Sea Works" or
among the new generation--"Long John," and some
labor-intensive plants were suitable in the first stages of
industrialization. This ratio should be judged therefore
according to the objectives of industrialization with
consideration regarding the quality of working life in the
plants.
This study has shown already that plants which
employed masses of people, and probably increased the rate
of employment in the town, in the long run did not
contribute to the community and actually were
counterproductive. The same was true for capital intensive
plants, which due to their high technology served the region
rather than the locality they were intended to serve.
In order to assure appropriate technology and
adequate Q.W.L., new plants should be accompanied throughout
the first stages of development by experts.
Research institutes should be encouraged to help in
finding suitable products and technologies for the
development towns.
In the industrial sector of the Kibbutz, efforts are
channeled into finding and especially adapting suitable
technologies to 'the Kibbutz. The Kibbutz and the
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development town, as some sort of Moshavim (collective
settlements), share similar characteristics regarding
industrialization. In most cases they are located in
non-metropolitan areas, and all three of them are
constrained by the size of the available labor force. The
Kibbutz and some types of Moshavim are constrained also by
ideological restrictions, for example they refrain from
hiring outside workers.
Regarding the Q.W.L. in the plants and the awareness
of its importance it should be noted that in 1979, a
collective agreement was signed between the labor union and
the chamber of commerce for coordination among the economic
organizations to improve the Q.W.L. in Israel. Except for
this agreement there was not any other intiative to improve
the Q.W.L. and this agreement was not found to be effective
at all. The number of applications of the policy to improve
the Q.W.L. was small. Most of the attempts to change the
content of the jobs, to alter the managerial tasks in order
to increase involvement in work organizations were
implemented in the Kibbutz. Generally, improving the Q.W.L.
is perceived in Israel by the industrial plants as improving
the quality of the physical environment or enriching welfare
services in the plant.
b. Industrialization policies for remote areas.
There is a wide range of issues relevant to the
appropriate industrialization process. This chapter will
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highlight the most important factors which emerged from the
study:
- The timing of the industrial support
The nature of this study and its scope do not allow
for a thorough analysis of the incentives system over the
years. Nevertheless, it was found that the timing of the
support, and especially determining the period in which the
support has to be discontinued, has a crucial impact on the
success of the plants.
It was found that high and prolonged protection
retarded the develpment of the plants in the development
areas. Inefficient firms were permitted to survive, and
sectors receiving high incentives tended to show the least
improvement in productivity. This was true mainly with the
"first generation" plants. On the other hand, plants which
belonged to the "new generation" were caught, in their first
stages of development, by strong changes in the support
system--from a high protection to a low protection--which
added to the difficulties they have faced already as plants
in remote areas.
The transformation towards encouraging the exporting
sector, and decreasing protection in general is a positive
change for the whole economy in general, but for those
plants and places which did not get to the "take off" point,
an abrupt change was found to be disadvantageous.
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Another issue which is connected to the timing of
the support is a continuous professional follow-up. There
is a heavy involvement by the Ministry of Commerce and
Industry and other governmental bodies (the local employment
agency, etc.), in the first stages of development, but
further developments, including the pace and the direction
of development are not carefully scrutinized. There is a
follow up regarding the financial situation of the plant
(due to some tax concessions for five years) but there is
not any follow up regarding the employment situation,
adaptation to technology, quality of working life, etc.
- Regional plants and local plants
One of the underlying assumptions of dividing the
country into regions and towns differing in the priority
given to their development and hence in the amount of
subsidies and support, was that plants closer to the
development town will be more beneficial to the specific
place and will help in achieving the dispersion goal. This
assumption is found to be erroneous in the regional reality.
It was found that some plants, inspite of being located
closer to the town were actually regional plants in the
sense that due to their technology (too high or too low for
the specific town), they have served the whole region. On
the other hand, some regional plants do not serve the
residents of the whole region mainly due to transportation
and accessibility problems.
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The issue of the target group: "Who will benefit
from regional or local plant" is crucial for implementing
and evaluating industrialization policies. The specific
target group has to be defined, i.e., "It is beneficial for
the individual? the community? the region? the country?" If
the assumption--that the welfare of the individual and the
community is the most important factor to secure dispersion
of population is valid--a combination of regional and local
plants will benefit the community and its individuals. This
will be achieved under several conditions: First, a
distinction should be made between the segments of the labor
force. Regional plants will serve better the males, heads
of families and the ex-soldiers while local plants which are
more accessible will serve appropriately the women and the
elderly. Second, there is no doubt that regional plants
usually enjoy better advantages compared to the local ones.
They have advantages of size, i.e., services, broader labor
market, better managers, etc., as well as locational
advantages. As such, the employees benefit from a broad
variety of opportunities in employment, wages, achievement,
etc. But these opportunities should be available to the
whole region and all localities. An accessible
transportation system should be available to all the
population groups, including those from settlements with
lower socioeconomic status and lower rates of public and
private transportation. In order to eliminate the "island
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phenomenon" it is important that every resident will be free
to choose his/her place of work, rather than administration
and policy constraints preventing this freedom.
It is important that the labor market be free to
accept new employees and to enable others to leave. This
may yield optimization of the labor market, nevertheless,
there exists always the danger in the region that some
places will "export" unskilled and semiskilled workers,
while other will provide the skilled and managerial labor
force. Such a situation will not benefit much the places
with the lower socioeconomic status, and their residents may
find themselves the first to be fired in recession periods
(Bar-El and Don, 1972, p. 235). There is therefore a danger
of stratification of settlements according to their
occupational status. Nevertheless, the advantages of
regional plants may outweigh this disadvantage with adequate
policies.
Third, local plants, smaller in scale, should be
encouraged to serve the special needs of those groups which
do not want to commute, i.e., women and the elderly. Small
plants may use appropriate technologies to suit the special
needs of these groups and to help them to advance. These
kinds of plants will help to create identification with the
place and satisfaction.
Towns like Yerucham and Dimona, which do not enjoy
any locational advantage, and even governmental subsidies do
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not compensate for the locational disadvantages, should
aspire to have in the region a well balanced mix of regional
and local plants. But more important they should aspire to
improve the socioeconomic status of their communities so
that they will be able to benefit from the industrial mix
the same way as the other communities in the region do.
-Employment policies
The individual and the community were in the center
of the analysis throughout this study. Therefore special
attention will be given to employment policies.
The many difficulties faced by employers as well as
employees in the development areas, added to the aggravating
circumstances under which the "island phenomenon" continued
to exist. Adequate employment in terms of payments and
Q.W.L. was found to have a crucial impact on eliminating the
"island phenomenon." Moreover, job dissatisfaction was
found to be a major impetus for emigration.
Similar to the case in Israel, in many developing
countries, government policies lower the cost of capital
with measures that increase the cost of labor to the firm.
High social charges, together with minimum wage legislation
and particular severence pay regulations may discourage
increased employment in the modern industrial sector. The
consequence of these policies is a bias against labor.
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Most of the support subsidizes the capital while
labor gets only marginal support. In a study conducted in
the U.S.A. on business incentives, it was found (Harrison
and Kantor, 1978):
The jobs in those industries which most closely
approximate the competitive ideal type will in
general pay lower wages, offer worse (and less
amply, capitalized) working conditions, provide
less stable (full year and/or full week)
employment, and make it more difficult for labor
to organize in order to protect its class
interests.1*
There are several employment issues which deserve
special attention and policy modifications. Some of them
are general, and applicable to the whole country, some are
unique to the two development towns and the region.
One of the main problems faced by the industrial
sector in the whole country is the low image attributed to
industrial jobs in general, and to production jobs in
particular. High school students evaluated the work in the
industry as: paying low salaries, having low status, the
jobs are boring, there is not much independence, the
physical conditions are uncomfortable and ugly. On the
other hand the expectations and the needs created by the
education system were probably difficult to meet by the work
in the industrial sector. Moreover, among ex-soldiers it
was found that industry's image is becoming more negative
0In Israel, most of the labor is organized except for a
few plants and the Arab labor force from the West Bank and
Gaza Strip.
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with the increase in the education level of the ex-soldiers,
and that these soldiers were looking for "interesting jobs"
as a prerequisite of working in the industry more than good
"salaries" (The Institute for Labor Productivity, 1981).
In the country in general, and especially in the
metropolitan areas, there is a new generation of plants in
electronics, computer science, and other high technology
sectors which can fulfill the needs and expectations of some
segments of the labor force, however they are totally absent
in the development towns.
It is recommended, therefore, on one hand to gear
the education system in the developing areas more towards
"blue collar" expectations rather than "white collar" ones,
and on the other hand to encourage development of
sophisticated and "clean" industries, with high Q.W.L.
Stronger connections between the plants and the future
employees and proper promotional activities may improve the
image of the industry.
Another problem is the unemployment benefits which
discourage many of the unemployed, especially among the
released soldiers, from entering the labor market since the
payments were almost equal to the payments in some of the
plants (especially in the textile plants).
It is therefore recommended that unemployment
payments be significantly lower than the payments in the
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industry but accompanied by adequate training courses and
on-the-job training to encourage the unemployed to take part
in the industrial work.
The last issue raises the problem of the level of
wages and salaries in the industrial sector. Due to the low
salaries in this sector, people are reluctant to take
industrial jobs. The residents of development towns get
seven percent exemption on their taxes, but it does not seem
to be attractive enough. It is recommended that the level
of wages be increased either by incresing the exemption on
taxes or by reducing other payments (like social security).
The work in development areas may become more attractive to
their residents as well as to outside workers, especially
among skilled and professional employees needed in these
areas.
This may ease the problem of shortage in managerial
and professional labor force.
The unique problems which characterize the two towns
are: the quality of the current labor force--which is the
result of continuous existence of obsolete plants and
government policies--the competition with regional plants on
the "cream" of the labor force, and the inadequacy of the
vocational education system in the area.
It is quite difficult to improve the quality of the
current labor force which consists mainly of older males,
who have been already employed for ten and twenty years. It
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is more difficult to change atmosphere and attitude towards
work. Nevertheless, it is recommended changing the
technology in the existing plants (if there is a reasonable
chance that the industry can be made competitive), and to
adapt the technology to the skills and capabilities of the
current employees. This means more machines and robots to
replace the manual jobs done by employees today. Less
control should be left for the workers who are incapable of
taking responsibility, and more automation should be
implemented.
The quality of working life in the plant should be
improved, starting with the physical conditions through
diversifying the job opportunities to increasing the
involvement of the workers in the plants.
In a study conducted in 1964 (Berler, 1964), it was
already found that Dimona--among other towns--had relatively
less vocational education facilities compared to other
towns. In addition, this study found that the system did
not operate in accordance with the needs of the industrial
plants and graduates found themselves without suitable jobs
in the towns. There should be more coordination between the
industrial sector in the towns and the region and the
vocational education system.
- Entrepreneurship and management
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Behind most of the successful and viable plants, one
may find active entrepreneurs but more important, good
managers. The significance of good managerial staff cannot
be underestimated.
Lack of entrepreneurship and competent management
are problems faced by the whole Israeli industrial sector,
but they are more severe in the development areas, in which
they are scarce and when available they have the following
disadvantages: First, most of the managers are "outsiders,"
people who commute everyday to the towns, this, increases-
the dependence of the communities on the "outside" world.
Second, many of them are young and inexperienced who see in
their work in the development towns a "spring board" to
better jobs in the metropolitan areas.
Until local entrepreneurship and management systems
are developed, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry should
direct entrepreneurs to the towns after conducting market
research and consulting regarding the suitable industrial
branches.
Local entrepreneurship and management should be
encouraged. It was found that enterprises established and
managed by local residents have a better chance to succeed.
This will also contribute to decreasing dependency.
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8.3. Conclusions and Suggestions for Further Research
Has the population dispersal goal been achieved?
Could it be achieved by implementing different policies?
What were the results and consequences of the policy?
The first question is out of the scope of this
study. The study has concentrated on implementation, on the
ways and tools used, and mainly on the consequences of one
type of policies--the industrialization policies.
Based on this study, it is suggested that the
critical error commited by the politicians and the
implementors of the population dispersal policies was in
their short-sighted perception of the meaning of the goal.
Instead of adapting a comprehensive perception of the whole
system--the national economic, social and educational
systems, the policies have been narrowed down to places, and
economic and social development programs have been replaced
by welfare, almost charity programs.
The government should have implemented a broader
policy of development of social, physical and economic
infrastructures, so that the places themselves will attract
the desirable population, instead, they have concentrated on
tax incentives for the individual and the plants. Improved
roads not only change the subjective feelings of the local
residents, they have an impact on the type and quality of
incoming residents.
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In 1952 an economic advisor to the
government--Professor Tron, who had extensive experience in
economic and development projects in the developing
countries, suggested that most of the money received from
the German government be invested in infrastructure:
If the aim is to industrialize the country, and to
create an independent country, the first step is
to invest in cheap and efficient transportation
systems, cheap electricity, water systems and in
developing skilled human capital (labor force).
Such an infrastructure will attract industrial
capital by its own mertis. If the country will
not use the money this way, this may be the last
chance to become independent. (Zohar, 1974)
Professor Tron suggested that all of the resources be
invested in a single comprehensive development program
rather than separate programs for each government
department. Inspite of the general approval of the program
by all high-rank officials, the program has never been
implemented. In 1953, Professor Tron resigned and left the
country.
From the analysis of the implementation policies it
is quite obvious that a mixture of time pressure, ignorance,
lack of experience, shortage in resources or political
considerations coincided to create what is termed today as
"failure of the policy." Moreover, there are always some
unforeseen circumstances like the "Six Day War," the "Yom
Kippur War," other pressing economic problems like balance
of payments and the oil crisis, and especially political
changes which may interfere even with the best development
program.
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In a way, the policy was bound to fail. Altman and
Rosenbaum suggest: "The use of development towns for
example, illustrates how ideology offers goals but not
entirely adequate means of implementation, while in the case
of rural settlements, both ideology and means were provided"
(Altman and Rosenbaum, 1973).
The situation from the onset was less favorable for
proceeding in the right direction. There were failures in
the location of several of the development towns, but also
the various attempts to reverse the situation were not
adequate, i.e., there was misunderstanding regarding the
processes and their long-range consequences and the policies
implemented were not adequate including the industrial
policies. Nevertheless, it will be extremeley difficult to
prove that the government did not care or had any interest
in keeping the situation as it is.
When the administration began to realize what was
happening, they have changed policies. The new direction in
estalishing and populating the towns of Arad and Carmiel are
examples of such a change. Moreover, today the development
of new areas is based on providing well developed
infrastructures for the settlers, while the latter are free
and independent to build their own homes and plants.
These new policies have not solved the problems
faced by the existing development towns, and changes in
circumstances further hinder their chances to recover.
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One final remark should be made regarding the two
case studies, Yerucham and Dimona. These two towns are
quite different in their historical development, and degree
of success. Dimona is considered to be one of the most
successful development towns, while Yerucham is considered
to be one of the least successful. Nevertheless, the
processes and the circumstances experienced by Yerucham
earlier, due to its weakness, have been experienced by
Dimona and other successful towns in recent years, and this
should signal a warning to the policy makers.
There are several issues which should be further
analyzed and studied in order to improve the
industrialization polic.ies and make them more effective.
a. The suitability of the industry to the community should
be studies on a larger scale, i.e., all the industrial towns
in Israel should be studied in the same way the cases of
Yerucham and Dimona were analyzed. A study of a larger
sample of development towns with different backgrounds, in
various locations and in different stages of development may
give more adequate answers to issues like: suitability and
stage of development, economic and industrial connections
between the town and the region, etc.
b. The issue of the impact of the various levels of
"distance" on remote settlements should be studied
thoroughly. The various levels of distance are found to
have a crucial effect on the success of the population
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dispersal policies. Ways to reduce their impact should be
found, as well as means to integrate the remote settlements
with the rest of the country, and to eliminate situations
like the "island phenomenon."
c. To what extent has a "dual employment market" been
developing in Israel? Is there a process of segmentation in
the labor force? (According to race--Jewish and Arabs?
According to country of origin--Ashkenazim and Spharadim? or
according to sex?). Segmentation of the labor market is a
dangerous process which should be eliminated by regulations
and adequate policies.
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